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FRACKING AND GOLDILOCKS FEDERALISM: THE TOO LOUD, TOO QUIET AND 
JUST RIGHT POLITICS OF STATES AND CITIES 
 
Wicked environmental and energy challenges often originate where energy, the 
environment and economics intersect (Rittel and Webber 1973). Fracking is one such example. 
As a practice, it has prompted a certain amount of political debate at both the state and municipal 
levels. Proponents argue that natural gas extraction reates well-paying jobs, helps grow and 
revive stagnant economies and that it provides a ‘cle ner’ burning energy source. Its opponents 
counter that the technique produces a number of environmental harms such as air pollution, 
surface and groundwater contamination, places new demands on infrastructure and causes 
geological instability (Davis 2012).  
Ranging from intergovernmental battles to cooperative relationships, the politics of 
fracking are reshaping the relations between neighborhoods, city hall and the statehouse. To 
explore the ‘second order’ dynamics of fracking, this dissertation asks several interrelated 
questions. What are the state and local institutions, rules and informal norms governing state-
municipal relationships when it comes to hydraulic fracturing? To what extent do municipalities 
regulate fracking and what are the types of city-leve  regulation? Finally, why are some cities 
willing to pass land use policies that challenge their state’s natural gas extraction goals and 
preemptive authority and others are not?  
To answer the questions above, I consider the second order dynamics in the context of 
Colorado, Texas and Ohio and a sample of cities in ach state. Each state has a high number of 
citizens living near gas wells, but offers cities and towns varying degrees of land use authority. 
iii 
To elucidate their second-order relationships and dynamics, each chapter tests potential 
explanatory variables originating from studies of environmental policy, democratic theory and 
urban governance. Results suggest that both macro level (environmentalism and mobilization) 
and micro level concerns (percentage of owner occupied homes and median home values) can 
affect second order relations and the willingness of local communities to exert more municipal 
autonomy and challenge their state. My findings offer a more complete picture of second order 
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Chapter 1  
Fracking and Goldilocks Federalism: The Too Loud, Too Soft and Just Right Politics of States 
and Cities? 
 
How states and municipal governments govern natural resources is an important 
intergovernmental question and one that has profound implications for environmental quality, 
economic development, public safety and federalism. Their shifting relationships, or second 
order federalism/devolution, reflects the evolving application of formal 
statutes/ordinances/police powers, the dynamic nature of political contests, the rhetorical and 
legal strategies employed by intergovernmental actors and the informal norms and operating 
procedures that influence institutional behaviors and goals. Second order relationships and 
outcomes are also diverse. They may be positive and collaborative, or beset by inter-
organizational and intra-organizational conflict. Extant research has identified these dynamics in 
foreign policy, welfare reform and fiscal federalism and enforcement of the Clean Air Act. 
Noticeably absent, however, are projects addressing natural resource governance and hydraulic 
fracking.1  
The picture of second order relationships is incomplete. First, fracking is considerably 
different than the topics traditionally studied by second order scholars. The practice generates 
real, unpredictable and tangible costs and benefits to state and city governments. Effects are not 
uniform and are location-specific. Some cities experience significant, dangerous and widespread 
quality of life disruptions via spills, accidents and the presence of new industrial development in 
residential neighborhoods and near schools. Communities also do not receive benefits equally. 
Job growth and rising home values due to extraction can only take place in specific locales. 
Applicable state structures, the municipal governmet’s historical experiences, its expertise, 
access to information and its environmental and economic goals further shape fracking’s real and 
                                                   
1 Especially the state-local working relationships that have governed hydraulic fracturing since 2008. 
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perceived costs. The unequal distribution of costs/ri ks, capacities, receptiveness and benefits 
add another layer of complication that likely contributes to episodes of second order conflict, 
avoidance and cooperation. Each relationship ‘type’ s aks to the complexities of contemporary 
intergovernmental environmental management.  
What follows in this chapter is a broad overview of fracking’s politics in the second-order 
context. It begins with an introduction of the legal principles that govern the relationship 
between states and local governments: Dillon’s Rule, th  Cooley Doctrine and the legal space in 
between (Hodos 2009). It then pivots to an overview of fracking. Particular attention is paid to 
where this activity is occurring and the locations f future development, its frequently cited 
justifications and benefits and the most prevalent critiques. The chapter then takes a sharp turn 
towards applicable national, state and local regulations that address natural gas extraction and 
development. It concludes by addressing state-local rel tionship drivers in selected states. As 
will be explicated throughout, state and city relationships exist within a web of applicable and 
often ambiguous state laws and state organizational structures, but also locally centered concerns 
related to water supply and quality, air pollution, infrastructure, public safety and residents’ 
quality of life and a nascent but powerful notion of c mmunity rights.   
Problem Background  
 
The federal-state-local system is inherently intergovernmental (Zimmerman 1995; 
Walker 1995). The participation of state and local governments in environmental policy 
implementation, however, is relatively recent. Beginning in the 1980s, many federal 
environmental regulatory regimes shifted power from Washington D.C. to the various 
statehouses and city halls across the country (Kenney 1999; Scheberle 2004). This represented a 
change from a top-down and hierarchical system, which according to critics, stifled innovation, 
3 
drove up transaction costs and failed to effectively address emerging environmental issues 
(Fiorino 2001, 2006; Klyza and Sousa 2007). Devoluti n supporters argued that new actors, 
including city and county governments, were better positioned to address stubborn 
environmental problems like climate change, biodiversity and non-point sources of pollution 
(Fiorino 2006). Advocates also insisted that by transforming the respective roles of the private 
and public sectors, new organizational paradigms could better manage the complex and cross-
jurisdictional reality of many environmental issues (Betsill and Rabe 2009; Davis 2014; Krause 
2011; Hempel 2009; Opp and Saunders 2013; Rabe 2006, 10; Stoker 1998; Vig and Kraft 
2009).  
Today, the inclusion of state and local policymakers in environmental protection is 
becoming the preferred method of environmental regulation and policy implementation (Scholz 
and Wang 2006). As sub-national units of governments become more involved, they are 
developing new resources, competencies/skills and levels of technical expertise. Despite the 
overall growth of organizational capacities, city and county entities still vary in their knowledge, 
staffing, willingness/commitment, funding levels, historical experiences, constraints and 
opportunities relative to environmental policy and protection (Rabe 2004, 2006; Betsill and Rabe 
2006). The intergovernmental administration of environmental programs is further complicated 
because many federal laws require the participation, c ordination and organization of multiple 
levels and units of government (McGuire 2006). For some issues and in some states, the reaction 
to growing environmental commitments and responsibilities is cooperative and collaborative 
working second order relationships. In others, mistrust and conflict dominate state-municipal 
interactions and ‘loud’ relationships result.   
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Much like the more frequently studied federal-state connection, state-municipal 
relationships are not immune to conflict and contestation. Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle (2004) argue 
that state-local conflicts are as old as the United States. Recent studies of bottom-up activism 
have found municipalities weighing in on national debates include the U.S. Patriot Act, U.S. 
Policy towards South Africa during Apartheid, U.S. policy towards the Contra rebels, the second 
Iraq War and protests against corporate food (Hobbs 1994; Riverstone-Newell 2012; Shuman 
1992). And, in many of these cases, cities have not hesitated in symbolically criticizing and 
tangibly challenging the policies of higher levels of government.   
The Legal Environment  
 
Municipal activism exists in a murky legal environment. Unlike states and the federal 
government, which both have some constitutionally grounded authority; city governments are 
creations of their states. They typically lack the constitutional and legal authority to force higher 
levels of government to consider their interests and policy preferences. Yet, they are not bereft of 
political tools to promote and protect their interests. Riverstone-Newell (2012) likens them to 
interest groups, who, after failing to successfully bargain and negotiate with state elected or 
regulatory officials, can resort to outsider strategies such as protests, press releases and press 
conferences to assert their preferences. Locals might also opt to use their own authority to pass 
local land use or health and safety ordinances that can facilitate or impede federal and state 
environmental/energy related goals (Berman 2003; Kincaid 1999; Sherman 2011; Wright 1978; 
Zimmerman 1995; 2012).   
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Legal Doctrines: Dillons and Cooley Rule(s) 
 
Through the intergovernmental management and implementation of environmental 
policies substate governments have developed new resources, capacities and levels of technical 
expertise (Berman 2003; Betsill 2001; Krause 2011; Rabe 2006). Despite these developments, 
they still operate in a legal environment established, legislated and oftentimes dominated by the 
state. While states vary in the discretion and autonomy they grant to city and county 
governments, each has retained the authority to determine the power and scope of second order 
relations. States also typically establish the scope of municipal powers and responsibilities 
including the powers to regulate land use (zoning), atural resources, environmental protection 
and public health/safety (Bowman and Kearney 2011).  
Two legal doctrines define the allocation of powers between states and municipal 
governments. Each can be placed on a continuum according to the degree it categorizes 
centralized or decentralized legal power. Dillon’s Rule argues that power is centralized at the 
state level (Bowman and Kearney 2011; Hodos 2009). Under this legal doctrine, cities do not 
have inherent powers and must seek state legislative pproval or authorization before acting. 
Conversely, under the Cooley doctrine, power between state and municipal governments is 
shared and legislative authority is often exercised concurrently. States operating with the latter 
are more likely to imbue their local communities with some inherent powers, especially over 
issues that have local-only impacts and interests (Berman 2003; Bowman and Kearney 2011; 
Krueger and Bernick 2012).  
Judge Dillon in an 1868 case best articulated the theory of state supremacy by declaring: 
“municipal corporations owe their origin to, and deriv  their powers and rights wholly from, the 
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist…as it creates, 
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so it may destroy” (cited by Hodos 2009, 52). This conception of power places the state as 
preeminent and controlling of local units of government. Under this regime, city governments 
may regulate in policy areas only after the State specifically authorizes them to do so. Scholars 
have documented several impacts on municipal operations. City budgets, for example, are under 
the auspices of the state, constraining locals’ ability to raise and collect revenues (Benton et al. 
2007). Dillon’s Rule also places an expensive intergovernmental burden on local governments. 
City officials must expend time and other resources lobbying state lawmakers to approve bills 
that authorize local authority and to reject legislation that restricts this authority. The National 
League of Cities (2013) reported that in a typical year in an average centralized state, cities and 
counties file up to 2,000 special acts, requests and exemptions by and from state government. 
Dillon’s Rule is guiding unless there is a constitutional or specific legal limitation that restricts 
State power. 
Because of Dillon’s inflexibility and rigidity, many local governments pushed for an 
alternative legal relationship with the state, best articulated by the Cooley Doctrine. Under it, 
substate governments enjoy greater “home rule” provisi ns, more autonomy from the state and 
the right ‘to be left alone’ by the state. The framework also expresses an inherent right of local 
self-government and determination, i.e. home rule that is absent in states adhering to Dillon’s 
Rule (Berman 2003). The National League of Cities (2013, NP) defines this right as the 
“delegation of [self-determination] power from the state to its sub-units of governments 
(including counties, municipalities, towns or townships or villages),” often known as home rule. 
In practice, however, municipal powers and authority can be restricted by the State to cities of a 
certain class or size and by field/subject area. The Cooley framework is likely to lead to 
numerous legal challenges and uncertainty as time is n eded to sort out a variety of questions 
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such as what constitutes solely a “state” issue, what is inherently a local one and what is a joint 
“state-local” issue (Berman 2003).   
Dillon’s Rule and Cooley Doctrine in Practice 
 
The Cooley-Dillon dichotomy oversimplifies a complex and shifting set of second order 
relationships. In practice, only 31 of the 39 Dillon’s Rule states apply the rule uniformly.2 The 
remaining states use the rule more selectively based on the size, class, policy, the jurisdictional 
type or the location of the community (Boscarino 2013; Bowman and Kearney 2012; Richardson 
2011). A similar dynamic is evident with Cooley states (Richardson 2011). Thus, to portray 
centralization and decentralization as a political ‘dyad’ fails to account for the rich diversity of 
power allocations between sub-national and local units of government. No state has completely 
centralized decision-making authority nor has any devolved authority completely to its local 
governments. Conversely, all city governments have retained some authority to control their own 
affairs (through both regulatory enactments and strategies of persuasion) and each state has kept 
enough authority to establish boundaries for local a tion (Berman 2003; Bowman and Kearney 
2011; 2012; Krueger and Bernick 2012; Zimmerman 1995; 2012).  
Less formal mechanisms also shape state-local relations. State and city officials interact 
with one another through managerial and stakeholder networks and develop personal and 
working relationships. They also collect and receive information that affect one another albeit 
they attach differing levels of saliency to pieces of information. Finally, each adopts rhetorical 
and political strategies to redefine problems, influence others to set each other’s agendas, to 
establish issue boundaries and to achieve policy goals (Berry 1989; Browne 1996; Heclo 1978; 
Krueger and Bernick 2012; O’Toole 1997; Shipan and Volden 2006).  
                                                   
2 The application of either doctrine is typically established in State Statute or articulated by a State Court decision 




The politics of hydraulic fracturing offer an ideal lens to study state-local environmental 
governance and management for several reasons. First, support and opposition do not fall neatly 
into traditional ideological categories. Davis and Fisk (2014) found that while Democrats more 
inclined to register opposition when compared to Republicans, partisan elites are bucking their 
parties relative to natural gas development and issues related to second order federalism. Despite 
this nascent polarization, Democratic elites, including the governors of Colorado, Wyoming and 
Illinois support the practice. Part of its appeal is that both economic developers and some 
environmentalists view natural gas as a solution to economic malaise and climate change 
(Boudet, Bugden, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Leiserowitz 2014; Davis 2012; Vig and Kraft 2009). 
Third, whether because of inability, obduracy or the lack of legal authority, the federal 
government is not the principal legal and political actor regulating fracking. This void enables 
states and cities substantial policy latitude and creates a political environment conducive to the 
study and evaluation of second order dynamics.  
Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States 
 
According to the Energy Information Administration estimates, the United States holds 
2,119 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of recoverable natur l gas. Of this, 60 percent is unconventional 
gas and trapped in underground shale rock or coal bed formations. Although fracking has been in 
practice for over fifty years, recent advances in horizontal drilling and extraction technology 
have made recovering large amounts of unconventional gas economically feasible. 
Technological advancements, alongside strong price signals and favorable federal policies have 
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led to substantial increases in natural gas production, often in urban and suburban communities, 
mostly via fracking (Lucas 2011).3 
Below is a map of shale plays in the lower 48 state – there are three major regional shale 
plays – the West (Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico), the South (Texas, Louisiana and 
Oklahoma) and the Mid-Atlantic (Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Michigan and Illinois) (EIA 
2009). 
 
Figure 1.1 U.S Shale Plays 
Source: EIA 2009 
 
As an extraction technique, hydraulic fracking is simple. Preparations begin with 
site/well identification and an application for the requisite permits and licenses. Once state 
regulators issue the applicable permits, drilling usually begins (a typical site includes a 10,000 
foot vertical well with attendant horizontal drilling). Next, drillers concoct a high-pressure blend 
of sand, water and a unique chemical cocktail and inject it into shale formations, which fracture 
                                                   
3 Fracking can triple the output of a traditional vertical well and is currently being used to increase production in 
more than 90 percent of all U.S. gas wells (Lucas 2011). 
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and release the trapped gas. While the exact composition and volume is related to the well type, 
geologic formation and ecology, its typical compositi n is approximately 90% water, 9.5% sand 
and 0.5% proprietary/trade-secreted chemicals (Davis 2012; EPA 2011; Fisk 2013; National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2010). Eventually much of what is injected returns to the 
surface; it can include radioactive chemicals such as radium and barium. This can be stored in 
above ground tanks, surface frackwater pits or injected into underground wells (Haluszczak, 
Rose and Kump 2013). 
Prospective Benefits 
 
Natural gas production and consumption are nearing  golden age. As an energy source, it 
comes with a number of advantages. First, natural gas production generates economic benefits 
including job creation, infrastructure and new revenu s. Second, natural gas generates millions 
of dollars in revenues in the form of severance taxs and impact fees for state and local 
governments (Davis 2012; EIA 2012; EIA 2012a; EIA 2011). The third benefit is environmental. 
Relative to fossil fuels, natural gas burns cleaner and its use in place of other fossil fuels can 
slow down the effects of anthropogenic climate change (EPA 2012, 2011; Tomain and Cuhady 
2004).4  
Economic 
State and local governments often charge severance t xes or collect impact fees to 
mitigate the infrastructure and environmental effects of natural gas mining. For many states and 
local governments, these additional revenues are vital, as many states have cut income and 
property tax rates in recent years (Davis 2012; Warner and Shapiro 2013). Utah, for example, 
                                                   
4 Scientists and environmentalists dispute fracking’s benefits. Howarth, Santoro and Ingraffea (2011) for example, 
noted that fracking’s greenhouse gas footprint is much larger than conventionally drilled wells and can be 20 percent 
greater than coal when it is measured on a 20 year timeline. 
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collects a severance tax ranging from three percent to five percent and a .2 percent conservation 
fee (in FY 2011). The fees generated over $65 million for the state’s general fund (Salt Lake 
2012). In 2012, North Dakota, the State’s 11.5 percent severance tax generated $1.9 billion 
dollars, up from $83,000 dollars before the discovery and subsequent drilling in the Bakken 
Formation. Even in industry friendly Texas, the State collects revenue from oil and gas 
extraction. In 2011, state oil and gas revenues generated $2.7 billion (Prah 2013).5,6 Gas 
development also decreases high capital costs by taking dvantage of a ready-made infrastructure 
in terms of distribution and transportation. Natural g s, for example, already powers nearly half 
of all U.S. households, meaning that if production c tinues to grow, much of the pipelines and 
delivery systems are in place (EIA 2012b).  
Local governments also benefit from hydraulic fracturing. Since 2010, the Pennsylvania 
counties of Bradford, Washington, Tioga, Lycoming ad Susquehanna, for example, each have 
collected over $4 million dollars in impact fees. In Colorado, of the $175 million collected in 
state severance taxes, approximately 50% went to the Department of Local Affairs in fiscal year 
2012. Of this allocation, the department distributed 70% of these collections to local government 
via funded projects, with the remaining dollars distributed directly to local governments (COGA 
2013a).  
Proponents of fracking also cite job creation as a reason for expanded urban drilling.7 The 
job creation ‘frame’ is particularly attractive to state and municipal policymakers in rust belt 
states (Davis 2012). In Pennsylvania and West Virginia, drilling in the Marcellus Shale has 
created upwards of 57,000 jobs already (Jackson 2011). In Colorado and New Mexico, oil and 
                                                   
5 The state levies a tax of 7.5 percent on natural gas and 4.6 percent on oil. 
6 The authors point to a number of variables that impact price including demand of natural gas as a transportation 
fuel, pipeline costs, environmental regulations andeven export markets (assuming no requisite increase in upply). 
Boersma and Johnson (2012) caution that despite sommarket elasticity and regulatory uncertainty, current prices 
are expected to remain low, depressing the demand for new investments.  
7 Much like its environmental benefits, natural gas’s overall employment impacts are disputed territory.  
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gas jobs total over 137,000 and 105,000, respectively (Haythorn 2013; Noon 2013). Ohio’s 
natural gas industry claims that it will create over 200,000 new jobs by 2015, although a study by 
the Ohio State University places that number closer to 20,000 (Louis 2012). Industry jobs are 
well paying. The average job in New Mexico, for example, pays $39,525 but the mean for an oil 
and natural gas job is approximately $86,000 (Noon 2013; Warner and Shapiro 2013).8 
Advocates, in short, highlight favorable economics as reasons to support expanded natural gas 
production.   
The employment benefits of fracking extend to non-producing states. A single well 
requires more than 2,000 tons of sand throughout its lifetime, leading to job growth in industrial 
frack sand operations and sectors. Wisconsin’s job creation efforts, exemplify the potential 
economic benefits to non-producing states. Prior to 2008, the State had fewer than ten sites in 
which industry mined sand; today, the state reports over 100 such facilities, supporting over 
2,000 jobs (Redden 2013). Opponents, however, warn th t industrial frack sand operations are 
subject to the boom and bust cycles and risks endemic to energy development and economics 
(Gazette Editorial Board 2014).  
Environmental and Security Benefits 
Supporters also extol natural gas’s purported enviro mental and national security 
benefits. Expanded natural gas production contributes to American national security by 
supplying end-users with domestically produced energy. Domestic gas adds the ancillary 
economic benefit of smoothing fluctuations in price because it is less vulnerable to geopolitical 
security risks and may help prevent future oil wars (Tomain and Cudahy 2004). Natural gas is 
                                                   
8 Nationally, the expansion of fracking has supported 2.1 million jobs (projected to reach 3.5 million by 2035), 
raised household income by nearly $1,200 and has generated over $283 billion of economic output as measured by 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Efstathiou Jr. 2012).  
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also environmentally friendlier when compared to other fossil fuels. When burned, it emits less 
pollution and climate change causing greenhouse gass. By refining it, operators may convert it 
into future and current uses. In the future, natural gas processed into pure hydrogen may power 
fuel cell vehicles. Current technologies can also benefit. Both power plants and gas-powered 
vehicles (municipal cars and buses) and even some taxi operators use liquefied natural gas as 
their primary fuel source (Roberts 2004).  
Natural Gas Renaissance  
Due to the economic, environmental or security benefits, natural gas has enjoyed a 
renaissance in recent years (Warner and Shapiro 2013). In 2010, total gas extraction totaled over 
25 million cubic feet (MMcf). The EIA expects this number to reach 40 million MMcf by 2020.  
 
Figure 1.2 Total Gas Withdrawals 
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Driving the upsurge in natural gas production and the number of wells is most certainly 
hydraulic fracturing. Analysts at the EIA expect that natural gas 
grow and will account for at least half of all U.S. natural gas productio
Figure 1.4 The Growth of Unconventional Natural Gas
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To summarize, proponents of fracking argue that it creates well-paying jobs, generates 
badly needed revenues for state and local governments, r duces the need to import oil and gas 
from geopolitically unstable regions and produces a ‘cleaner’ energy source. Recognizing these 
benefits, state and municipal policymakers continue to turn to natural gas as a likely solution to 
achieving multiple goals: satisfying the country’s energy appetite, mitigating the emissions of 
climate change causing gas and as a way out of the curr nt economic malaise (Boersma and 
Johnson 2012; Davis 2012). 
Environmental Costs 
 
Opponents counter that fracking is a source for a number of environmental and social ills 
(Davis 2012). Critics claim that it threatens air quality in terms of releasing dangerous air 
particulates and methane, a potent greenhouse gas. They add that fracking threatens concerns for 
surface and groundwater quality and adds a new demand on scarce water supplies. Finally, 
fracking can disrupt quality of life through increases in dust contamination, truck traffic and 
noise and by placing new pressures on local services (Fisk 2013).   
Public Health and Air Quality 
 
Fracking releases air pollutants including methane d other air particulates that have 
detrimental public health impacts including nervous sy tem, immune and cardiovascular 
systems, skin, respiratory, kidney gastro-intestinal, eyes and cell health (Colborn, Kwuiatkowski, 
Schultz and Bachran 2011). A Colorado study found that drill sites were associated with 
increases in acute and chronic health impacts including respiratory ailments and the presence of 
cancer clusters (Kelly 2012). In Garfield County, Colorado, for example, approximately 460 gas 
wells released approximately 30 tons of benzene, an amount twenty times greater than the 
volume emitted by large-scale oil refineries (EGWG 2013). Other studies point to a link between 
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fracking and poor air quality. Sites located near Pinedale, Wyoming, reported ozone pollution at 
124 parts per billion (ppb), 67 percent higher than the EPA’s maximum daily limit and giving the 
rural area air quality worse than Los Angeles (Associated Press 2011; Kuster 2012).  
Water  
The practice is associated with perturbations in water quality. Drilling operations, deep 
well injection (a method of disposing of flow back), spills and poor well integrity each can 
threaten ground and surface water quality (Rabe and Borick 2013; Wiseman 2009). 9 Recent 
research downstream from a fracking wastewater plant in Western Pennsylvania, for example, 
detected unusually high levels of harmful and radioctive elements (bromide and radium), salts 
and metallic compounds. Radium, which can enter the food chain, is linked to leukemia clusters. 
Bromide rates are also concerning because it reacts with chlorine to form toxic compounds 
(Main 2013, N.P.). Finally, salinity concentrations were 200 times the legal limit established in 
the Clean Water Act (CWA). 
Quality of Life 
Fracking can disrupt quality of life and strain local infrastructure, especially in rural areas 
(Jacquet 2014; Kuster 2012; Ladd 2013). Rabe and Borick (2013) catalog fracking’s localized 
impacts to include truck traffic, dust contamination, noise and distrust between citizens and 
governments (See also Wiseman 2009). Unincorporated areas or communities w thout zoning 
restrictions often face even more intense land use/q ality of life impacts. Even when robust and 
restrictive zoning rules are in place, land use planning cannot abrogate a firm’s property rights or 
its right to access the mineral estate. These intrusions have the potential to disturb nearby 
neighborhoods and communities with additional dust and noise and pollution (Wiseman 2009). 
Impacts to local transportation infrastructure can be much more costly. New York State, for 
                                                   
9 Up to seven million gallons of water for each fracking operation (Groat and Grimshaw 2012). 
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example, estimated that if it were to permit fracking, the costs for road repairs and enhancements 
would reach between $211 and $378 million dollars. In Texas, the state’s Transportation 
Commission has already authorized an additional $40 million in road repairs for areas within the 
Barnett and the Eagle Ford shale plays (Efstathiou Jr. 2012). 
Resident quality of life can also be impacted by sudden industrialization brought about by 
gas drilling (Davis 2012; Opsal and O’Connor Shelley 2014). Jacquet (2014) observed that high 
rates of gas development contribute to poorly planned and vulnerable development patterns. 
During the height of extraction, resulting industrialization contributes to overtaxed local 
infrastructure, second-rate construction of new homes and businesses, higher costs and demands 
for services and uncoordinated land uses and building sites. The cumulative effect, Jacquet 
contends is that residents, whose quality of life has diminished, look to move elsewhere.  Long-
term effects can be even more pernicious and harmful to quality of life, especially once the 
‘boom’ subsides.  Many of the new buildings, for example, are likely to be vacant or left 
incomplete, which can contribute to increasing crime rates. Workers may also be left 
unemployed and seeking to relocate to the next ‘boom’ t wn, exacerbating budgetary pressures.  
Employment Realities 
 The expectation of job growth due to natural gas production is hotly contested territory. 
Critics argue that employment estimates are inflated nd that actual employment number are 
much lower.  They argue that broader recovery effects have, rather than expanded natural gas 
production, remains behind the small gains in manufct ring jobs (Songer 2014). Challenges in 
measuring employment impacts are further complicated by the intense politics surrounding 
natural gas. In the Pennsylvania gubernatorial race, for example, incumbent Republican 
Governor Tom Corbett’s campaign claimed that fracking employs over 200,000 people, a 
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number that includes both direct and indirect jobs. The State’s own Department of Labor and 
Industry, however, reports slightly over 30,000 industry jobs. Foran (2014) explained that the 
gap may be the result of different ways to measure job creation. The smaller figure are those 
individuals directly employed by industry (natural-gas extraction, well drilling, and pipeline 
transportation). The larger number by comparison includes jobs created or supported in the 
supply chain and includes occupations ranging from freight trucking to street and road 
construction. 
The Policymaking Environment 
 
The following sections offer an overview of the policymaking environment enveloping 
fracking. It begins with a discussion of the federal policy towards fracking and natural gas. The 
latter and more substantive portion delineates the typical roles and environmental responsibilities 
of state and municipal governments and their intergovernmental dynamics.  
National Regulation 
 
Sub-national units of government are responsible for the bulk of natural gas regulation 
with some federal statutory and regulatory participation, as shown in Table 1.4.  




Recovery Act (RCRA) 
Approximately 270,000 oil and natural gas wells drilled in the 
West since 1980.  The Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act exempted these wells superfund designation (RCRA 
History).10 In 1988, the EPA and Congress agreed not to apply 
RCRA to oil and gas wastes, overriding objections from some 
officials at EPA, which had documented 62 cases in which oil 
and gas waste had caused environmental damage (EGWG 
2013).  
Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know 
The bill requires companies to disclose the release of 
significant levels of toxic substances to the Toxics Release 




Act of 1986 Inventory (TRI). The Oil and Gas Accountability Project, a 
reform organization argues that law should apply to benzene, 
toluene and xylene, chemicals often used in oil and gas drilling 
(EGWG 2013). 
 
TRI usually does not apply to fracking operations, under a rule 
that allows wells that produce less than 2,000 releases to avoid 
the reporting requirements (EGWG 2013). 
Clean Water Act  In the 2005 Energy Bill, Congress xempted all oil and gas 
construction facilities from the requirements of the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (EGWG 2013). 
National Environmental 
Policy Act 
Exempts certain oil and gas drilling activities. The exemption, 
enacted in 2005, shifts the burden of proof to the public to 
prove that such activities are unsafe. In 2006 and 2007, the 
BLM granted this exemption to about 25 percent of all wells 
approved on public land in the West (EGWG 2013). 
Safe Water Drinking Act Under the 2005 Energy Policy A t, the Bush Administration 
exempted natural gas/fracking operations from disclosing the 
chemicals used in fracking fluids (EGWG 2013). 
Clean Air Act Recent EPA actions included the issuance of cost-effective 
regulations intended to reduce harmful air pollution. 
Regulation is aimed at “reduced emissions completion” or 
“green completion,” which is designed to capture gas that is 
emitted during fracking operations. It goes into full effect in 
2015.  
 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT2005) is the federal law that most directly 
addresses hydraulic fracking and its environmental impacts. The law exempted the process from 
the Safe Drinking Water Act’s underground injection controls and from its chemical disclosure 
requirements. While, the EPACT2005 is still the lawof the land, the Obama Administration has 
proposed more rigorous disclosure programs and water-management plans and is moving issuing 
new rules governing fracking (Mufson 2013). Despite th se narrow federal interventions and 





The State, Cities and the Natural Gas Industry 
 
A common theme throughout this dissertation is that st te-municipal interactions have 
never been immune to conflict. Regardless of whether the relationship is collaborative (just right) 
or oppositional (too loud), state and municipal policymakers are actively weighing into the 
second order debates that concern fracking and the enforcement of environmental protections.  
The relationship can turn on a variety of causes such as revenue sharing or lack thereof, 
withholding impact fees, water availability and quality, air emissions, impacts to housing costs 
(both price increases and decreases) and the environment. Despite this burgeoning bottom-up 
action that can lead to challenges to states’ preemptive authority, many cities share their states’ 
goals of increasing development. In other cases, states seek to limit municipal activism, helping 
to set the stage for second order devolutionary confli t.  
Davis (2012) argued that the development of politically powerful state level sub-
governments (comprised of industry and trade officials, regulatory departments and state 
legislators) have favored oil and gas operations. These closed networks protect industrial 
expansion at the expense of environmental protection and public safety.11 Industry backed sub-
governments have effectively precluded and rejected local activism and other grassroots efforts 
designed to disrupt the status quo. Cobb and Elder (1972) have suggested that this agenda denial 
power is especially pronounced when the policy domain is complex, requires technical expertise 
and when industry possesses ample capital and financial resources.  
States, however, are not monolithic supporters of fracking. State lawmakers from 
Colorado and Wyoming have passed more stringent fracking disclosure rules (Fisk 2013). Other 
                                                   
11 Davis (2012) noted that oil and gas sub-governments included firms that engaged in exploration, production and 
distribution, such as pipeline companies, as well as st te legislative committees with exclusive jurisdiction and a 
friendly regulatory agency.  
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states vary in the extent to which they protect ground and surface water. Illinois mandates that 
fracked water be stored in above ground storage pits, while in other states, surface pits are an 
acceptable disposal technique. Finally, in other state  such as Vermont and New York, 
policymakers have effectively blocked fracking through the implementation of statewide bans 
and moratoria (Davis 2012).  
A number of statewide laws and fairly centralized processes govern most natural gas 
operations (Davis 2012; EPA 2011; National Conference of State Legislatures 2010). Operators 
begin by applying for a state permit and while specific regulations and requirements vary, states 
usually require that operators disclose and document th ir surface and subsurface activities, spill 
protocols and well construction procedures. Once reiv d, operations begin, subject to state 
enforcement and oversight, which can be fairly lax in some states. In some states, a public 
hearing is required prior to the permit’s issuance (Davis 2012). 
In most jurisdictions, municipal involvement relative to natural gas operations and urban 
drilling is limited. State oil and gas commissions may authorize municipal officials to participate 
in other administrative aspects of fracking policymaking. Colorado, for example, gives local 
governments a role in its decision making process. The commission permits the appointment of a 
local governmental designee (LGD) during hearings and other administrative procedures. The 
LGD or a city official may also seek a local public forum (LPF) when a permit applicant seeks to 
increase well density or to change processes that may affect the welfare, safety and public health 
of nearby communities (COGCC 2008). Illinois also pr vides local governments an 
‘administrative’ voice as they may call for a public hearing before the State Department of 
Natural Resources issues a drilling permit.  
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State-Local Fracking Battle Lines  
 
The state and local relationship relative to fracking has until recently been fairly 
uneventful. In the context of state-local relations a d hydraulic fracturing, state law usually 
determines the extent of municipal authority and the ability of municipal governments to 
intervene in natural gas development and siting decisions. While states have retained much of 
their authority to oversee drillings, locals can influence development patterns. Municipalities and 
counties, contingent upon state law, may promulgate eneral zoning ordinances and public safety 
laws that may indirectly impact where wells are located, their appearance and security and other 
ancillary effects of urban drilling (Warner and Shapiro 2013).  
Recent second order challenges have erupted in a variety of states often over setback 
distances land use and infrastructure reimbursements (Davis 2014). Setbacks are considered by 
which public officials can balance public health and safety, the welfare of residents and 
environmental protection with the rights of property owners by establishing minimum distances 
between development and occupied structures. State law varies in the land use discretion 
afforded to communities. In Pennsylvania, as it does in Colorado, and Michigan, state law 
establishes uniform minimum setbacks between wells and streams, schools, buildings and water 
sources, leaving city government little recourse in terms of protecting their citizens’ quality of 
life (NPR 2013). In Ohio, cities may create environmental or conservation zones that block all 
development and in Texas, municipalities may decide their own setback distances.  
Industry argues that setbacks must occur in specific locations that are adjacent or at least 
proximate to the underground resource. By eliminating options, local governments (and in some 
cases states) restrict the locations available for firms to recover the mineral. Conversely, locals 
want flexibility and the ability to protect residents, other occupied structures, green spaces and 
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bodies of water. Municipal action, however, can decrease the firms’ economic efficiencies, 
preclude opportunities for industry to centralize facilities and reduce revenues sent to the 
Statehouse and city hall (COGA 2012a).  
State Perspectives 
 
The case against bottom up action and for centralized state control is fairly consistent 
across the States. The Colorado Oil and Gas Association (COGA) typify a highly centralized 
viewpoint in its setback policy position “drilling practices vary according to the unique 
geological characteristics of the region…and ensures that agency officials understand the 
operations in each basin” (COGA 2012c, NP).12 Regulators in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan 
also justify centralized state power in a similar manner and explain that without it, a patchwork 
of local reactions/regulations would result and weaken state policy by imposing an undue burden 
on businesses, depress revenues, discourage future investment and dampen economic growth 
(Phillips 2012).  
Local Regulatory Attempts  
 
Despite, the strong and nearly monopolistic role state  hold in regulating natural gas, 
locals are increasingly injecting themselves into the political discussions of fracking. In the 
following, I provide several brief anecdotes of state-local fracking debates.  
The West (Colorado and New Mexico) 
The Colorado State Oil and Gas Conservation Commission pre-empts local regulation in 
regulatory areas dedicated to well intensity, location and well concentration and construction. 
Despite this centralized authority, local anti-fracking campaigns have experienced several 
political victories. Numerous cities, including Longmont, Lafayette, Boulder, Broomfield and 
                                                   
12 These regulations must meet or exceed as federal standards. 
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Fort Collins have passed bans on the practice inside their corporate limits. In Longmont and Fort 
Collins, municipal bans have been struck down by the State Judiciary but are being appealed. 
The Counties of Gunnison, Garfield, La Plata and Pitkin have also considered enacting 
additional standards and rules governing natural gas development. Finally, there have multiple 
statewide ballot initiatives intending to grant locals more authority to regulate the shape, location 
and character of natural gas development (Rochat 2012, 2012a). 
Substate actions stand on precarious legal grounds a  industry has already filed lawsuits 
against the Cities of Fort Collins and Longmont (Rochat 2012; 2012a). In 1992, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that the City of Greeley “could not impose a total ban on the drilling of any 
oil, gas, or hydrocarbon wells within the city limits” (Denver Post Staff Editorial 2012). Yet, 
other major Colorado cities, such as the Cities of Greeley, Grand Junction and Colorado Springs 
are taking no action or have embraced the practice and the revenues fracking will likely generate 
(Colorado Oil and Gas Association 2012a-b; CBS Denver 2012).  
Southern 
  
In Texas, similar state-local tensions have percolated up through the state judicial system. 
Texas cities enjoy home rule authority and “have, under their police power, authority to regulate 
the drilling for and production of oil and gas within their corporate limits” (Goho, 2013, 7). 
Texas Courts have upheld municipal zoning regulations that establish city wide minimum night 
and day noise levels for well sites, deliveries andrepairs and setbacks. In Dallas, the City 
succeeded in temporarily banning fracking. In August 2013, the City Council rejected the three 
natural gas permits and, while the city is still in the process of promulgating a drilling ordinance, 
for the time being, the City will not be issuing any drilling permits (Mosqueda 2013). Setbacks 
also range in Texas with Cities like Denton pushing for setbacks of 1500 feet while communities, 
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such as Fort Worth support a much closer setback stndard of 600 feet (Heinkel-Wolfe and 
Brown 2012).13 City and county actions, however, still may not directly conflict with state law or 
constitute a ‘regulatory takings’ of the mineral estate. 
New Mexico has also experienced local pushback. The City of Las Vegas adopted a 
resolution that called for a statewide fracking morat ium until state regulations are in place. In 
Mora County, county leaders banned the practice basd on their concern that fracking would 
pollute already limited groundwater supplies. Mora County’s fracking ban is considered as a 
“community rights” ordinance, in which local governments assert control over their health, 
safety and environment and thereby intentionally challenge the state’s preemptive authority (Cart 
2013). 
Mid-Atlantic (Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan) 
Much like Colorado, local governments in Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania, ranging in 
size from Pittsburgh (306,000) to Highland Township (1200) have adopted ordinances that ban 
or restrict fracking. 14 Local opposition is not constant across any of the s ates. Voters in 
Youngstown, Ohio, for example, rejected a proposed fracking ban twice. In many other 
Pennsylvanian and Ohioan communities, local lawmakers have remained silent, leased excess 
water to operators and have permitted drilling on municipal property, suggesting an 
unwillingness to challenge their state’s preemptive authority.15 Much like Colorado, in these 
                                                   
13 A recent court case involving the City of Grand Prairie, exemplifies the regulatory complexity in Texas. In the 
case, the court denied a preliminary injunction against the city’s landscaping requirements and noise limits relative 
to frack sites but ruled in favor of the State that t e city could not require fencing as the state held exclusive 
jurisdiction over that particular question (Goho 2013).  
14 Highland Township framed its ordinance in terms of civil and community rights rather than a more conventional 
zoning ban. 
15 Yet, local action is not limited to bans and moratoi . Collier, Pennsylvania passed a series of ordinances designed 
to balance between residents’ quality of life concer s and industry by requiring companies to reduce odors for 
nearby properties (located within 500 feet of a drill site) (Negro 2012).  
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states, industry and state officials argue that local preemptive action violates state law and have 
sought judicial remedies (Phillips 2012). 
State-local conflict has also erupted regarding howPennsylvania distributes fracking 
related impact fees. A 2012 law circumvented municipal zoning powers and mandated that cities 
allow drill rigs in all ‘zones’ except for densely populated residential areas. Four Pennsylvania 
communities, which had their impact fee payments wihheld by the state, sued the state on the 
grounds that the State did not have the right to wihhold the impact fee money. The State 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of local governments, finding that the law’s language prohibiting 
local governments from passing zoning rules relative to drilling activity violates the state 
constitution (Phillips 2012; Rabe and Borick 2013). 
Local activism is also evident in Michigan. Following the discovery of the Antrim Shale 
Play – the state sold its mineral rights in 23 counties, including highly populated Oakland and 
Barry Counties (the location of a popular State Park). During the auction, natural gas firms 
outbid residents and other non-profits (EcoWatch 2012). Under the Michigan Zoning Enabling 
Act, state regulators have also succeeded in centralizing many of the responsibilities to regulate 
fracking including well design, location and intensity. The legislation also preempts local 
authorities from passing any zoning regulations that address natural gas wells setbacks (Solomon 
and Schindler 2012).   
Recognizing that the Michigan House and Senate may not be a receptive venue, 
opponents have turned to alternative venues including city and county governments. In 
Thornapple, like the nearby communities of Yankee Springs, Detroit and Orangeville, the 
Township Board passed a resolution calling “our state representatives, Michigan congressional 
delegation and United States senators to ban fracking to safeguard our citizens from harmful 
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effects and to preserve our environment for generations to come” (Makarewicz 2012, NP). In 
other cases, local governments have opted for more coercive measures including bans and 
moratoriums. West Bloomfield, for example, passed a one year ban and has recently extended it 
through 2013 (Hopkins 2013).  
In Illinois, state-local tensions are also surfacing. In rural Hardin County, Elizabeth 
Canfarelli (a local activist) suggested that drilling would cripple and overwhelm county services 
and that increasing revenues may not be enough to offset the immediate challenges brought on 
by an increase in drilling (Wernau 2013). Mark Haggerty, an analyst with Headwaters 
Economics in Montana, noted that additional revenues may not be enough to offset short-term 
costs associated with new drilling. He suggests that loc l governments can wait up to two years 
to “get the bulk of the tax revenue that comes from fracking...that's because production taxes 
don't kick in until a well is producing oil, long after a community is beset by transient workers 
and truck traffic…the same goes for severance taxes on oil and gas” (Wernau 2013). Citing 
many of these concerns, five counties in Southern Illinois (Johnson, Jackson, Union, Pope and 
Hardin) have banned or restricted the practice (SAFE 2013).   
The local activism observed in Illinois, like in many other states, faces an uncertain legal 
future. Recently, Democratic Governor Quinn shepherded through legislation that required all 
firms interested in fracking to receive a permit from lawmakers prior to drilling, to collect and 
provide frackwater samples to state regulators through ut the drilling process and to store 
wastewater in aboveground storage tanks. The new law, moreover, requires open comment 
periods and hearings for all drilling applications. Yet, the law also centralizes authority and 
restricts city and county action. In short, local governments must accept fracking but they may 
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call for a hearing if they or any other entity believes that fracking may adversely affect the 
community or its surrounding environs (Yeagle 2013). 
State-municipal disputes have erupted in several states and the preceding chapter shows 
many of the scenarios that can precipitate state-local conflict. The following map demonstrates 
geographically where municipalities have passed local bans and/or moratoria. Second order 
lawsuits are recent, ongoing or threatened in the following states: Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
New York, Illinois, Michigan, Texas and New Mexico. 
 
Figure 1.5 State-Local Conflicts 
Source: Richardson et. al 2013 
 
Concluding Thoughts  
 
City governments may refuse, ignore, and impede the implementation of state and federal 
policies, especially when there are local costs and no irect benefits. They also may work 
cooperatively with higher levels of governments. They do so in an uncertain political 
environment. As the preceding demonstrates, the structures and decisions made by state and 
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local governments affect environmental policy and outc mes. A state, for example, may set 
GHG reduction goals only to see the zoning plans of local governments encourage more driving 
and low population densities (Bedsworth and Hanak 2013). Conversely, cities may supplement 
the work of the state by greening its operations and working to decrease emissions through smart 
growth, renewable energy use and by building bike lan s and walking paths. For fracking, while 
a state government may encourage extraction; local opposition may seek to ban or limit the 
practice within its jurisdiction. City governments could also encourage fracking locally in states 
that are much more skeptical of the practice (Warner a d Shapiro 2013). 
Plan for the Dissertation 
 
This project began with an overview of fracking and examples of the circumstances that 
may influence supportive and positive state-local relationships and of the factors that influence a 
poor and oppositional relationship. It then shifts to the academic literature on second order 
devolution, a subset of the larger literature on American political institutions. The body of 
second order federalism research is fairly thin but when appropriate, it is supplemented by 
insights drawn from the public policy and public administration fields. Relying upon these 
literatures, Chapter 3 sets forth the research expectations and specifies the dissertation’s 
methodological strategies and decisions. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the second order 
federalism environment in three separate states (Colorado – Chapter 4, Ohio – Chapter 5 and 
Texas – Chapter 6). Each state is actively weighing the costs and benefits of urban fracking and 
has thousands of residents living within one mile of a fracking well. Each chapter is organized to 
best address and answer the dissertation’s three major research questions:  
• What are the state structures governing state-municipal relationships when it comes to 
hydraulic fracturing?  
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• To what extent do municipalities regulate fracking and what are the types of city-
level regulation? 
• What is the relationship between sustainable economic development and hydraulic 
fracturing?  
• Why are some municipalities promulgating policies that exceed and/or oppose state-
level goals associated with extraction i.e. challenging the state’s preemptive authority 
and others are not?  
Research Goals 
 
Because neither states nor their local governments hold an absolute monopoly over 
fracking governance, the project’s questions fit well into what Frederickson (1999) describes as 
one of the major functions of modern public administration - that is addressing the challenges 
caused by or associated with the fragmentation and disarticulation of the modern state.16 The 
questions also complement each other and lead to a m re complete picture of second order 
federalism politics in the context of natural resources and environmental governance.  
The research goals here are both theoretical and practical. Practically, my dissertation 
aims to uncover the patterns, complexities and realiti s of modern state-municipal governing 
relationships. By improving the understanding of how state and local lawmakers address and 
then implement policy, a number of administrative benefits are possible such as more efficient 
program delivery, innovation, responsiveness and greate  transparency (Kincaid 1998; Krane, 
Rigos, and Hill 2001; Ostrom 1976). Local solutions are also considered to be a widely 
supported and fundamental principle in American democracy. Krane, Rigos and Hill (2001, 1) 
point out that “local self-government is one of themost cherished and fiercely contested ideas in 
                                                   
16 Frederickson (1999, 708) defines these solutions as conjunctive – which is similar to networking. 
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the pantheon of principles by which Americans organize their system of governance” (See also 
Schneider, Jacoby, and Lewis 2011).  
The relationship between cities and their state government was an early interest of Deil 
Wright (1978, 228) who argued that one of the “a chief intergovernmental problem that 
confronts state legislatures is state-local relations.” At a more theoretical level, this project 
continues the work of Wright and other scholarly activity concerned with intergovernmental 
management and second order relations. By including a variety of external and internal variables 
common to the policy and administration literatures, the dissertation supplements and deepens 
the current understanding of second order federalism and of American political institutions in 
general. It also offers and tests a typology in an attempt to introduce some predictive power to 



















First order federalism researchers center on the relationships, powers and legal 
arrangements of national and state governments. Interested in a similar set of dynamics, second 
order devolution or federalism research shifts the focus downward towards state-local 
governance and interactions. Little research asks and answers second order devolution questions 
directly. When it does, the literature addresses three major content areas: temporal dynamics, 
normative justifications for local control and implementation/outcomes. Devolution’s 
foundational ideas, however, have long been the conceptual concern of public choice, public 
administration (new public management and governance) and public policy (venue shopping and 
implementation) scholars. When appropriate, these literatures supplement the work of second 
order federalism scholars and are included throughot.  
This chapter is an overview of the devolution litera u e. It is organized into three major 
subsections: devolution over time, theoretical justifications for devolution and a discussion of the 
program outcomes of devolution (i.e. are there local variations and resultant state-local working 
relationships)? The first traces how subnational rel tionships vary across broad policy domains 
(i.e. education, healthcare, natural resources) and historically (Bowman and Kearney 2011, 2012; 
Stephens and Wikstrom 2000; Stephens 1974). A second category considers devolution’s 
theoretical underpinnings (Kettl 2002; Kooiman 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). From this 
perspective, the common question is why states and federal lawmakers would seek to devolve 
their authority to lower levels of government. The t ird category evaluates devolution’s 
implementation outcomes, i.e. the resulting intergovernmental working relationships and whether 
or not local variation is present in second order federalism (Cho et al. 2005; Davis 2014; Harvey 
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2013; Lipsky 1980; Long and Franklin 2004). The chapter concludes by identifying a series of 
research gaps present in both the second order devolution and environmental federalism 
literatures and why such gaps are problematic relativ  to the study of American political 
institutions.   
Category 1 – Broad Measures and Perceptions  
 
Stephen’s 1974 work was one of the earliest efforts t  directly measure the temporal 
aspects of second-order devolution. His work identifi d a general trend towards state fiscal 
centralization. Updating Stephen’s work, Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) concluded that state 
centralization scores peaked in the mid-1980s and moved towards more decentralization through 
1995. Updating Stephens and Wikstom’s work, Bowman and Kearney (2011) observed a 
comparable set of historical state-local power dynamics. Through 2008, they found that public 
expenditures and revenue collection remained highly centralized with labor more decentralized.17 
Their study showed that all states collected 60 percent or more of total public revenues (within 
the state). For public spending, state centralization was again the norm, with 41 states classified 
as “centralized” with the remaining nine states being more balanced. The third measure, public 
employment, ranked as the most decentralized area of st te-local dynamics.18 Bowman and 
Kearney (2011) also averaged the three scores into a ‘second order composite’ rating.19 The 
                                                   
17The authors’ consolidated his fifteen categories into eleven (police, corrections, health, hospitals, natural resource, 
economic development, highways, education, parks and recreation, land use and planning, financial administration 
and public welfare). Five functions are identical to Stephens: police, corrections, health, hospitals, and natural 
resources. Stephens’ two public welfare categories ar  collapsed into one. Elementary and secondary education 
categories are combined into a single ‘‘education’’ category as well.  
18 Approximated by calculating a ratio between full time equivalent (FTE) state employment and FTE local 
employment. 
19 The authors considered States that scored a 100 as completely centralized while a score of zero represents full 
decentralization.  
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scores reaffirmed the general trend of increasing state centralization. In 1957, for example, the 
average state score was 47.1 and by 1995, it increased to 58.20  
Devolution patterns were far from uniform across the States (Bowman and Kearney 
2011). They did note, however, several relationships between basic socio-demographic, 
geographic variables and the degree of second orderdevolution. Smaller states in terms of 
geography and population (e.g., Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, and Rhode Island) tended to be more 
centralized as compared to more populous urban states (California, Florida, New York, and 
Texas). They reasoned that it is easier and more cost-effective for geographically small and rural 
states to coordinate, centralize and consolidate programs in the state capital as compared to 
larger and more populous states. Smaller states also confront less ‘diversity’ in terms of local 
needs and are more amenable to one-size fits all state policies, which would be problematic in 
more heterogeneous states (Bowman and Kearney 2011).  
Perceptions of Authority 
 
Perceptions of authority, goals and ‘interference’ shape city-state working relationships. 
Cho et al.’s (2005) work suggested that bureaucrats perceive their effectiveness as related to 
levels of professionalization, staff capacity and feelings of empowerment. Goal clarity also 
affected actors’ perceptions of organizational effectiv ness and the utility of more localized 
control. When survey respondents were unsure about what lawmakers meant by ‘quality of life’ 
(employment, working conditions, family support services, housing etc.), they were less likely to 
feel effective at meeting organizational goals (Bardach 1977; Goggin et al. 1990; Sabatier 1986; 
Scheberle 2004).  
                                                   
20 Other scholars examine state-local temporal trends through the lens of fiscal federalism (Berman 1998; Krane, 
Ebdon and Bartle 2004; Watson and Gold 1997). Krane, Ebdon and Bartle (2004) find as a portion of state spending, 
state aid to local governments peaked in the late 1970s and has slowly diminished as a percentage of state 
expenditures ever since.  
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Bowman and Kearney’s (2011) data showed that perceptions are related to one’s 
intergovernmental professional position and to the issue area. Data indicated that city managers 
felt that state lawmakers were the most frequent intruders into local affairs (by appropriating 
local revenue streams and through unfunded mandates) followed closely by state courts. 
Conversely, managers considered voter referenda and citizen initiatives as much less likely to 
interfere with local affairs. Despite broad agreement that municipalities have lost some of their 
autonomy, perceptions also varied by issue area. Over 50 percent of city managers perceived a 
substantial or modest loss of autonomy in local finance as compared to less than 40 percent of 
state lawmakers. Managers also believed that state laws had a harmful effect on city operations 
although this shifted based on issue area (less severe - parks and recreation to more severe 
financial administration) (Bowman and Kearney 2011).  
Comparatively, state officials were much more sanguine in their assessment of state-local 
power sharing. Finally, state lawmakers and city managers differed on the significance of state 
mandates on local government. Data showed that state legislators were generally more positive 
towards state-directed mandates (believed they werenec ssary and unobtrusive) while city 
managers saw them as an unnecessary hindrance to local operations.  
Interest in state-local relations has led researchers to also assess whether prior service in 
municipal, county or special district government shapes how state lawmakers perceive and 
evaluate local concerns. Lovrich and Newman (2004) found that, overall, Washington state 
lawmakers possessed lower levels of information about local affairs as compared to other topics. 
They were also less inclined to prioritize local government matters when compared to other 
public problems. The authors, however, detected a relationship between experience in local 
affairs and sensitivity to municipal and county conerns. State lawmakers with previous local 
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government experience were significantly more likely to prioritize local affairs and be receptive 
to their interests as compared to their peers without local service.   
Hays’ (1988) study of perceptions of local personnel relative to Iowa’s highway 
transportation policies similarly detected a complex s t of contingent relationships. The study 
showed state-local perceptions to be generally positive, which he attributed multiple points of 
local input and to the expertise of state transportati n officials. First, the state created a formal 
role for localities in the planning process by offering them opportunities to express their 
preferences to Department of Transportation staff. Second, while the agency held an 
informational and data advantage over municipalities, it simultaneously cultivated a reputation of 
rationality and technical competence among local policymakers. Its reputation enhanced the 
department’s legitimacy and convinced local stakeholders that their priorities were consistent 
with statewide needs. 21 Such processes and reputation building, according to Hays (1988), were 
especially important when IDOT chose to reject a loca  project. After learning of a rejection, 
local perceptions of the agency did drop, but over half of Iowa’s municipalities still viewed the 
department as efficiently administered and responsive to local needs.  
Category 2 - Why Devolve? Theoretical Justifications 
 
The second category of research attempts to answer the question of ‘why devolve or 
decentralize?’ As one of the more venerable question  in political science, public policy and 
public administration, scholars have offered a myriad of potential answers.  
Economic Justifications 
Some of the earliest theoretical calls for devolutin originated from within the public 
choice and administrative rationalist movements (Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 
1961). As a set of policy and managerial prescriptions, ‘public choice’ subscribers rely on a 
                                                   
21 Data collection includes physical condition, traffic volume and safety hazards.  
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number of assumptions regarding citizens and governm nts. It presupposes that citizens are 
rational and capable of maximizing their utility through their choice of municipal goods and 
services. Adherents also contend that individuals possess the requisite ability, information and 
means to achieve their goals. Relative to cities, public choice scholars presume that substate 
governments possess enough institutional and political flexibility to adjust their taxes and service 
levels in such a way that they are able to attract some citizens and repel others. When ‘scaled up’ 
to a metropolitan or region, the theory/approach suggests that, by competing over tax and service 
levels, an equilibrium emerges that produces the optimal allocation of public services and taxes 
(Tiebout 1956; Weimer and Vining 2011).  
Scholars have utilized public choice methodologies to identify the economically optimal 
loci of authority for various government services. In their seminal work, Ostrom, Tiebout and 
Warren (1961) examined whether or not decentralized networks of public and private agencies 
govern as efficiently and as effectively when compared to more centralized systems. Their 
results indicated that small to medium size cities managed water service delivery as effectively 
as more centralized organizations (Ostrom 1962; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; Ostrom 
2009, 2010). Later research by Weschler (1968) affirmed that decentralized water agencies were 
capable of performing just as efficiently and effectively as their larger counterparts. Ostrom 
(2010) noted that by the 1970s, public choice research rs extended their work into municipal law 
enforcement and issues of public safety. Much like the previous work on water governance, they 
were unable to find evidence that suggested larger and more centralized organizations 
outperformed their smaller peers.22  
                                                   
22 Ostrom’s (2010) work summarizes a series of studies conducted in Indianapolis and St. Louis (Ostrom and Parks 
1973), Chicago (Ostrom and Whitaker 1974), and St. Louis (Ostrom 1976) and then replicated elsewhere.  
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Shifting to a more explicit environmental focus, Owens and Zimmerman (2013) 
examined organizational ‘size’ and wetland protection. Data indicated that decentralized 
governance and networks offered citizens and policymakers numerous social and environmental 
benefits. Citizens enjoyed more opportunities to shape wetland decisions and were more likely to 
support more robust wetland protection efforts. Institutions also benefitted. Owens and 
Zimmerman (2013) also found social and administrative benefits (increasing local flexibility and 
responsiveness to new data and focusing events, finding cost reductions and generating citizen 
support), which they credited to second order devolution.  
Cautions  
Despite the optimistic tone of the authors above, Feiock (2013, 398) cautioned that 
decentralized organizations still cannot resolve colle tive action dilemmas because “outcomes of 
individual decisions [are] collectively inefficient in the absence of mechanisms to integrate 
decisions across policies and/or jurisdictions.” Even if the performance of decentralized agencies 
is comparable or more efficient, when communities fail to consider the decisions of their 
neighbors, they inevitably run the risk of programmatic overlap, duplication, redundancies and 
inefficiencies.  
The lack of regional coordination has contributed to a multitude of environmental and 
urban development challenges. Savitch and Vogel (2000), for example, pointed out that suburban 
development patterns have contributed to growing levels of social and economic segregation 
between ‘central city’ minority groups and more affluent middle-class suburban whites. 
Uncoordinated suburbanization has also led to enviro mentally destructive land use patterns. 
New suburban growth has replaced millions of acres of open space, wetlands and farmland, 
hastening soil erosion and contributing to the increasing prevalence of urban flooding (Savitch 
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and Vogel 2000). Arguing that land use patterns have serious financial implications, Yin and 
Sun’s (2007) work examined the financial impacts of prawl and found that by failing to 
coordinate growth, substate governments have spent millions of ‘avoidable’ tax dollars largely 
through redundancies and overlap.  
New Public Management 
Relying on their public choice orientation, adherents of New Public Management (NPM) 
support managerial and policy devolution (Barzelay 1992; 2001; Hood 1991; Kettl 2005; 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992). To solve problems, NPM challenges conventional top-down 
administrative systems by advocating for managerial flexibility and empowerment of lower level 
governments and actors. By imbuing actors with greate  discretion, managers may then 
creatively and effectively address complicated public problems with improved economic 
efficiency and responsiveness (Barzelay 2001; Eggers and O’Leary 1995; Gainsborough 2003; 
Sunley, Martin and Nativel 2001). 
Governance 
Public governance literature provides a second tangential linkage to second order 
federalism. Kooiman (1993) defined governance as a system in which clients, suppliers and 
producers work together to develop and implement policy. Proponents assume that no single 
sector or agency holds a monopoly on the production and consumption of goods or on topical 
expertise. By working together as co-producers and consumers, each may leverage each other’s 
strengths and deliver better public policy.   
Governance manifests itself in fluid inter-organizational networks and other public-
private arrangements. Fattore, Dubois and Lapenta (2012) contended that interactive 
relationships and learning opportunities form the foundation of effective governance networks. 
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Networks are necessary because multiple levels of government and sectors must participate and 
communicate with each another to address contemporary ch llenges (See also Kettl 2002). 
Actors must also learn because the paradigm calls upon public managers to recognize and rely 
upon the expertise and skills of other actors. By recognizing co-dependencies and each actor’s 
expertise, participants learn and work together to create, design and execute effective public 
policy (Feldman and Khademian 2002, 534). Ostrom’s 2009 polycentric governance approach to 
climate change documented additional organizational benefits. Through their participation, 
subnational and substate agencies could build new organizational capacities and competencies 
(See also May 1992). Innovations may also be ‘scaled up’ leading to regional and national 
programs and benefits.23  
Summary 
Financial benefits and programmatic flexibility are th  foundations of economic 
approaches justifying devolution. Grounded in the language of new public management and 
governance, devolution incents higher levels of government to authorize greater levels of lower 
i.e. local and managerial autonomy. They do so because devolution is seen as a vehicle to 
promote innovation, policy responsiveness, programmtic flexibility and policy 
experimentation., which lead to more effective soluti ns to pressing public problems. Ultimately, 
devolution gives local governing bodies the capacity to customize solutions that fit their unique 
policymaking context in a way that reduces overall costs.  
 
 
                                                   
23 Lindblom (1959) identifies a critical benefit of incremental policy change. In short, through incrementalism 
policymakers are less likely to pass policies that generate negative economic consequences because change only 
occurs in small adjustments and leading to successful programs quickly diffusing outward to other governmental 
entities 
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Political Justifications  
Institutional and political factors also contribute to decisions to devolve power (Kincaid 
1999; Riccucci 2005). Policy scholars note that the sel ction of a municipal or county institution 
instead of a state agency may be unrelated to finding economic efficiencies but because of 
strategic partisan preferences. Devolution, here, takes place after actors strategically select 
institutions (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Pralle 2006; Sherman 2011). It may also result from 
state lawmakers seeking to avoid politically damaging votes. 
Legislative Incentives 
Peterson’s 1995 work identified political rationales behind state level decisions to 
devolve powers to local governments. Elected state lawmakers, according to Peterson (1995), 
devolved power to avoid showing support for less popular redistributive and regulatory 
programs. Devolution, according to Peterson generated two benefits for state elected officials. 
First, they avoid being on record as supporting programs likely to mobilize opposition and to 
give credence to future talking points (See also McCabe 2000). A second benefit is less 
nefarious. Peterson (1995) argued that lawmakers’ dsire to frame their decision to devolve can 
also be treated as one made in support of local empowerment and self-determination, which “is 
one of the most cherished and fiercely contested idas in the pantheon of principles by which 
Americans organize their system of governance” (Krane, Rigos and Hill 2001, 1). Political 
incentives are particularly high when state budgets are as tight as they have been in recent years 
(Berman 2003; Kincaid 1999).  
Kincaid’s (1999) research pointed to political motiva ons behind second order 
devolution decisions as well. He found that state legislators began to devolve power in the 1980s, 
less out of a concern for local innovation, experimntation or tailoring solutions, but because 
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they were confronting intransigent budget deficits. Devolving programmatic power to local 
governments forces them to generate monies for imple entation rather than the state, alleviating 
state budgetary pressures. A 2003 report by the National League of Cities (NLC) echoed many of 
Kincaid’s findings and concluded that states reduce th ir budget woes by pushing a variety of 
programs down to local governments in the form of unfunded mandates (Pagano and Hoene 
2003).   
Woods and Potoski (2010) also viewed state decisions t  devolve authority to local 
governments as politically motivated. Their data shows that states, which are more open to 
devolution (i.e. its history and willingness to support greater degrees of local autonomy), are 
more likely to empower locals to regulate air quality. Interest groups also mattered in their study. 
Such groups, Woods and Potoski write, were strategic venue shoppers and believed that local 
governments would be more sympathetic to their cause s compared to state and federal 
policymakers (See also Abel, Stephan and Kraft 2007; Daley and Garand 2005; Matisoff 2008; 
Pralle 2006, 2006a; Ringquist and Garand 1999; Schattschneider 1960). Finally, air quality 
second order devolution decisions were tied to state  with greater concentrations of city dwellers, 
which are more likely to have dedicated intergovernme tal officials (Bowman and Kearney 
2011; Woods and Potoski 2010). 
Empirical research has also examined second order fe alism and the degree of local 
government empowerment in relation to traditional socio-demographic, opinion and institutional 
variables. Wood (2011) found that state lawmakers typically allot more autonomy to larger, more 
populated and full-service municipalities. The presence of more educated citizens, according to 
Wood (2011) also contributed to more autonomous and self-governing municipalities. Likewise 
institutional i.e. legislative professionalism characteristics shape decisions to devolve power. 
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States with more professional legislatures (more staff, longer sessions, higher salaries) are more 
likely to centralize authority as compared to less centralized jurisdictions (Bowman and Kearney 
2010).  
The decision to devolve may also be partially a functio  of public opinion of and trust in 
state/local institutions. Alm, Buschmany and Sjoquist (2011) observed a relationship between 
higher levels of citizen trust in local government a d a greater reliance on local governments for 
education spending and setting policy. Conversely, when citizens report greater trust and 
confidence in state government, the state is typically responsible for a larger proportion of public 
education financing and planning.  
Venue Shopping  
Defined by Pralle (2006, 2006a) as a search by actors for alternative institutions followed 
by a deliberate effort to shift control of an issue from one institution to another, venue shopping 
is another political mechanism by which local governments can become active in regional, state 
or national affairs (See also Schattschneider 1960). Venues, however, are idiosyncratic. Their 
symbols, participants, rules, norms and competitive environments are unique and produce 
different opportunities, values, agendas, goals and obstacles for stakeholders. Problem 
definitions and strategies, for example, that may be well accepted in one venue and congruent 
with its values (a city), can fail in another (a stte agency) (Houston and Richardson Jr. 2000). 
Aware of these institutional differences, actors shape their strategies accordingly and select the 
venues and rhetorical/ideational frames, which theyb lieve are the most likely to generate 
support. The nature of distinctive venues, when considered in the context of a structural reality 
where power is incomplete, means that actors can identify and seek out the institutions 
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predisposed to favor their policies/goals and open up multiple policy ‘fronts’ (Long 1949; 
Riverstone-Newell 2013). 
The type of problem further drives state-local venue assignment and selection (Cobb and 
Elder 1972; Lowi 1972). Woods and Potoski (2010) contended that second order devolution is 
particularly attractive to state policymakers when the nature of the problem varies significantly 
across the state. The varying sources and concentratio s of air pollution, for example, incentivize 
devolution because neither its effects on public healt  nor its regulatory costs are felt equally 
throughout the state.  
Civic Environmentalism 
 
Civic environmentalism offers another set of justifications supporting second order 
devolution. Under the paradigm, decentralized and smaller units of government actively assist 
citizens wishing to act upon their environmental beliefs. The process involves negotiation, 
collaboration and learning, with the hope that citizens and stakeholders will find common ground 
and judiciously negotiate potential tradeoffs. Increasing citizen deliberation and better decision-
making via civic environmentalism generates sizable social and environmental benefits. It 
enables participants to conceptualize and more completely understand environmental problems. 
Once understood, individuals are more likely to support policies and build social capital that 
significantly alter their behaviors, causing them to act in ways more conducive to robust 
environmental protection (John 1994).   
Increasing social capital is the second product of ivic environmentalism, which is 
especially noteworthy because of a rising level of disaffection with government and greater 
sensitivity to real and perceived environmental andpublic health risks (John 1994; Jacquet 2014; 
Perry 2012). Dense social networks, Putnam (2000) speculated are likely to include community 
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members who eschew apathy/conflict and favor working together to resolve collective action 
dilemmas (like urban drilling). Through the sharing of knowledge and facilitating deeper 
understandings, networks rich with social capital are more likely to act with the belief that 
meaningful policy change is possible (Hempel 2009; Lemos and Agrawal 2006).24  
Category 3 – Second Order Federalism/Devolution and Outcomes 
 
 The third body of second order devolution literatue addresses questions of political 
power and how it is shared among and between levels of government and with outside actors 
(Dahl 1961; Kantor and David 1988; Drabenstott 2006; Elkin 1987; Lindblom 1977; Peterson 
1987; Stone 1980; 1993; 2006; Rast 2009).  
Top-Down Implementation 
Through a vertical hierarchy, the top-down approach holds that administrative and 
political superiors may effectively oversee, manage nd coordinate the activities of subordinates 
(or lower units of government) (Birkland 2011; Sabatier 1986). Power and information flow 
down the organizational hierarchy to street and local level actors, who then implement the policy 
in a manner consistent with higher-level objectives. Despite acknowledging the presence and 
influence of street-level or local level politics, top-downers argued that principals have enough 
tools to constrain their agents’ behavior (Elmore 1978; Lipsky 1980; Palumbo, Maynard-Moody 
and Wright 1984).  
Top-downers identify a variety of forces that influence how street level agents deliver 
goods and services (Matland 1995). Ringquist’s (1993) research identified four sets of factors 
                                                   
24 Thinking about and engaging in environmental problem solving encourages a diversity of actors and outcomes. 
Discussion does not necessarily guarantee consensus or meaningful policies (John 1994). In some instances, civic 
environmentalism might produce incremental policies that do not recognize the exigency of environmental issues or 
that operates at scales that fail to overcome collectiv  action dilemmas. It can also trigger a hostile response from 
higher levels of government.  
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that impact agent or agency discretion. The first set relates to how well lower level agents 
understand the statute, i.e. is it clear and unambiguous? The second group centers on the type 
and clarity of goals and whether there is agreement among top officials relative to how to best 
achieve those goals (See also Mazmanian and Sabatier 1986). Third, internal and political 
organizational factors shape the actions and decision-making of street-level implementers. If 
elected officials and key agency leaders fail to prvide the requisite technical, managerial, and 
financial resources to street-level staff, it is like y that implementation efforts will fail. Lastly, 
external factors, such as socioeconomic variables, population and education shape 
implementation effectiveness and outcomes.  
Bottom up Implementation 
Bottom up scholars adopt the view that effective implementation research begins by 
studying the lowest level implementers (Birkland 2011; Elmore 1980; Lipsky 1970). They argue 
that ‘street-level’ variables related to organizational routines and capacities, expertise, process 
internalization and networking are influential determinants of implementation effectiveness and 
to second order variation (Allison and Zelikow 1971; Hjern and Porter 1981; Matland 1995; 
Maynard-Moody, Musheno and Palumbo 1990; Wright 1978; Yanow 1993). Through these 
processes and their superior knowledge, lower level ag nts and institutions possess enough 
discretion and informational advantages to engineer strategies so that their preferences will likely 
triumph (Matland 1995).  
Implementation and Devolution 
 
Although, the second-order devolution/federalism literature does not resolve bottom up 
and top down implementation debates, its findings and conclusions do fit nicely within the 
uncertain nature of second-order implementation outcomes (Clingermayer and Feiock 
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2001). Some studies have found that substate governments respond to local needs after being 
empowered by their states (Fording, Soss and Schram 2007). Other studies described harmonious 
relationships with the State, but suggest that local utcomes and administrative procedures do not 
vary significantly. In these scenarios, the presence of professional norms was sufficient enough 
to overcome the motivation and authority to innovate (Harvey 2013; Pegues et al. 2012; Sheely 
2013). In other scenarios, there is a clear conflict between substate and state actors.  
State-Substate Implementation Conflict  
Turner (1990) examined Florida’s 1975 Local Governme t Comprehensive Planning Act 
(LGCPA) and its 1985 Growth Management Act. Data indicated that both acts strained the state-
local relationship. The 1975 Act required local governments to incorporate two state goals: 
environmental protection and comprehensive planning to reduce urban sprawl. The act was 
largely ineffectual because legislators failed to include the requisite enforcement powers at the 
state level to compel local compliance. Without a sate mandate, local governments avoided 
creating climates hostile to business interests (Turner 1990; See also Stone 1980, 2006). The 
1985 Growth Management Act also failed during the implementation phase. Tensions surfaced 
once the state restricted local funding authority. 
Bruhl, Linder and Sexton (2013) linked municipal poicy strategies and tactics to the 
likelihood and intensity of second order conflict. The City of Houston used multiple policy tools 
(regulatory, evidentiary and persuasion) in an attempt to implement policy change at the State 
and Federal level. Regulatory tools included city ordinances, some zoning regulations (and other 
legal actions) and contributed to an antagonistic relationship with industry and the state. The 
city’s nuisance ordinance, for example, (used only after less coercive measures failed) generated 
48 
the most intense reaction from state and industry elites and dramatically increased tensions 
between the city and state.  
The city also utilized evidentiary tools like information disclosure, monitoring and 
investigations. Compared to regulatory tools, industry and state officials viewed these as less 
intrusive and combative. The City established its own air quality monitoring and data collection 
program and used the data as leverage during efforts to shame industry into improving its 
performance. It also incorporated the data into a prioritization framework that permitted the city 
to more efficiently and effectively target its limited resources and persuasive strategies on the 
dirtiest areas/industries (Bruhl, Linder and Sexton 2013).  
A third set, persuasive tools, were the least likely to elicit an oppositional relationship. 
Tools included the use of moral persuasion and public appeals by city leaders. Mayor White 
employed this type of strategy throughout his tenur. He called for firms to be responsible for 
their air pollution and for the State to take on an increased role in protecting the region’s air 
shed. Persuasive tools also formed the foundation of the City’s Benzene Reduction Plan. The 
efforts were largely ineffective at changing industry behavior, but the plan did help the city form 
a working partnership with the national EPA (Bruhl, Linder and Sexton 2013). 
State-Substate Implementation Detachment25 
Devolution can also lead to local policy and administrative outcomes that do not vary. 
Sheely (2013) found that despite opportunities to exercise discretion and authority to make 
exceptions, California county governments’ welfare payment patterns did not change. This 
                                                   
25 While not incorporating the second order devolution explicitly, Pegues et al. (2012) did not detect much variation 
between states relative to air quality for ozone and NO2. Outside of California, states with worse air quality did not 
respond any differently from states with cleaner air even after states received primacy. In fact, the majority of 
emissions reductions were the result of federal standards and not state innovation.  
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pattern held even when the author included the Great R cession years (2007-2008).26 In short, 
county welfare offices did not exercise flexibility and discretion to respond creatively to local 
economic conditions – one of the main justifications for devolution.  
State-Substate Implementation Collaboration with Variation  
Fording, Soss and Schram (2007), however, uncovered local variations in county welfare 
benefits distribution. They connected differences in county-level implementation practices to 
local political and ideological factors.27 While, the authors refused to identify a causal 
mechanism explaining their findings, they did speculate that by devolving power to local 
agencies, state lawmakers facilitated new policymaking avenues for local bureaucrats. By 
creating new policymaking pathways for substate officials, local preferences, needs and values 
led to shifts in county welfare policy implementation. 
Local variations also became evident in many of California’s environmental policies. 
Since 2000, the State of California has passed several laws that limit local discretion via 
mandates relative to anthropogenic climate change. It established new baselines for regional 
planning, energy efficient building codes and waste reduction requirements. Despite the presence 
of unfunded mandates, the consequences/penalties for municipal non-compliance were not 
draconian. In fact, many programs were voluntary, leading Bedsworth and Hanak (2013) to 
                                                   
26 Sheely (2013) identifies three ways that administrative exclusions could be used as a way to respond to local 
needs. First, caseworkers could increase their use of the practice when economic conditions are strong. By doing so, 
they could ensure that only individuals that truly need welfare will receive it. Second, during economic slowdowns, 
agents could decrease the number of exclusions so that more individuals can access public assistance. Second, 
during recessions and slow growth periods, exclusions may increase in an attempt to limit county expenditures. 
Finally, agent behavior may not be responsive to local economic needs but rather variation could be observed due to 
local political factors.  
27 After controlling for individual-level client charcteristics 
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identify several examples of non-compliance among city governments but also of locals 
exceeding state-set standards.28  
Bedsworth and Hanak (2013) embraced the idea of state-designed ‘incubating’ periods 
for local officials. During these periods, local governments have the time to develop the 
additional capacities and resources they need to meet i pending mandates. The State’s ‘waiting 
period’ approach seems to have had some success. By 2006, over 50 percent of jurisdictions met 
the state’s waste diversion standard of 50 percent and have done so with little second order 
conflict. Krause (2010), however, cautioned that ste rules that have ‘teeth’ must come after 
incubating periods. She found that because state-level climate policies do not have ‘teeth’ to 
them, municipal climate change policies were largely unrelated to the policies passed in their 
respective state capitals.  
State-Substate Implementation Collaboration with NO Devolutionary Variation 
Harvey (2013) concluded that devolution contributes to ubnational and substate 
lawmakers’ willingness to depart from Federal goals. In the Texas context, both states and local 
governments shared in the belief of reducing welfar availability. To meet state goals, locally 
based workforce investment boards applied two main strategies. First, they restricted access to 
workfare services and welfare assistance. Second, by using small block grant surpluses, WIBs 
rewarded supporters through patronage jobs and contracts. The results, according to Harvey 
(2013) adversely affected access for the politically powerless and poor families to education, 
daycare and transportation assistance.  
                                                   
28 In some cases, non-compliers may be ineligible for positive incentives such as state grants (e.g., the new water 
conservation targets) or lower regulatory hurdles (e.g., easier environmental permitting, an incentive for infill and 
TOD projects under SB 375). Power utilities do face the prospect of fines for failing to meet renewable portfolio 
standards, but there is some compliance flexibility and the state has yet to issue any fines. 
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Second Order Federalism, the Environment and Problematic Gaps 
 
Two literatures speak to dynamics observed in Chapter 1. The first category, second 
order devolution, directly studies state-local relationships and power allocation and sharing, 
oftentimes in the arena of welfare reform. The second literature, environmental federalism, 
examines the delegation and implementation of enviro mental policies, typically beginning at 
the federal level. A smaller group of studies combines the two and examines state-local 
devolution in the context of environmental issues and/or natural resources. Even when combined, 
interested academics have not drawn a complete picture of environmental/natural resource 
second order federalism. This gap is particularly vexing in light the growing popularity and 
reliance on hydrofracking, especially in urban/suburban communities. In response, the agendas’ 
of state and local lawmakers are increasingly being occupied with fracking related questions and 
concerns.  
Gaps in the Traditional Environmental Federalism Literature  
 
Scholarly attention dedicated to U.S. environmental policy and federalism traditionally 
centers on interstate competition, policy implementation, enforcement and state-federal 
relationships (Davis 2014; Klyza and Sousa 2007; Scheberle 2004). This research continues to 
generate insights into the antecedents of state and federal environmental 
performance/commitment, governance, collaboration and policy formulation and diffusion 
(Abel, Stephan and Kraft 2007; Agrano• and McGuire 2001; Daley and Garand 2005; Duroy 
2008; Kraft, Stephan and Abel 2011; Matisoff 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Ringquist and 
Garand 1999; Scheberle 2004).  
Despite important findings, the environmental federalism literature has failed to 
sufficiently account for state and local governing relationships. This oversight is problematic for 
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three reasons. First, state and city governments are recognizing and acting upon sustainable 
development discourses and policies, often doing so without federal leadership. Second, states 
have retained their traditional authority over land use (including oil and gas drilling), public 
health and public safety and are responsible for the administration of several federal 
environmental programs. Finally, through their decisions and powers, state and local entity 
policymakers shape the scale, scope and pace of environmental outcomes and their relationships 
with one another (Betsill and Rabe 2009; Davis 2012, 2014; Klyza and Sousa 2007).  
State and Local Sustainable Development 
 
Academic and professional discussions of sustainabil ty have reshaped the between the 
public and private sector, but have yet to systematically address state-municipal relationships. 
The contemporary sustainability movement believes that public actions ought to reflect balance 
between environmental, economic and social equity concerns (Dryzek 2005; Hempel 2009; 
Keller 2009; Pralle 2007).  
As the figure below shows, policies may be placed anywhere inside a triangle (Dryzek 
2005). In some cases, state and local goals and policies relative to sustainable development may 
align with one another and, in other examples, might exist in opposition.   
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By engendering a balance, sustainable development avoids ecological thresholds and 
mitigates contemporary environmental challenges (Adams 2006; Kates, Parris and Leiserowitz 
2005; Meadows et al. 1972; Opp and Saunders 2013; Portney 2003; Saha and Paterson 2008; 
Zarsky 2010). Sustainability policies range in scale, i.e. local and national regimes, and in 
stringency such as policy steering to top-down coeri n (Barry and Eckersley 2005; Vig and 
Kraft 2009; Ostrom 2007).  
The empirical record shows that environmental protection efforts can contribute to state 
and local economic growth (Feiock and Kim 2001; Kamienicki 2006; Layzer 2002; Ringquist 
and Feiock 1998; Vig and Kraft 2009). Feiock and Stream (2001) identified a positive 
relationship between firms’ performance and environme tal regulation. Regulation, they 
conceded, can generate new costs for businesses, particularly by certain industries and 
underscores their opposition to environmental policies. But regulation, they found, was just as 
likely to produce economic benefits. First, by ensuring compliance, firms can compete on a level 
playing field and leading to fairer competition. Second, regulations provide investment and 
planning stability, leading to the potential of firms achieving a competitive advantage. Stability 
produces less erratic returns on investment and more predictable and higher profits. Third, state 
investments add to a firm’s short-term expenses but public investment can also reduce its long-
term liabilities, future compliance costs and waste disposal responsibilities – each improving the 
firm’s bottom line. Fourth, by supporting more sustainable forms of economic development, the 
business community may discourage future regulation and may secure a seat at the table when 
state or local lawmakers are weighing new policies or programs (Gunningham, Kagan and 
Thornton 2003; Layzer 2002).  
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Recent literature recognizes the unique and powerful role that subnational and substate 
governments play in promoting more sustainable development public policies and protecting 
resident’s quality of life. Portney (2003) broadened this literature to include research on 
municipal governments. His 23-city sustainability index suggested that wealthier, older and 
communities in Western U.S. States take sustainabilty more seriously as compared to those 
cities with higher levels of poverty and which are located in the East and South.29 Citizen 
engagement, he added, explains differing levels of municipal sustainability commitment as well. 
In their study of twenty municipal climate action plans, Basset and Shandas (2010) also found 
that more successful plans fostered increased levels of citizen engagement and contributed to a 
greater number of climate-change learning opportunities for citizens. These relationships 
remained even when the researchers controlled for the education levels of the population, city 
size and political ideology.30 
State and Local Historical and Current Roles 
  
A changing regulatory and policymaking environment has contributed to lawmakers’ 
recognition of the limits of a federal-centric approach and the benefits of first and second order 
devolution. Alternative regulatory approaches emerged in the 1980s that focused on 
decentralizing and devolving federal power (Kenney 1999; Scheberle 2004). New governing 
strategies emphasized flatter management styles, as well as the inclusion of private actors and of 
decision-makers from sub-national units of governmet. Contemporary environmental 
policymaking reflects this change as the federal government now shares many of its 
responsibilities with state, regional and local (city and county) governments (Scholz and Wang 
                                                   
29 Higher median family incomes, unemployment rate and home values each produced coefficients that were not 
statistically significant. 
30 Other variables were conspicuous by their lack of statistical significance. Support for the Democratic Presidential 
nominee, for example, was unrelated to a city’s commit ent to sustainability. 
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2006; Woods and Potoski 2010). This recognition, however, has not translated into rigorous 
analyses of how states and cities engage one another t  solve environmental collective action 
problems, such as urban drilling. 
Under the partial preemption framework, command and control language permits the 
devolution of responsibility to state and local governments. Although Congress and federal 
managers still establish national standards, sub-national entities act as the primary enforcement 
agents (Konisky and Woods 2012; Scheberle 2004). Rabe (2006) estimated that the states issue 
over 90 percent of all environmental permits, complete approximately 75 percent of 
environmental enforcement actions, but rely on the fed ral government for less than a quarter of 
their funding. Continuing the downward movement of p licy management, many states have 
formally devolved enforcement and administrative responsibilities to local officials (Woods and 
Potoski 2010). Woods’ and Potoski’s (2010) study added empirical evidence by noting the 
various forms that second order relationships may take. Their study identifies thirty-three states 
that have devolved aspects of the Federal Clean Air Act to city, county or regional bodies. Of 
those thirty-three: 
• Two states provide local agencies the authority to establish air quality standards. 
• Thirteen states allow locals to operate the majority f their ambient air quality monitoring 
stations. 
• Six states place primary enforcement power with local regulators. 
State and local governments, in addition to their federal responsibilities, promulgate a 
variety of their own environmental policies (Portney and Berry 2010). Like the federal 
government, state and local policies range from outright coercion to voluntary programs and 
market incentives (Hempel 2009; Vig and Kraft 2010). Lehner (1993) pointed out that state and 
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city governments provide a number of “dirty” services including: trash removal, recycling, waste 
management, wastewater/stormwater treatment and road building and maintenance. City 
governments also enact land use-management plans, pss ordinances and write and enforce 
zoning laws (Betstill 2001; Trisolini 2010). Other local governments provide electrical services 
to their citizens, giving residents some influence in the sources used for power generation. 
Through such powers, state and local governments influence the pace and location of 
development, neighborhood aesthetics, the availability of renewable power and access to 
recycling and waste diversion programs.  
According to Busche (2010) state and local governments may further influence 
environmental outcomes because of their close proximity to citizens. By being closer and more 
accessible to citizens, state and local policymakers have more opportunities to learn of their 
preferences and, in consequence, pass laws that better reflect their community’s needs and 
concerns. Portney (2009) identified local councilmemb rs and staff as particularly well 
positioned to listen and respond to citizens. By doing so, city officials may create a political 
context supportive of democratic governance by fomenting stronger beliefs in political efficacy 
among citizens, encouraging the recognition of potential co-benefits between the environment 
and the economy and by improving citizen’ awareness and increasing their understanding of the 
severity, exigency and veracity of today’s environmental problems.   
Stubborn Environmental Problems 
 
There are normative reasons why research of state-local environmental federalism is 
needed. Enhanced levels of local capacity, manageril flexibility and knowledge reflect the 
complexity of ecological and natural resource question  (Bowman and Kearney 2012; Schneider, 
Jacoby and Lewis 2011). As problems become more diverse and intractable, governments are 
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also acknowledging their co-dependencies and shortcomings. Locals, for example, cannot 
effectively address environmental spillovers and externalities because ecological issues do not 
follow jurisdictional boundaries and impact multiple communities (Ostrom 2009). Conversely, 
States’ policies that fail to recognize the localized impacts of environmental harms are typically 
ineffective at mitigating the problem, inefficiently administered and implemented and contribute 
to state-local frustrations (Krane, Rigos and Hill 2001; Zimmerman 2012).  
Gaps in the Second Order Federalism/Devolution Literature  
 
 The gaps in the second order research lead to an incomplete understanding of state-local 
relationships. Researchers have primarily addressed the questions of whether or not devolution is 
taking place, the decision to devolve and the outcomes of second order devolution. Despite, the 
literature’s infancy, it too, has produced key findings that form the foundation of this chapter. 
But, its missing pieces make ample room for more detailed accounts and for projects that begin 
the work of second order theory building.  
Broad Trends  
The first major question asked by devolution scholars is: ‘is devolution occurring?’ The 
general answer is that second order devolution is the least likely to occur in areas of revenue 
collections and expenditures (Bowman and Kearney 2010, 2011; Stephens 1974). These studies 
incorporate data on a wide variety of very broad policy areas including natural resources, 
education and public safety. This focus however, misses critical jurisdictional, historical and 
issue specific variation. States, for example, may enlarge or restrict local governments’ 
operational home rule and land use authority when it comes to fracking while leaving other 
natural resource issues alone. Courts may also employ various tests in order to determine what is 
an inherent local power (both in the historical and contemporary sense), what is a mixed state-
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local issue, what constitutes a municipal police power and to what extent concurrent regulation is 
permissible (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001; Richardson 2011).  
Broad measures also miss experiential and historical d fferences. States do not 
necessarily share similar experiences with natural gas extraction; they may hold differing 
understandings of fracking’s costs and benefits and disagree on the proper role, scope and 
powers of local governments. On the other hand, states with long legacies of home rule authority 
may centralize natural gas policies because they perceiv  the alternative as risky or because they 
see statewide control as a way to encourage economic development while also protecting the 
environment.  
Implementation and Outcomes 
This line of research has identified multiple scenarios, i.e. variation and state-local 
relationships, but lacks consensus as to the factors and causes of such relationships. Below is a 
summary of the most current research’s findings including the relationship between state-
substate actors and whether devolution succeeded in local variation. 
 State-Substate Implementation Conflict with Devolutionary Variation  
 Funding and Mandates (Bruhl, Linder and Sexton 2013; Turner 1990)  
 State-Substate Implementation Detachment with NO Devolutionary Variation  
 California welfare distribution (Sheely 2013)  
 State-Substate Implementation Collaboration with Devolutionary Variation  
 Florida welfare distribution (Fording, Soss and Schram 2007)  
 California Cities and Climate Change (Bedsworth andHanak (2013)  
 State-Substate Implementation Collaboration with NO Devolutionary Variation  
 Texas Workforce Training (Harvey 2013) 
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 North Carolina Welfare (Cho et al. 2005) 
Such studies have produced a wide variety of findings and insights but fall short in two 
aspects. First, each lacks attention to theory building and to generating explanatory relationships 
relative to when oppositional/collaborative relationships are likely. Building more effective 
models of state-local interactions and of second order variations requires an expansion of the 
pool of policies and explanatory factors, such as hydraulic fracturing. The centralization/risk 
model, presented in Chapter 3, is an explanatory model that may provide a comprehensive and 
cogent understanding of the connection between institutional centralization/decentralization, risk 
and resulting second order relationships.   
Second, the focus on welfare devolution has missed other potential second order 
relationship outcomes. Bowman and Kearney (2011), for instance, argue that outcomes are 
partially a function of municipal/local capacity and the community’s willingness to support its 
new responsibilities. They go further to provide a number of expected outcomes relative to state 
policy, summarized in Table 1 below.  
Table 2.1 Second Order Relationship Outcomes 
Scenario State-Local Relationship 
Possess enough resources to perform new 
state-ordered tasks or lack the willingness to 
challenge the state Little or no conflict, clarification 
Possess enough expertise/willingness to go 
around the state) or to challenge the state’s 
authority Potential Conflict 
Local refusal, failure, departure Recentralization/Retrenchment or Conflict 
Unexpected consequences Unknown 
Municipal Uncertainty about fracking’s 
environmental and economic impacts Conflict or Collaboration 
Source: Bowman and Kearney 2011 
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The table details a number of possible actions and outcomes but does not incorporate an 
explanatory element, i.e. what circumstances lead to local refusal or failure to comply with the 
state. This focus also misses several potential outcomes. First, it does not sufficiently account for 
the role of outside factors such as the involvement of third party actors or the use of voluntary 
agreements that cities may sign with industry. Second, the literature does not include the 
potential for collaboration between states and city governments.  
Concluding Thoughts  
 
When viewed in their entirety, the literatures in this chapter paint a picture of 
intergovernmental dynamics that are ephemeral and tempered by a myriad of contemporary and 
historical forces. Whether it is through second order evolution or through their inherent powers, 
state and local governments are central actors in addressing current environmental challenges. 
Cities are sites of high-energy consumption and waste production, and through their land use and 
waste management functions they affect overall carbon emissions, renewable power options and 
natural gas drilling. Local authorities are often key actors in terms of coordinating action 
between the state, cities and citizens. Finally, the capacity of many state and municipal 
governments has grown in recent years and they possess a wealth of experiences in addressing 
environmental issues including climate change mitigation, bio-diversity, renewable power and 
natural gas exploration. Despite these growing and transforming roles, scholars have yet to 
systemically evaluate the factors associated with opposition, detached and collaborative state-
municipal relationships.  
In the U.S context, environmental challenges are rip for state and local government 
involvement. In California, pressures to devolve power culminated in Proposition 31, a 2012 
ballot question. The failed initiative would have allocated new powers to cities, counties and 
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schools to implement many of the state’s environmental programs.31 California’s attempted 
devolution was not necessarily a partisan issue. Th Natural Resources Defense Council 
announced “Prop 31 would allow local governments to override landmark state laws that ensure 
a healthy and clean environment for all Californians” (NRDC 2012a). They allied themselves 
with the League of Women Voters, California Tea Party Members and the California League of 
Conservation Voters to urge voters to vote against the plan (NRDC 2012a). In explaining his 
opposition, Tea Party writer Stanley Kurtz, warned of unelected and unaccountable regional 
governments circumventing the public will. He equated the act to “redistribution without 
representation, an Americanized version of the undemocratic financial and political 
arrangements currently killing the European Union” (Greene 2012).  
Much like California’s Prop 31, fracking has created a state and local political context 
replete with legal challenges/threats, heated rhetoic, the execution of political strategies but also 
examples of cooperation and collaboration. As detailed in Chapter 1, urban natural gas extraction 
is increasingly encroaching upon and impacting local governments by reducing their air quality, 
threatening drinking water and reducing residents’ quality of life (Davis 2012; Fisk 2013; Rabe 
and Borick 2013; Wiseman 2009). At the same time, th  extraction of natural gas generates state 
and local economic, tax and direct/indirect employment benefits. These tradeoffs underpin much 





                                                   
31 The plan was financed through a percentage of state ales and property taxes (up to $200 million annully) (KCET 
2012). 
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Chapter 3                                                                                                        
Design and Methodology 
 
 
Prior to engaging in quantitative or qualitative work, the researcher must make a number 
of design choices. He or she must formulate theoretically rich research questions, adopt the 
appropriate conceptual framework, operationalize the dependent and independent variables and 
determine the project’s overall scope and logistical boundaries (Tannewald 2007; Yin 2009). 
This chapter aims to do that. It presents and explains the project’s overall methodology and 
design decisions. It begins with a brief description of three significant research questions and an 
explanation of why a mixed-methods approach is appropriate for this project. The chapter 
transitions to a description of the ‘operational details’ of case selections of both the states and 
municipalities being assessed.  
To explore the ‘second order’ dynamics of fracking, three major questions guide this 
dissertation.  
• What state structures govern state-municipal relationships when it comes to hydraulic 
fracturing in urban and suburban communities?  
• How and to what extent do municipalities regulate fracking, i.e. what are the types and 
popularity of city-level policy response to fracking?  
• Why do some municipalities promulgate policies oppose state-level goals associated with 
extraction, i.e. challenge their state’s preemptive authority while others do not?  
• What is the relationship between ‘sustainable economic development,’ mobilization and 




Using Mixed Methods  
 
I utilize the comparative case study method to answer my three major research questions. 
Case studies offer a number of advantages for policy and administrative research (Bennett and 
Elman 2006; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; 
Mahoney 2010; Yin 2009). Yin (2009) argued that case studies are appropriate when the 
research goal is to understand a contextually driven, real-life social and/or political phenomenon 
in depth. Case studies, Yin continues, offer the opportunity for research to develop a more 
nuanced and detailed account of causal factors or influences. Insights can then inform alternative 
hypotheses to be tested in future research (George and Bennett 2005; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). 
Finally, case studies are suitable when the state of applicable research is inchoate. This makes it 
difficult for researchers to draw upon a rich body of literature to test the plausibility of an 
expected relationship or set of relationships.  
Mixed methods bring balance and rigor to a research p oject. Strictly qualitative work, 
for example, makes it difficult for a researcher to make generalizations about the sample’s 
overall population and to identify explicit causal linkages between the variables (George and 
Bennett 2005; Yin 2009). Without qualitative work, however, research may miss out on key 
explanatory variables and more nuanced relationships. Statistical techniques, without regard to 
qualitative measures, are also problematic. There are limitations to effectively operationalizing 
variables and to accurately measuring the effects of potential explanatory factors such as: 
focusing events, interest group influence and communication, social capital and the political will 
necessary to challenge the state. Yet, quantitative methods improve the researcher’s ability to 
make statistical inferences and probabilistic statements (George and Bennett 2005; Yin 2009).   
64 
The ephemeral nature of intergovernmental relations and the exploratory nature of this 
project also limit the utility of relying on just one methodology. Intergovernmental relationships 
change rapidly and build upon existing working relationships (Anderson 1960; Klyza and Sousa 
2007; Wright 1978). As evidenced in Chapters 4-6, new dynamics, unforeseen challenges and 
random focusing events can further complicate measuring second order and intergovernmental 
relationships (Davis 2014; Frederickson et al. 2012; McGuire 2005; Stever 2005; Wright 1978).  
Units of Analysis 
 
City-state relationships exist within a multi-dimensional web of multiple governing 
relationships (McGuire 2005). States and municipal governments operate within this web while 
concurrently confronting and debating the costs and benefits of hydraulic fracturing. States are 
typically the dominant actor but their power is incomplete. They set broad parameters by which 
state regulators and municipal officials make drilling and related land use decisions (Bowman 
and Kearney 2011; Woods and Potoski 2010). City governments also play a critical role in 
second order relations. They often implement state decisions and regulations and make decisions 
that can impede or facilitate state policy goals. Communities also experience, first-hand, the 
environmental and economic impacts of many state lev l decisions (Bowman and Kearney 
2012). Recognizing the pivotal role in fracking land-use politics, this dissertation focuses on 
cities/towns (that have land-use and zoning authority) as the unit of analysis.  
State Involvement 
Second order natural gas politics exemplify the powerful role of state institutions (Cremer 
and Palfrey 2002; Davis 2014, 2012; Mashaw 2006; McGarity1991; Rabe and Borick 2013, 
Riccucci 1995). Even in states with strong home rulprovisions, State Oil and Gas Commissions 
or Departments of Natural Resources often establish and enforce the protocols and procedures 
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that operators follow (e.g. well intensity and siting, information disclosure, environmental health 
and safety regulations, setbacks, impacts to wildlife (if any), public notifications and waste 
management). They do in varying degrees of stringency for both municipalities and industry.32,33 
Many of the policies favored by industry and protected by the sub-government’s hegemonic 
position limit opportunities for opponents to achieve non-incremental policy changes (Hayes 
2001). 
State policymakers can also establish policies that lead to collaborative relationships with 
city governments. Finally, the state may remain on the ‘sidelines’ and permit municipalities a 
large role in setting rules for the land use impacts of urban drilling and fracking (Barnes 2013; 
Boscarino 2013; Goho 2012). Conversely, state leaders may adopt an antagonistic position 
towards local governments by participating in lawsuits against local entities.   
Municipal Roles 
Cities play a critical role in the environmental governance puzzle (Boscarino 2013). 
According to Bowman and Kearney (2012), states are the dominant actors in establishing the 
jurisdictional boundaries of second order federalism. Yet, the parties responsible for devolution’s 
outcomes are less clear (Bowman and Kearney 2012). Second order outcomes are a function of 
municipal governing capacity and the willingness of city leaders to support their new policy 
responsibilities (See also Gargan 1997; Kodras 2001). Bowman and Kearney’s (2011) study 
depicted several scenarios and an expected outcome, as shown in the table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1 Devolution’s Potential Outcomes 
Municipal Centric Scenario  State-City Relationship Outcome 
1. The city possesses enough resources to perform 
new state-ordered tasks or it lacks the 
willingness to challenge the state  Little or no conflict 
                                                   
32 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 – with the descriptions of both the Dillon and Cooley Doctrines.  
33 Specific permit requirements will be discussed in greater depth during the presentation of the case studie .  
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2. A city refuses or fails from the state’s goals  Recentralization/Retrenchment or 
Conflict 
3. A city circumvents the state and but does so in a 
way that does not challenge the state’s 
preemptive authority  Unknown 
4. A city action that leads to unexpected 
consequences i.e. third way or a departure from 
state policy/goals Unknown 
 
In the first relationship scenario, cities possess enough resources and organizational 
capacity to adequately perform state-ordered tasks nd to implement policies effectively. This 
can be accomplished with or without state assistance. Bowman and Kearney (2011) expect that 
under such a scenario, little to no second order confli t is likely. The authors’ second scenario 
examines attempts to devolve power that fail. The most likely result is the state (re)centralizing 
authority and to exacerbate second order tensions. The third outcome, non-purposive and 
unexpected, contributes to expected and unforeseen political consequences, which Bowman and 
Kearney (2011, 577) describe, “as having the potential to be unpleasant.”  
Municipal governments possess formal and informal powers that shape the politics of 
second order fracking and the larger issue of policy implementation. They pass and enforce 
zoning ordinances, abate nuisances and enact other laws that protect the public’s health and 
safety. Like interest groups, municipal political strategies include issue avoidance or expansion, 
and negotiation with state officials and industry. Cities might also adopt outsider strategies such 
as protest tactics, press releases and conferences to advocate for their claims (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991; Berman 2003; Bruhl, Linder and Sexton. 2013; Kincaid 1999; Pralle 2006; 
Riverstone-Newell 2012; Sherman 2011; Zimmerman 1995; 2012). Whether it is through formal 
or informal actions, municipalities can and do shape second order outcomes and the relationships 





How do city governments make decisions about enviromental policy? Are choices 
between economic development and environmental protecti n mutually exclusive? Does this 
dichotomy extend to decisions about urban natural gas drilling? With regard to municipal 
decision-making, I ask several questions: what actions are municipalities taking towards 
fracking? And, do certain predictors influence the type of policy actions adopted or taken by city 
governments? The dependent variable therefore consists of municipal policy actions taken to 
either impede or facilitate natural gas development. 
I placed each sampled (discussed on pages 77-83) city’s policy (substantive and 
symbolic) on a municipal response ‘table’, placement of which offers a number of 
methodological advantages. First, as a heuristic, it captures the range of second order dynamics 
and is particularly useful in categorizing municipal actions and understanding how state and 
industry officials will likely respond, i.e. will the municipal actions lead to a supportive 
(collaborative), indifferent (too soft) or oppositional (too loud) second order relationship (Bruhl, 
Linder and Sexton 2013). Application of a policy scale also helps answer the dissertation’s 
second major research questions by providing a descriptive and explanatory account of how 
municipalities are responding (ranging from symbolic resolution and more coercive measures 
banning fracking) to increasing urban drilling.  
Finally, the small number of cities per state and their distribution pattern preclude using 
an ordered probit model. By scaling the municipal responses, however, it is possible to group 
them into new dichotomous dependent variables that address the third question (challenging the 
state’s preemptive authority) via logistic regression. For each case study, I recode municipal 
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policy (or policies) as a ‘yes/no’ variable as to whether or not the municipality exceeds the 
state’s policies and whether city policy challenges the state’s preemptive authority.  
Opposition  
(From a state centric perspective that supports fracking) 
Bans and/or 
Moratoria 
Zoning regulations that exceed the 
state standards and limit where 








Circumventing the State 
(Exceeds State – No Challenge to 
State Authority  
Support  
(From a state centric perspective that supports 
fracking)  
Voluntary agreements with 
industry that still permit 
development 
No Action, special use permits 
or resolution in support of 
development 
Ancillary actions i.e. 
selling/ leasing 
excess water 
Figure 3.1 Municipal Governments’ Hydraulic Fractur ing Policy Action Scale 
 
Outright bans and longer-term moratoriums on natural gas development are likely the 
most severe policy options that a municipality can enact. Moving towards the center and less 
likely to raise the ire of industry are policies that restrict oil and gas development to areas zoned 
specifically for development (or restrict it in certain zoned areas i.e. residential) and bans on 
public spaces such as parks. Despite permitting development, zoning regulations are considered 
‘opposition’ since they restrict company autonomy, limit where drilling may take place and 
typically exceed state setback/buffer zone policies. Further on the continuum are resolutions 
against the practice. These actions are not legally enforceable but are indicative of the 
municipality registering its opinion on fracking or second order policies and going on record for 
or against some policy (Barnes 2013).  
Municipal actions may also restrict industrial development without challenging the state’s 
preemptive authority. Closest to the middle of the scale are voluntary agreements between cities 
and industry with terms that generally exceed state standards. Voluntary agreements can vary in 
their scope, applicability and even the actors involved. Despite wide variation, their genesis is 
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often precipitated by a desire to increase participants’ (local government, state government and 
oil and natural gas industry) flexibility, improve effectiveness (protect the environment and 
public safety while permitting development) and to decrease transaction costs (Carmin, Darnall 
and Mil-Homens 2003).  
Voluntary agreements can be a considered a ‘third way.’ They are legal documents that 
permit more restricted forms and locations of development but are not at the scale of 
comprehensive zoning regulations. As compared to zoning schemes, they are more ad-hoc, do 
not necessarily involve the state and indicative of a local community’s recognition of the state’s 
legal authority but simultaneously demonstrating dissatisfaction with the state’s regulatory 
regime relative to fracking. Voluntary agreements between cities and industry are typically 
focused on providing the city legal protections, incorporating citizen concerns about air and 
water quality, emergency and disaster planning, enforcement and information sharing and 
regulatory stability for industry by filling in gaps in state language.  
Municipal governments may also opt to remain silent and rely on applicable state law and 
policy to guide development. Finally, city governments can voice their support for fracking by 
promoting additional development within their limits or by passing industry-favored legislation 








Table 3.2 Municipal Policy Position Coding Schematic 
Policy Action Coding Value 
Bans or Moratoria  0 
Zoning Regulations (more stringent than state laws) 1 
Bans on municipal owned spaces (parks, easements) 2 
Resolutions against the practice 3 
Voluntary Agreements (stricter than state standards) 
but permitted under state law 4 
No Action/resolutions favoring industry/special use 
permits (that do not conflict with state law) 5 
Actions increasing development (oil and gas) 
including leasing excess water and/or leasing public 
spaces for oil and gas development 6 
 
Methods for Selection 
 
I use multiple mechanisms to identify and select cases for inclusion. I began by excluding 
all jurisdictions that currently do not have and/or will be unlikely to have future drilling 
activities.34 The second and third mechanisms used to identify appropriate cases are based on a 
state centralization continuum and on a case selection technique known as diverse cases. By 
maximizing the variance along the major independent variable (the state centralization/ 
decentralization continuum) I selected the states of Colorado, Ohio and Texas. These states 
represent a high, middle and low degree of state centralization (diverse cases) relative to fracking 
and have hundreds of thousands of citizens living within one mile of a fracking well. The logic 
for each is addressed in the following paragraphs. 
Identifying the States 
 
A number of possible measures and organizational schemes can be used to identify states, 
appropriate for consideration. One possible way to organize these relationships is to classify 
them according to a continuum based on degree of centralization of natural gas policies and the 
                                                   
34 I accomplished this by examining where fracking operations are currently ongoing and where the Energy 
Information Administration has located oil and gas re erves. The logic for this filter is that state and substate 
governments that currently do not have fracking and likely will not in the future are unlikely to be engaged in the 
intergovernmental management of fracking. 
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proximity of natural gas wells to citizens. Under this framework, I place the degree of 
centralization (state control) on the X-axis. In an attempt to approximate proximity and exposure 
to development, a second dimension (Y-Axis) ranks the number of residents located within one 
mile of a frack site. Once eligible states are identifi d, I use the state’s political leanings and 
geographic region as additional natural break points a d as ways to ensure that the selected states 
are diverse (Patton 2002; Seawright and Gerring 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 State Filters 
 
Why Proximity? 
There are a variety of mechanisms that identify the sources responsible for causing the 
public to perceive something as risky – both involuntary and voluntary.35 While the particular 
source causing a citizen or institution to evaluate something as risky is certainly interesting, it is 
not necessary for understanding why it is an important antecedent to understanding citizen 
behavior and the working relationships between state  nd city governments. Rather, it is the 
effects of unwanted proximity and its motivational impacts on citizens and municipal actors that 
                                                   
35 The psychometric model grounds risk evaluation in the activity’s characteristics (number of people exposed or 
wells, or acres, etc), its novelty and the severity of potential accidents i.e. a spill (Slimak and Dietz 2006). A second 
model, the value-belief-norm theory (VBN) argues that that risk is more related to characteristics of the individual 
evaluating the activity rather than the activity itself. According to this latter approach, variables such as partisanship 
filter new information and organize the degree of risk that the individual associates with the project (Dietz, 
Fitzgerald and Shwom 2005; Sjoberg 2000; Slimak and Dietz 2006). 
 Higher Proximity  
             Lower Proximity 
               Decentralized Centralized 
I focus on all high 
proximity states but with 
varying degrees of state 
centralization.  
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are essential to understanding interactions between states and city governments. The selection of 
states based on citizens’ proximity to wells rather t an overall production recognizes the role 
proximity plays in site-based political disputes and limits this analysis to states in which fracking 
may be occupying a place on state and local institutional agendas. 
Viewing something (like a frack site) as an unnecessary intrusion on quality of life can 
act as a motivational factor. They interact with oter perceptual factors such as ideology and 
beliefs about a policy or specific problem. Their combined impact shapes an individual’s 
behavior and intentions, i.e. his or her motivation t  act (Ajzen 1991). Highly motivated 
individuals, Ajzen (1991) found are more likely to push for a desired outcome and more willing 
to spend the time and energy necessary to carry out goals as compared to less motivated 
individuals. Place-based disputes, such as those associ ted with fracking well sites or 
underground injection wells, typically originate because of how nearby populations understand 
and perceive (tempered by ideology, etc.) the costs and rewards of the facility or project (Bidwell 
2013; Davis and Fisk 2014; Hamilton, Colocousis andDuncan 2010; Schlosberg 2007; Sherman 
2011; Slovic 1987; Tierney et al 2001). 
Elevated levels of unwanted proximity or closeness to wells among citizens contribute to 
a number of possible second order dynamics. Municipal officials, who believe that fracking 
threatens their environment or citizens are likely to be more receptive to a grassroots group 
seeking to build a citizen initiative restricting development than those city officials who do not 
see fracking as encroaching too close to the community. They may also be more motivated 
themselves to pass a ban or to seek out a memorandum of nderstanding (voluntary) agreement 
with a developer. Concerned citizens and elected lea ers may also utilize their municipality’s 
zoning and public health power to restrict fracking. Focusing events like a spill, accident or a 
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water-well running dry can further sharpen citizens’ or city councilmembers’ perceptions 
(Birkland 2011). Following a focusing event, citizens living or working close to the frack site or 
underground injection well may activate even more citizens in support of municipal challenges 
to the state’s preemptive authority.  
This first dimension reduces the number of possible states to eleven. The following table 
shows each of these states along with the number of individuals living within one mile of a 
natural gas well (Gold 2013). Residents in these state  are more likely to feel the impacts of 
development, to be exposed to potential environmental risks and to experience infrastructure 
strains of fracking. They are also more likely to encounter air and water pollution and to face 
exposure to dangerous chemicals should there be a spill of fracking fluids or wastes. I also list 
other factors such as the state’s ideological predisposition, its overall production of natural gas, 
its region and the state’s economic dependency on oil and natural gas extraction.  
Table 3.3 Selected State Level Characteristics for Natural Gas Producing States 
 State 
Pop within 1 mile 









Texas 6.09 8 7.42 percent Red Oil Patch 
Ohio 2.63 20 0.12 percent Blue Rust Belt 
Pennsylvania 1.78 12 0.27 percent Blue Rust Belt 
California 1.62 21 0.81 percent Blue West 
Oklahoma 1.17 4 7.86 percent Red Oil Patch 
Louisiana 1.06 2 8.13 percent Red Oil Patch 
Colorado 0.34 7 2.57 percent Blue 
Mountain 
West 
Michigan 0.25 19 0.05 percent Blue Rust Belt 
New Mexico 0.19 3 5.85 percent Blue 
Mountain 
West 





North Dakota 0.04 11 1.96 percent Red Plains 





To further refine the set of states, I applied a case selection strategy known as diverse 
cases. The strategy seeks to maximize variation along a chosen variable, state-city centralization 
(George and Bennett 2005). Seawright and Gerring (2008) contend that the approach is ideal for 
exploratory and hypothesis seeking studies because it capitalizes on the variation present in at 
least two cases that represent the full range of the hypothesized causal relationship. Finally, the 
strategy forces a researcher to specifically identify and select a diverse array of cases, thereby 
helping to improve the researcher’s ability to draw generalizations (Seawright and Gerring 
2008).36 Among the list of higher-proximity states, I selected a highly centralized, a moderately 
centralized state and a decentralized state.  
Following the second order federalism literature, I place relative degrees of power 
allocation on a continuum from highly state centric o decentralized and locally-centered 
(Bowman and Kearney 2012; Richardson 2011). Specifically, I evaluate centralization by 
examining municipal authority relative to well siting, setbacks and land use authority, the policy 
areas Davis (2012, 2014) identified as being important o municipal governments.  
With this second major filter, I identify three cases, two of which represent extreme 
values (centralized and decentralized) and a third at is an average case. This dimension of 
interest (centralization) is supplemented with other natural breakpoints including region, the 
state’s economic dependency on oil and natural gas extraction and the state’s political leanings, 
as shown in Table 3.3 (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2007; Elman 2005). Each breakpoint 
helped achieve maximum variation so that the project’s results may better represent all states and 
                                                   
36 The inclusion of all states may distort the actual distribution of cases, especially if there are more centralized 
states than decentralized or vice versa. Despite this weakness, Seawright and Gerring (2008) write that this selection 
technique is among the most representative case study technique and offers the researcher the ability to make some 
generalized claims.   
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municipal governments. The states selected, Colorado, Ohio and Texas differ along the most 
pertinent dimension, the state centralization of natural gas regulatory and land use power. These 
states also vary along regional, political, and economic dimensions.  
An issue specific scale can better reflect the dynamic nature of intergovernmental 
management. In other words, the state-local legal rel tionship when portrayed using the Dillon-
Cooley dichotomy is overly reductionist. Even when organized along broad categories, such as 
public safety or natural resources, researchers may miss critical state-level differences. A state 
may be highly centralized for the purpose of revenues and collections but still authorize local 
governments to establish zoning, public health and safety ordinances and to promulgate 
comprehensive land use regulations. Cities in centralized states may deliver water and power to 
citizens, further shaping the character of second order relations. Conversely, in decentralized 
states with a long history of home rule, natural gas regulatory power may be centralized in an 
effort to achieve state goals, even at the expense of local control (Berman 2003; Bowman and 
Kearney 2011; 2012; Krueger and Bernick 2012; Zimmerman 1995; 2012).  








Natural Break Points 
Region Politics 
Oil and Gas 
percent of GDP 
Colorado Centralized High 
Mountain 
West Blue 2.5percent 
Ohio Middle Ground High 
East/Rust 
Belt Purple .12percent 








The Selected States 
 
Colorado: A Centralized State  
Colorado is an ideal example of a centralized state. First, the legislature, through passage 
of applicable statutes, and reaffirmed by the State Supreme Court, has centralized natural gas 
regulatory power in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) and 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE). State regulation preempts 
cities from regulating any portion of the natural gs life cycle process including the drilling, 
completion, operation, abandonment and the location of wells, setback distances and air and 
water quality standards. This power has been upheld in recent State Supreme Court decisions, 
which clarified that local regulations are only lawful when they do not materially conflict with 
COGCC regulations and when they do not impede upon the state’s goal of orderly natural gas 
development (Davis 2014; 2012). Local governments’ participation is limited to a public hearing 
or sharing information. Some cities, working within constraints of state law, have signed 
voluntary agreements with operators that exceed state etback standards.  
Colorado also represents the intermountain west region. While the state’s politics reflect 
a bluish hue, it has a long history of promoting natur l gas production. This legacy is similar to 
other Western states such as Wyoming, Montana and New Mexico. And until recently, these 
states were fairly similar in the powerful role that oil and gas operations played in their 
respective state’s economies (Wyoming excluded) (Davis 2012).  
Ohio: A Middle Ground Approach 
Ohio represents a middle ground example for several r asons. House Bills HB 278 and 
HB 299 authorized the State Division of Mineral Resources Management to regulate natural gas 
permitting, siting and production. The State Constitution, however, tempers the ODNR’s 
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authority, by authorizing municipalities to play an important role in environmental protection 
(water) and conservation (Ohio DNR 2014).  
Positions of the legislature and State Courts are also indicative of a middle ground 
approach to second order federalism. The legislature vested Ohio’s cities and townships with 
public health and safety and comprehensive land use planning authority. Cities may limit 
fracking by establishing conservation or environmental zones, which protect the public’s health 
and safety and the environment (Nolon 2013). The Ohio State Supreme Court, however, in the 
Newbury case, also held that should cities adopt fracking restrictions, they must bear the burden 
of proof that they are doing so to accomplish local health and safety goals.  
Ohio exemplifies some of the challenges in eastern and rust belt states such as New York, 
Michigan, West Virginia and Pennsylvania. For many of these states’ policymakers, fracking is 
an attractive way to reinvigorate stagnant economies and to replenish local and state coffers. 
Ohio also represents one of the ‘new players’ in natural gas politics and its associated 
environmental costs. The discovery and mining of the Marcellus and Utica Shale Plays began in 
the 2000s and continues today. Finally, for most rubelt states, oil and natural gas operations 
occupy a small but growing role in the economy. 
Texas: A Decentralized Approach  
The most decentralized of the three states is Texas. At the state level, two agencies 
oversee fracking operations. The Railroad Commission of Texas (or RRC) develops and enforces 
rules relating to technical (and subsurface) aspect of drilling, well intensity, safety and 
groundwater protection. The Texas Commission on Enviro mental Quality oversees air quality 
and emissions, offsite environmental impacts and well casing and cement regulations (Wittmeyer 
2013). Under Texas law, home rule cities still may promulgate regulations that directly impact 
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fracking operations (Negro 2012). They have the authority to issue and reject drilling permits, 
regulate site security and some operations (flaring), expand setback distances and to promulgate 
zoning regulations of just oil and gas development. The Dallas City Council went so far as to 
reject several drilling applications and to establish 1,500-foot setbacks (Henry 2013). 
Conversely, in nearby Fort Worth, the site of many wells, the City requires natural gas 
development to take place at least 600 feet away from residences (Baker 2013).  
Texas is typical of the historical experiences and the policy expertise and goals of the oil 
patch states of Oklahoma and Louisiana. Expanded fracking, in these states, is attractive to 
lawmakers as the region is historically accepting of widespread development of its financial 




In order to identify local governments that differ r lative to the dependent variable 
(municipal policies towards fracking) I apply a purosive quota sampling technique. The strategy 
requires the researcher to intentionally select certain units or cases ‘‘based on a specific purpose 
rather than randomly’’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003, 713; Patton 2002). This method aims at 
generating the maximum heterogeneity within a study’s chosen sample (Miles and Huberman 
1994). In order to maximize variation, I created a two-by-two typology, which the case studies 
(Chapters 4-6) test. In each quadrant for the three stat s, I identified twelve to fifteen cities 
(depending on state population) that met the inclusion criteria. 
Filters 
I apply multiple filters to limit the number of city governments. The first filter excludes 
all municipalities located in a county that is without ongoing natural gas extraction. Cities 
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located in areas far removed from extraction are unlikely to pass legislation or engage in other 
activities germane to this project (although they may be ripe for future research). Similar to state 
lawmakers, the close proximity to natural gas wells impacts how city leaders and residents 
perceive the risks and benefits that fracking poses to them.  
Population size, the second filter, is necessary for tw  substantive reasons. In many 
states, including Texas, Colorado and Ohio, home rule is related to municipal size. Texas’ cities 
with a population of more than 5,000 establish their own governing structures and enjoy a variety 
of regulatory powers.37 A population of 5,000 or more is also the line of demarcation between 
being a city and a village/township in Ohio, although both types of governments may enact 
zoning plans and issue other land use regulations. Fi ally, in Colorado, communities must pass a 
charter ordinance and have a population greater than 2,000 citizens in order to be a home rule 
municipality (Colorado 2014).  
The organizational and public management literature also identifies agency capacity as a 
major driver of effective organizations (Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; Frederickson et al. 2012; 
Lowry 2005; McGuire 2006; McGuire and Silvia 2010; Moe 1989; Scheberle 2004; Wang et al. 
2012). Walker (1969) and Andrews (2000), moreover, link capacity to policy/organizational 
innovation. Enhanced organizational capacities, Portney (2003) argued, enable cities to pursue 
more integrated development approaches and to incorporate a variety of new tools and 
management techniques sensitive to environmental goals while still promoting economic growth.  
The Municipal Dimensions 
 
The third filter relates to municipal typology (presented below). The second order 
federalism literature finds that local governments affect the implementation of state policies 
                                                   
37 City voters must also pass a charter ordinance. Smaller cities can be Type C and still possess land use authority.  
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(Bowman and Kearney 2012). Yet, it does not identify the requisite municipal characteristics that 
may explain oppositional or supportive relationship.  
To identify and select a filter, I turn to the environmental policy and fracking research. 
One possible organizational scheme is a typology based on mobilization (x-axis) and 
receptiveness to environmental issues (y-axis) (Davis nd Fisk 2014; Feiock 2013; Patton 2002; 
Seawright and Gerring 2008). The typology and selection criteria yielded over 160 cities 
(Colorado – 48 cities; Ohio – 60 cities; Texas – 60 cities).  
 
Figure 3.3 Municipal Filters 
 
Mobilization (X-Axis) 
Mobilization literature identifies the mechanisms by which more attentive and engaged 
citizens impact elite level decision-making (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Johns 1994; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2012; Kingdon 1995; Selman 2004). Elites and policy entrepreneurs may seek to 
mobilize citizens to gain a political advantage, to engender a desired political change, to pass 
policies or to influence an institutional agenda. Effective leaders are strategic and will time their 
appeals to citizens to coincide with focusing events or a favorable political climate. Other 
High Commitment to a Sustainable 
Development 
Lower Commitment to Sustainable 
Development 
High Mobilization  Low Mobilization  
81 
scholars examine the association between mobilization nd a particular issue’s dimensions. 
Mobilization results more readily when individuals see issues as important, salient and when a 
resolution is unknown (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
At the local level, leaders are beginning to strategically mobilize their publics. Deliberate 
citizen engagement efforts can help to diminish the resistance that surfaces during the 
implementation of climate change action plans and other environmental programs (Davis 2014; 
EPA 2010; Federal Register 2006; Leighninger 2006). Scholars have attributed a variety of 
causal mechanisms to decreasing resistance. Municipalities, for example, offer citizens more 
opportunities to participate and shape local policies through volunteer boards, visioning sessions, 
focus groups, surveys/polls and working groups. Research has also shown that because cities are 
closer and more accessible to citizens, citizens believe cities are more responsive to local 
concerns (Hempel 2009; Krause 2011a; Scheberle 2004).  
Responses to environmental collective action dilemmas, such as urban drilling, may also 
relate to the ability or willingness of groups to act collectively. Hamilton (1995), for example, 
found that minority groups and poorer neighborhoods are less likely to overcome collective 
action problems. If regulatory inspections and attention occur more frequently in response to 
complaints and activism, then poorly organized neighborhoods, which are less likely to report 
violations, are likely to compel fewer inspections. A similar logic is observable relative to 
permitting and other siting issues. If negotiations between operators, the state and citizen groups 
include public input, differences in participation levels may result in lower standards for 
vulnerable populations (See also Hamilton and Viscusi 1999; Opp 2012). In these communities 
and neighborhoods, because organized opposition is weaker or non-existent; firms opt to locate 
in these neighborhoods.  
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With each state, I include the most recent and avail ble voter activity statistics. 
• In Ohio, I measure mobilization by the voter participation rates of the counties in the 
2012 Presidential election. 
• In Colorado, I measure the ease of mobilization by the percent of active registered voters 
per county in February 2014. Identification as an active voter in Colorado means that the 
individual voted in the last general election (Colorado Secretary of State 2014).  
• In Texas, I consider the percent of voters who voted in the 2010 mid-terms Congressional 
elections (Texas Secretary of State 2014). 
Sustainable Economic Development  
A small but growing area of attitudinal research measures opinions relative to natural gas. 
Jacquet (2012) examined support for natural gas development and production through a temporal 
lens. His work offers insights into how attitudes change prior to and after development. The 
results showed that public attitudes are much more supportive of gas prior to development. Once 
development begins and residents experience more of the costs of development, attitudes sour. 
Davis and Fisk’s (2014) analysis more explicitly links fracking support to ideological beliefs. 
Their work suggests that the most powerful predictor of support for fracking is whether or not 
the individual is inclined to support environmental protection efforts in general (11). They also 
suggested a fairly strong relationship between anti-fracking attitudes, Democratic Party 
identification and a willingness to pay for environmental protection.   
Support for green job creation also reflects a commit ent by public entities to promote 
more sustainable economic development. As defined by both Brookings Institution and the 
Bureau of Labor statistics, green jobs are those jobs “that produce goods and provide services 
that benefit the environment or preserve natural resources. These goods and services are sold to 
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customers, and include research and development, installation, and maintenance services” (BLS 
2013, NP). The BLS identifies five functional areas of green jobs:  
1. Energy from renewable sources – this includes electrical, heat or fuel generation from 
renewable sources38  
2. Energy efficiency – including goods and services that increase energy efficiency; 
Products and services that improve energy efficiency39  
3. Pollution reduction and removal, greenhouse gas reduction, and recycling and reuse -  
4. Natural resources conservation – These include goods and services designed to conserve 
natural resources such as organic agriculture and sustainable forestry/products; land, soil, 
wildlife and water management 
5. Environmental compliance, education and training, and public awareness 
Green jobs, albeit a crude and imperfect approximation, does demonstrate concern for 
and commitment to environmental protection. Portney (2009) noted that a rising number of 
municipal governments are attempting to become more sustainable by balancing environmental 
protection, economic development often by seeking out green jobs for their communities (See 
also Opp and Saunders 2013).  
Work by Svara, Watt and Jang (2013) further tied green jobs and municipal commitment 
to sustainability. Data indicated that local governments which prioritize green jobs achieve, on 
average, a 3.9-point higher sustainability rating than local governments that do not give the same 
importance to green jobs, holding all other variables at their mean.  Finally, Yi’s (2013) work 
showed a relationship between commitment to environmental protection and green job growth. 
                                                   
38 The BLS defines renewable power as wind, biomass, geothermal, solar, ocean, hydropower, and landfill gas and 
municipal solid waste (BLS 2014). 
39 Energy efficiency goods and services include “equipment, appliances, buildings, and vehicles, as well as products 
and services that improve the energy efficiency of buildings and the efficiency of energy storage and distribution 
(BLS 2013a). 
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Acknowledging that the index was limited to larger MSAs, Li also noted a relationship between 
willingness to address climate change and a propensity to host a higher number of green jobs as 
compared to those communities without climate-change mitigation/adaptation policies or 
membership in climate networks.40   
To approximate municipal receptiveness to sustainable economic development, I use 
several measures. The first measure is the number of green jobs within the county. The 
Brookings Institution organized 39 separate green job segment types within the five original BLS 
categories (Brookings Institution 2011). Here, I used 38 of the 39 categories (I drop jobs in 
nuclear energy production) as nuclear generation leads to a number of unresolved environmental 
challenges (Pew Charitable Trusts 2009).  
I selected Brookings’ data for several reasons. Fir t, their approach and methodology 
produces results similar to earlier green job studies from Pew and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1,821,000 - 2,382,000 total green jobs) (Brookings 2011) suggesting some degree of 
reliability of their data. Second, other researchers have already used Brookings data in social 
science research. Bowen, Park and Elvery (2013), for example, applied it in their research and 
found a relationship between the duration of a state renewable portfolio standard and green job 
growth.41 Finally, the 2011 Brookings data is the most recent and is the only set to break down 
the number of green jobs per county rather than by NAICS code.42 
• Municipal receptiveness to form sustainable forms of ec nomic development primarily 
through a dichotomous measure of green jobs in the region (high/low) excluding nuclear 
power related jobs.  
                                                   
40 Yi (2013) documented that holding all other variables constant, ICLEI membership contributed to 12.3percent 
more green jobs than non-ICLEI members.  
41 Other models found no statistically significant relationship between green jobs and state RPS.  
42 In early 2013, the BLS eliminated all programs that measured green jobs (BLS 2013).  
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• The second filter to identify cities concerns to sustainability is: membership in the U.S. 
Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement.  
• Finally, if the number of cities for possible analysis is still too large, I apply a third 
criterion: ranking as a top city to live in by CNN/Money Magazine anytime between 
2009 and 2013. This latter measure serves as a proxy for neighborhood livability and the 
municipal government’s commitment to promoting a high quality of life, both of which 
may be negatively affected by encroaching natural gas development (Money 2014; U.S. 
Mayors 2014).  
Research Expectations 
 
H1a: Cities, which are more inclined toward sustainable economic development, are more 
likely to be associated with challenges to the state’s preemptive authority.  
H1b: Cities, which are more easily mobilized, are more likely to be associated with 
challenges to the state’s preemptive authority. 
H2A-D:  
A. Wealthier cities are more likely to be associated with challenges to the state’s 
preemptive authority.  
B. More homogenous cities are more likely to be associated with challenges to the state’s 
preemptive authority.  
C. Better-educated cities are more likely to be associated with challenges to the state’s 
preemptive authority (Hamilton 1995; Krause 2010; Opp 2012). 
D. Cities with more institutional capacity are more likely to be associated with challenges 
to the state’s preemptive authority.  
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Both models include the typological categories, institutional and the most recent 
socioeconomic data from the American Community Survey (ACS) (2008-2012). Measures 
include median household value, per capita income, race, educational attainment and form of 
government. The adoption and enforcement of policies is often related to traditional socio-
economic factors. The conceptual model, for example, off red by Abel, Stephan and Kraft 
(2007) suggests that affluence and education are associ ted with environmental awareness 
(Daley and Garand 2005; Howell and Laska 1992; Jones a d Dunlap 1992; Matisoff 2008; 
Ringquist and Garand 1999; Wood 2010). Affluence may also be predictive of state 
environmental quality, capacity and municipal autonomy. Generally, as a state’s income level 
increases, so does its commitment to and ability to spend resources on environmental protection 
(Duroy 2008; Lowry 1992; Wood 2011).  
The policy and justice literatures typically analyze the connections between race, income 
and environmental risks or burdens (Hamilton 1995; Konisky 2009; Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts 
2009; Opp 2012; Bullard 1990; Bullard and Johnson, 2000; Hird and Reese, 1998; Ringquist, 
2006). Konisky (2009) documented evidence of income-based disparities in state enforcement of 
three federal environmental programs with poorer aras receiving less enforcement. Similarly, 
Opp (2012) found evidence of both racial and income based disparities with neighborhoods, 
which reported greater concentrations of African Americans or lower income individuals 
receiving fewer RCRA inspections.  
The political capacity and economic fortunes of resid nts may also impact municipal 
fracking policies. Hamilton (1995) found evidence suggesting that communities with higher 
levels of political capacity face fewer environmental burdens (See Hamilton and Viscusi 1999). 
Relative to fracking, policymakers from both parties argue that fracking is a vehicle for 
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economic growth and industrial development. Recognizing its potential to generate new jobs and 
revenues, state and municipal policymakers have shown a willingness to embrace natural gas as 
a policy solution to slow economic growth (Davis 201 ; EIA 2012; EIA 2012a; EIA 2011; 
Newcomer and Apt 2009). Davis and Fisk (2014), however, found no relationship between 
unemployment rates and support for fracking and/or ancillary regulations such as chemical 
disclosure programs.  
Local environmental policy research has also documented how institutional structure 
mediates citizens’ access to city officials’ and effective local official responsiveness to 
constituent demands. Krause (2012) found that at-large elections and the presence of non-
partisan elections reduce levels of responsiveness of local government to minority interests such 
as those of environmental groups (Bae and Feiock 2013; Sharp 2002). The logic of institutional 
analyses is fairly straightforward. In mayor-council jurisdictions, elected leaders’ ability to 
satisfy citizens’ preferences affects his or her relection chances. Conversely, in council-manager 
cities, expertise and professional competence are mo likely to be influential during municipal 
decision-making (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001). 
Data Collection and Statistical Techniques 
 
I apply statistical models to identify and then to estimate the net effect of each 
independent variable on the dependent variable (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).To ascertain 
the associations between the dependent and independnt variables, I use multiple statistical 
techniques: measures of association, two-way factori l ANOVAs and logistic regressions. By 
using multiple statistics techniques, the dissertation more fully answers the research questions 
posed in this chapter (and in Chapter 1).  
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A city’s willingness to impede or to facilitate state goals may be a result of a variety of 
other factors, accounted for through the ANOVA and regression models. ANOVA models 
primarily test the utility of the municipal typology through approximating whether there are 
differences among High Green-High Turnout cities, High Green-Low Turnout cities, Low 
Green-High Turnout cities and Low Green-Low Turnout cities. To further assess what outside 
factors are affecting the dependent variable, I recod  data into dichotomous variables (yes, no), 
making logistic regression the preferred statistical echnique.43 For each state, I utilize two 
independent, but related models. The first distinguishes between cities, whose policies towards 
natural gas exceed, challenge or voice displeasure with their state’s natural gas policies. The 
second model employs a more a narrow dependent variable. It limits it to only those 
communities, which have policies that challenge their state’s preemptive authority.  
Data Collection Strategies 
 
I collect data from a variety of sources. Each case study includes a review of relevant 
documents (state and muniipcal statutory and regulatory provisions, judicial decisions, 
government and industry reports and news stories). These materials are frequently available 
through online resources and when necessary, by requests from agency personnel. Semi-
structured interviews accompany the formal document r view to further triangulate the findings, 
which Yin (2009) notes, are necessary for the research r to make causal inferences (See also 
George and Bennett 2005).  
 
                                                   
43 I recoded the data in dichotomous variables for tw principal reasons, which are hinted at above. The first relates 
to the distribution of the dependent variable. Because of the small sample size, distribution would be poor and there 
would not be enough of a distribution in each category to find any statistically significant relationship. A second 
reason relates to my third major question – which asks about challenging and exceeding the state’s preemptive 
authority. In each state, multiple policy options may encroach upon the state’s turf and lead to oppositional 




 I collected municipal policies from a variety of surces. Key words and phrases, such as 
fracking, hydraulic fracturing, drilling, home rule, moratoria, bans, community rights, local 
authority and zoning are used to search municipal websites when appropriate. A second step 
reviews applicable land use policies of each local government. If municipal policies towards 
drilling were undetermined, I searched LexisNexis News and Google News to identify news 
stories/data relative to the dependent variable. Th search terms for news searches matched the 




To assess municipal policy positions, each case study incorporates data gathered from a 
review of formal sources including state statutes and gency regulations, state and local 
legislative reports, legislative actions and histories, press releases and State Court decisions. 
Other primary source materials include meeting minutes and reports, budgets, press releases and 
annual reports from applicable state and local regulatory divisions. I use non-primary source 
documents such as interest group white papers, law reviews, media and newspaper accounts, and 
position statements to further leverage the data collected from primary sources. In short, I review 
multiple documents in an effort to triangulate data nd to corroborate any conclusions made 
(George and Alexander 2005; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Mahoney 2010; Yin 2009).   
Interviews 
 
Anderson (1960, 3-4) noted that while laws and statutes establish formal structures, roles 
and responsibilities; intergovernmental relationship  are still shaped by “human beings clothed 
with office who are the real determiners of what the relations between units of governments will 
90 
be” (See also Long 1949). In order to triangulate my findings from the interviews, I utilize a 
other sources of data such as those described on Page 91  (Agterbosch et al. 2007; Wright 1978; 
Yin 2009).  
Regulatory Officials Interviews 
A variety of state regulatory agencies oversee fracking. Recognizing this diversity and 
when appropriate, I include the perspectives of state officials representing: oil and gas 
conservation commissions, departments of health and environment and natural resource 
departments. The views of appointed city managers/administrators or those designated to oversee 
municipal environmental programs are also included. First, these officials are the central actors 
in the enforcement and implementation of natural resource and environmental laws that shape 
ecological and public health (Davis 2012; Frederickson et al. 2012). Second, they routinely 
communicate with their counterparts and rely upon specific rhetorical, legal and political 
strategies or protocols to accomplish their goals. Third, they actively participate in the decisions 
relative to the legality and political fallout of state and municipal actions. Thus, chief 
administrative officials are in a unique position t ascertain the costs and benefits of fracking and 
how extraction might influence state-city relationships.   
Other Targets 
A snowball effect identified other interviewees, such as state lawmakers and pertinent 
interest group representatives. A snowball sampling technique is useful because it enables the 
researcher to gain access to other individuals who are also familiar and/or involved in state-
municipal fracking dynamics (Lofland, Snow, Anderson and Logland 2006).44 This type of 
sampling enables the researcher to better capture the lusive set of willing interviewees whose 
                                                   
44  Once each interview had concluded, I asked if the interviewee knew of any additional contacts that would be 
willing to discuss his or her experiences. Snowball s mpling was only used for the first and second set of interview 
participants (Lofland, Snow, Anderson and Logland 2006). 
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perceptions and experiences are critical to understanding the intergovernmental relationship 
between state and city policymakers.  
Interview Questions 
Questions are open-ended and the precise wording of each question is not predetermined 
(Lofland, Snow, Anderson and Logland 2006; Yin 2009).45 I do, however, rely upon a flexible 
outline of topics related to second order devolution relationship types and the antecedents of 
those relationships. This flexibility enables me to find a balance between my overall research 
questions and the need to allow the interview to flow and mirror the interests of the interviewee. 
By retaining some flexibility and the ability to ask unscripted questions, Lofland, Snow, 
Anderson and Logland (2006) found that interviewees may reveal new and unexpected data. 
Question guides for both state and local government participants were developed and are 












                                                   
45 Interviews lasted between 30-45 minutes.  
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Chapter 4                                                                                                                    
Second Order Politics in Colorado 
 
  
Colorado’s second order experiences are important for several reasons. First, it is typical 
of a centralized state within the context of sub-state oil and natural gas policies where statewide 
concerns often dwarf local policy preferences. Second, new gas extraction is often located near 
urban and suburban communities unaccustomed to heavy industrial development and truck 
traffic. While some residents likely believe that such development leads to new jobs and 
revenues, others see extraction as a frightening enterprise, dangerous to their health, their 
immediate environment and to their quality of life. Third, significant tensions between the state 
and municipal governments are newsworthy and have culminated in citizen led municipal ballot 
initiatives, state-municipal lawsuits and a statewide petition to grant municipal government more 
control over development. Evidence of cooperation between the state, industry and municipal 
governments also exists.  
To tell the Colorado second order story, this chapter adheres to the following 
organization scheme. It begins with a summary of the relevant statutory language and regulatory 
provisions and the case law that addresses natural gas extraction and the relationship between 
cities and the state of Colorado. A discussion of the costs and benefits of natural gas in Colorado 
follows. The chapter then provides a cursory description of current state-city relationships with 
regard to hydraulic fracturing and municipal policy options. It concludes with a series of 
statistical tests including a two-way ANOVA and logistic regressions, each designed to better 




Colorado’s Natural Gas Experiences and Context 
 
Colorado continues to be a major (8th) producer of energy in the U.S. (U.S. Energy 
Information Office 2012). Its long legacy of energy development has favored institutions and 
lawmakers receptive to the concerns of industry (Comm n Cause 2012; Davis 2012). New 
technologies, including horizontal fracturing, have reinvigorated Colorado’s natural gas industry, 
especially in areas located in the Niobrara shale pl y and the Piceance Basins (see Table 4.1), 
which collectively hold approximately 100 trillion cubic feet [TCF] in recoverable natural gas 
(EIA 2013).  
Table 4.1 Recoverable Natural Gas in Colorado 
Shale Play Recoverable Natural Gas Region 
Niobara  57 TCF Front Range 
Piceance Basin 41 TCF Western Slope 
Source: EIA 2013c 
 
Support for natural resource extraction has long been a reality in state economic and 
political circles and within the membership of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (COGCC), the state’s main oil and gas regulatory oversight body. Recently, 
however, the State’s economy has diversified to include more engineering, tourism/outdoor 
recreation and manufacturing firms (EIA 2013).46  
A political transition has paralleled the economic one. Since 2008, state lawmakers have 
passed laws and regulations that require the gradual phasing out of coal-based electrical 
generation, the adoption of renewable portfolio standards and climate change goals and policies 
accelerating the development of wind and solar production facilities. The State’s leaders have 
also reconfigured the COGCC to include greater public health, environmental and wildlife 
perspectives. Even though, environmentalists lauded many of these reforms, policy changes did 
                                                   
46 Despite the inclusion of new jobs and revenue streams, oil and natural gas still contribute to millions to state and 
local economies (Davis 2012).  
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not resolve rising municipal and county concerns over gas setbacks and other local 
environmental impacts brought about by expanded suburban and urban natural gas drilling 
(Davis 2014).  
Many state leaders, while still supportive of extrac ion, have also called for additional 
scrutiny and oversight of the industry. Democratic Representative Dianne Primavera, for 
example, in calling for a study on the effects of fracking observed, “fracking has been so 
controversial an issue in my district that it is important we get better information.” Rep. Joann 
Ginal, D-Fort Collins and the bill’s sponsor noted hat “Fear is driving communities to bans and 
moratoriums, and fear shouldn't be the motivation” (Jaffe 2014). The COGCC has also passed 
new restrictions on fracking related methane emissions, which are some of the strictest in the 
nation.  
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions  
 
The majority of Colorado’s oil and gas regulation stems from the State’s Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (COGCC), which was created in 1951 under the to Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-100, et seq.). Under the Act, the state established and 
began to enforce its basic parameters and standards (wil life, habitat, and environmental 
protection requirements) for industry to follow. Its 2007 revisions (HB1298 and HB1341) 
included language that mandated that the COGCC workith the Colorado Wildlife Commission 
and the Department of Health and Environment to issue new environmental standards for 
industry (Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 
2013). Other pertinent laws include the Habitat Stewardship Act of 2007 (§34-60-128), the Air 
Pollution and Prevention Control Act (§25-7-100, et s q.) and the Water Quality Control Act (§ 
25-8-100, et seq.). Each, according to supporters, r duces industry’s environmental footprint and 
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attempts to better balance industrial development with public health and environmental concerns 
(Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 2013).  
Finally, like many of its neighbors in the West, Colorado, is a split-estate state. Because 
each party (surface and mineral or subsurface owners) holds property rights, a holder of a 
mineral right may exercise his or her right to develop the underground estate. The right entitles 
the individual to the “reasonable use” of the surface estate to access the subsurface one (Getches-
Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 2013).  
Colorado’s home rule provisions further shape its second order relationships. Cities with 
over 2000 inhabitants at the time of the last census, under the Home-Rule Amendment, can opt 
to become home-rule communities. Home-rule cities pass and enforce their own ordinances, 
issue land use plans and zoning regulations and act without state authorization prior to municipal 
action (Col. Const. Art XX). The legal position of statutory (non-home rule) cities is reversed 
and they may only act when authorized to do so.47  
Home rule powers are limited. First, local self-determination is available to the extent 
that the stakeholders consider the matter local. For mixed (state and local) and state issues (like 
natural resources), the state interest/statute prevails. Second, local government policies and 
procedures cannot be arbitrary or capricious with state law as guiding until the city adopts a 
charter ordinance. Third, home rule cities have no preemptive right, even when issues have a 
local impact or generate municipal interest (Century Elec. Serv. & Repair, Inc. v. Stone, 193 
Colo. 181, 564 P.2d 953 (1977). Finally, home rule authority is malleable and as such, the state 
may reduce or expand areas of municipal regulatory authority (City & County of Denver v. Sweet 
138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958). 
                                                   
47 Of the 271 communities: 98 are home rule municipalities, 160 are statutory towns, 12 are statutory cities and1 is a 
territorial charter city. 
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 The 1974 Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act established additional 
parameters of local land use authority. Under the 1974 law, land use authority (for both home 
rule communities and statutory cities/town) extends to:   
• Development in hazardous areas  
• Development that would cause “immediate or foreseeabl  danger to significant wildlife 
habitat or species, could lead to substantial changes in population density or that 
materially impacts the community (Community Development Office 2013)48 
Regulatory Provisions  
The State Legislature in 1951 established the COGCC and charged it with the promotion 
and responsible development of the state’s natural resources. Organized within the Department 
of Natural Resources, the COGCC’s mission is to facilit te the efficient exploration and 
production of the state’s oil and natural gas resources while simultaneously protecting the 
public’s health, safety and welfare. Its goals include preventing waste, protecting mineral 
owners’ rights and reducing adverse environmental impacts caused by development (COGCC 
2012). Operationally, the COGCC promulgates rules that govern the life cycle of natural gas and 
oil extraction (Davis 2012; Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment 2013).  
Prior to 2008, The COGCC’s composition included seven members, a majority of whom 
represented the oil and gas industry. Davis (2012) summarized the pre-2008 COGCC as a partner 
in an industry friendly sub-government, which was too receptive to the demands and interests of 
industry. Under HB 07-1341, then Governor Ritter, a Democrat, broadened the commission’s 
membership and added a public health and environmental perspective. The new make-up 
enabled the Ritter Administration to re-write many of the rules regulating the natural gas industry 
                                                   
48 The law also permits local regulation in areas of historical and archaeological importance. 
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such as information disclosure, air and water monitori g, air and water emissions and setbacks 
(Davis 2012; Hartman 2011).  
Hydraulic fracturing is subject to a number of COGCC regulations and standards. 
Operators must apply for a permit requiring them to disclose and to describe all of their surface 
and subsurface activities. The COGCC defines activities as well design and location, spacing, 
operational procedures, water and waste management and disposal, air emissions, wildlife 
impacts, surface disruptions and disturbances and worker health and safety rule-making. A 
secondary function of the COGCC is the enforcement of its rules. The table below summarizes 
many of these rules, which preempt substate regulations/actions: 
Table 4.2 A Snapshot of Colorado’s Fracking Regulations  
Regulatory Area  Colorado 
Pre‐Drilling Water Well 
Testing  Required for bodies of water .5 miles from a wellhead 
Water Withdrawal 
Restrictions  
Addressed in permit 
Casing and Cementing 
Depth Requirements  
50 feet below the water table 
Intermediate and Production 
Casing Cement Circulation 
Regulations  
 
Surface Casing Cement 
Circulation 




Cementing to surface required 
Venting and Flaring  Notification and approval required  
Fluid Storage   
Pits allowed and regulated for all fluids including freeboard and 
liner requirements and five year tracking requirements. 
Underground fluid injection Allowed  
Disclosure 
Current law requires companies to disclose the concentrations 
of all chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing to state regulators. 
 
Colorado law protects industry’s trade secrets. If their fracking 
fluids are a trade secret, industry must still disclo e the 
ingredient's chemical family to state regulators but only in the 
case of an emergency, do they need to provide public health 
officials with a detailed accounting of their secret formula. 
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Air and Stormwater Quality 
The State Department of Public Health and Environment with 
limited oversight power relative to issue air quality and 
stormwater permits (CDPHE 2014). 
Local Issues 
In Colorado, local officials may access the chemicals used in 
fracking processes through Fracfocus.org (Banda 2011; COGA 
2012b; Davis 2012). 
 
Impact fees are set by the affected local government but cannot 
exceed the costs of development. 
Source: Richardson et al. 2013 
 
State law restricts local participation to mainly a procedural and informational role. Cities 
may appoint a local governmental designee (LGD) and contribute input during COGCC 
rulemaking proceedings. The LGD receives information relative to all oil and gas activities 
within his or her geographic area and may request a hearing to evaluate any likely significant and 
adverse impacts. A LGD can also call a local public forum (LPF) under Rule 508 to consider 
drilling applications that petition for an increase in well density and consideration of other 
requests that may affect the welfare, safety and health of nearby communities (COGCC 2008). 
Cities and counties may submit testimony during hearings. Municipal actions are not always 
state-sanctioned. According to State Official 1 (SO1), “the most significant way that municipal 
actors have shaped the state’s fracking policies is through the local ballot measures that imposed 
bans or moratoria.  Longmont, Fort Collins, Lafayette and Broomfield have created quite a stir 
and this has prompted, rightfully so, the current situation with such high stakes [Constitutional 
ballot initiatives in the Summer of 2014]. Loveland is poised to be next.”  
The debate enveloping fracking certainly involves the rules above, but they are not ‘front 
and center’ during state-municipal natural resource conversations. As Davis (2014) documented, 
due to their acute impacts to local communities, setbacks are often high on the agenda of local 
policymakers. New rules issued by the COGCC in 2013 expanded setbacks from 350-feet in 
urban areas and 150 feet in rural areas to a uniform 500-foot boundary. The larger buffers also 
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prohibit drilling within 1,000 feet of any building that houses/hosts a large number of individuals 
like a school or nursing home without approval from the COGCC. The 2013 setback rule, offers 
an exemption for operators seeking to drill in rural areas (Jaffe 2013a). In rural areas, operators 
may drill within 500 feet of an occupied structure, if the COGCC director approves the well and 
if it incorporates all best practice mitigation measures (Jaffe 2013a). While several municipalities 
have voiced concern over COGCC rulemaking (addressed lat r in this chapter), Dave Neslin, 
former Executive Director of the COGCC, summarized r cent rules. He stated “taken together, 
we [COGCC] think these rules address many of the concerns that people have raised about 
hydraulic fracturing by requiring operators to provide additional information to our staff and to 
medical professionals, and also by establishing some common sense precautions against potential 
impacts” (Neslin quoted in Woock 2010).  
Despite promulgating new and more stringent rules, the setback issue, according to 
policymakers, is hardly settled. “Undoubtedly, this decision will go under the dome” said Mike 
King, the Executive Director of State Department of Natural Resources and a COGCC member. 
Despite, lobbying against the setback expansion, oil and gas representatives are reluctant to 
pursue legislative alternatives or strategies, explaining that attention from state lawmakers would 
add considerable regulatory uncertainty for the industry and could depress its overall output 
(Jaffe 2013a paraphrasing Tisha Schuller, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Colorado 
Oil and Gas Association).  
Despite, Colorado’s pro-extractive industry past, Davis (2012) identified multiple 
challenges to the industry’s influential position within State Government. Since the early 1990s, 
the state’s politics have moved from a conservative ori ntation towards more moderate and 
liberal policy positions. Liberal-leaning governors and statehouses have advanced new 
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environmental policies. The environmental movement in Colorado has also grown and become 
more sophisticated, enabling it to act as a political counterweight to the oil and gas industry. 
Land-use conflicts have sparked the rise of new interest group alliances and coalitions (usually 
between sportsmen, ranchers and environmentalists), which have further eroded the influence 
exercised by industry (See also Duffy 2005). Finally, several schisms have weakened industry’s 
hegemonic political position and have opened new windows for environmental groups to 
influence policy (Davis 2012).  
Judicial Decisions 
  
The Colorado Supreme Court has also weighed in on the relationship between state and 
municipal regulatory authority. In City and County of Denver v. State of Colorado (1990),788 
P.2d 764, the Court held that when an issue impacts both state and local governments, a 
municipal ordinance may exist alongside state regulation. The ordinance, however, must not 
conflict with the state statute, and in cases when it does the state law prevails. The Colorado 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of limited con urrent regulation when it ruled that a 
home rule municipality may regulate outdoor advertising with its jurisdictional limits “only to 
the extent that the local ordinance does not materially impede the significant state goals 
expressed in the Outdoor Advertising Act §§ 43-1-40 to 420” (Voss v. Lundvall Brothers 830 
P.2d 1061 (1992)).  
Second order conflict relative to natural gas development reached the judiciary in the mid 
1980s. In 1985, Greeley voters banned the drilling of oil and natural gas wells within its limits. 
The Greeley City Council followed and implemented Or inance No. 90, with language that 
enacted the citizen-led initiative. After the promulgation of Ordinance Number 90, Lundvall 
Brothers sued the City on the grounds that the Ordinance No. 90 violated the COGCC’s 
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preemptive authority. In Voss v. Lundvall Brothers 830, P.2d 1061 (1992) the Supreme Court 
ruled against the City stating that “the state’s interest in efficient oil and gas development and 
production throughout the state, as manifested in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act is 
sufficiently dominant to override a home-rule city’s imposition of a total ban on the drilling of 
any oil, gas or hydrocarbon wells within the city lmits.”  
The Court’s logic centered on two factors: the nature of oil and gas deposits and the 
state’s overriding development goals. Oil and gas deposits, according to the Court, do not follow 
the boundaries of local governments, making natural gas extraction as much a state issue as a 
local one. As such, it found natural gas regulation o be a mixed (state-local) issue, and that 
municipal regulation may not significantly impede or c nflict with State law or the State’s goal 
of responsible and efficient development. In its holding, the Court ruled that the ordinance did 
impede the State’s goal and that the State’s interest superseded the City of Greeley’s home rule 
powers (Jones 2013). The court’s decision, however, was not absolute and left enough ‘grey 
area’ for future local legislation and litigation.49  
The Court reached a similar conclusion in the Bowen case (Bowen v. Edwards 830 P.2d 
1045 (1992). The case came to the courts after La Plata County Commissioners enacted 
additional land-use regulations to control oil and gas development-taking place within the 
County. One particular regulation required that prior to drilling, oil and gas entities acquire 
county-issued permits in addition to COGCC licenses. The Court, in its ruling, pointed to the 
nature of the county’s regulations, “It is the county’s intent … to facilitate the development of oil 
and gas resources within the unincorporated area of L Plata County while mitigating potential 
land-use conflicts between such development and existing, as well as planned, land uses.” 
Despite, noting the county’s dual goals, the Court r led that the state’s interests and goals 
                                                   
49 The Court did not specify the types of land use authority permissible under its holding.   
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preempt county regulatory authority.50 Like its earlier Lundvall decision, the Court determined 
that COGCC’s regulations do not preempt all aspects of a county’s land-use authority, although 
it did not offer any examples (Jones 2013).  
The Court of Appeals applied the twin Lundvall/Bowen holdings in Town of Frederick v. 
North American Res. Co. (60 P.3d 758 (2002)). In the Frederick case, the court ruled that a series 
of the state regulations preempted the Town’s ordinances/rules. Setbacks, the Court found, 
conflicted with COGCC Rule 603a and Colo. Regs. 404-1; noise abatement requirements (§16-
120, conflicted with COGCC Rule 802, visual impacts were invalidated because they conflicted 
with COGCC Rules 318, 803, 804, 1002, and 1003. The Court also struck down the Town’s 
penalties against operators, because they are preemt d by state law (Town of Frederick v. North 
American Res. Co. (60 P.3d 758 (2002)).  




Extractive industries have employed fracking since the 1970s, although recent 
technological advancements in horizontal drilling technology have made it possible for firms to 
access formations and deposits that were previously economically unrecoverable. As a result, the 
state’s natural gas industry has enjoyed steady and, in some locales, explosive growth in recent 
years, much of it driven by fracking. This growth, in both number of producing wells and overall 




                                                   
50 The Court’s holding included “there is no question that the efficient and equitable development and pro uction of 
oil and gas resources, requires uniform regulation of the technical aspects of drilling, waste prevention, safety 














Figure 4.1 Count of Colorado Gas and Gas Condensate Wells 
Source: EIA 2013d 
 
Figure 4.2 Colorado Natural Gas Production, By Technique 
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The use of fracking and attendant industrial growth is concentrated in several counties (along the 
Front Range and Western Slope): Weld, La Plata, Las Animas, Garfield, Rio Blanco, Yuma and 
Mesa. These seven counties are home to 91 percent of well drills since 2011 and are home to a 
variety of second order dynamics and relationships.  
Table 4.3 Localized Natural Gas Developments 
County Producing Wells since 2011 Percent of State Total 
Weld 2262 49% 
Garfield 1323 28% 
Yuma 148 3% 
Rio Blanco 109 2% 
Mesa 127 3% 
La Plata 99 2% 
Las Animas 85 2% 
All others (includes Front 
Range counties of Larimer, 
Boulder, Broomfield, etc.) 506 9% 




Fracking generates a variety of state and local economic benefits. In 2012, for example, 
industry generated over $9.3 billion in production value, directly supported over 29,000 jobs and 
50,000 indirect jobs. Industry jobs averaged over $100,000 in annual compensation, significantly 
higher than the average wage in the State. The cumulative impact for Fiscal year (FY) 2012 was 
approximately $3.8 billion in employee income.  
Table 4.4 Oil and Gas Employment in 2012  
 Direct Indirect Induced Total 
Drilling 2,402 780 1,753 4,935 
Support 
Activities 26,853 15,363 25,356 67,572 
Refining 501 2,193 2,052 4,746 
Transportation 801 1,080 1,009 2,889 
Gas Stations 14,062 1,998 2,586 18,646 
Other 6,611 2,278 3,799 12,688 
Totals 51,230 23,691 36,554 111,476 
Source: Lewandowski and Wobbekind 2012 
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 Oil and gas operations made additional contributions to the state’s economy in 2012. 
Operators contributed $1.6 billion to the State’s general fund in 2012, much of which came from 
severance taxes, public leases, royalties and property tax payments (Lewandowski and 
Wobbekind 2012). Despite gas industry’s large role in the state’s overall economy, critics 
highlight industry’s ‘avoided’ costs. If Colorado wells were located Wyoming, for example, 
developers would owe over a billion dollars more in state taxes (adding costs avoided from 2002 
through 2006). Gas developers have also benefited from the ad valorem loophole, which costs 
the state over 200 million dollars annually (Anderson 2014). Industry also paid over 600 million 
dollars to private landowners in royalties and lease payments. The cumulative economic 
statewide impact, as shown in the table below, is nearly $30 billion. 
Table 4.5 Oil and Gas Economics in Colorado in 2012  









Drilling 4,935 $319.17  $1,054.36  $1,556.59  
Extraction and Support 
Activities  67,572 $3,942.23  $9,580.08  $18,701.75  
Petroleum Refineries 4,746 $245.89  $1,133.73  $4,789.86  
Transportation  2,889 $178.85  $263.18  $791.88  
Gasoline Stations 18,646 $466.24  $1,000.47  $1,649.90  
All Other  12,688 $687.31  $1,194.55  $2,078.18  
Totals 111,476 $5,839.69  $14,226.37  $29,568.16  
Source: Lewandowski and Wobbekind 2012 
 
Local governments have also benefitted, primarily fom additional indirect and direct 
sales and property taxes. In 2010, La Plata County, for example, collected approximately $30 
million in oil and gas taxes, although the amount of local revenues depends on the volume of oil 






Opponents point to a number of environmental ills including the use of chemicals that 
may cause cancer, disrupt major bodily systems (cardiovascular, nervous and skin) and 
respiratory ailments (Jacquet 2014; Kuster 2012). They also argue that fracking leads to surface 
and groundwater contamination, air pollution through methane leaks and particulates, and it 
contributes to climate change. A recent Colorado study linked areas near frack sites to greater 
concentrations of acute and chronic health impacts (Ku ter 2012). EPA studies have also found a 
relationship between fracking and poor air quality in the West. Areas in and adjacent to Pinedale, 
Wyoming, for example, reported ozone pollution at well over 120 parts per billion. Ozone at that 
amount is 67 percent higher than the maximum daily limit established by the EPA and surpassed 
ozone pollution in Los Angeles (Associated Press 2011).  
Drilling activities also have harmful environmental effects typically through increasing 
truck traffic and emissions from construction equipment (Wiseman 2009). Finally, 
environmental scientists have shown that fracking causes increases in methane (a potent 
greenhouse gas and worse than carbon dioxide) emissions because pipe fittings can become loose 
and leak (Finley 2014).  
Fracking affects Colorado’s limited water supply. Constitutionally, the state prioritizes 
residential and domestic consumption over all other us s (Grantham 2011).51 The State must also 
pre-approve and authorize the withdrawal of water for any non-domestic use. As applied to 
fracking, this means natural gas firms cannot take water without prior state approval. Conflicts 
and legalities aside, state regulators estimated that oil and natural gas operations consumed 
                                                   
51 When waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those 
using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those 
using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing 
purposes. 
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approximately 6.5 billion gallons of water in Colorado in 2012, about 0.1 percent of overall 
water consumption (Healy 2012). Operators may lease surplus water supplies from cities, which 
can also lease excess water to farmers.  
While operators cannot arbitrarily withdraw water, their anticipated usage complicates an 
already complex set of water-related issues in the arid West. The recent and ongoing drought has 
exacerbated tensions between water users (Healy 2012). Colorado’s farmers and ranchers have 
historically leased water from sellers (often cities) for approximately $30 for an acre foot of 
water, the equivalent of about 326,000 gallons.52 Oil and gas companies, however are offering 
between $1,000 and $2,000 for an equal amount of treated water from cities, setting the stage for 
a potential conflict between farmers and frackers, which may be especially problematic during 
times of drought (Healy 2012).  
The environmental impacts of fracking are disputed, especially its relationships to climate 
change. The table below presents the statewide environmental impacts with the time-frame noted 
in the column on the left. 
Table 4.6 Environmental Impacts of Fracking 
Environmental Harm 2012 Impact 
Acres damaged since 2005 57,000 
Based on Well Completion from 2005 to 2012 
(metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent) 23,000,000 tons 
Particulate Matter 1100 tons 
NOx 14,000 tons 
Carbon Monoxide 21,000 tons 
Volatile Organic Compounds 2000 tons 
Sulfur Dioxide 50 tons 






                                                   
52 This can rise to over $100 for an acre foot of water in dry years. 
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Second Order Issues - Setting the Stage   
 
Municipal authority to regulate oil and gas activities in Colorado is severely restricted. 
The State Supreme Court has announced that state law supersedes municipal home rule authority 
when:  
1. There exists a need for statewide uniformity 
2.  Municipal regulations affect persons living outside the city’s corporate limits 
3. The issue has been historically governed by the stat  (City & County of Denver v. 
State, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990); Lundvall Bros. Inc. v. Voss, 812 P.2d 693.  
4. The issue, as it is for a natural resource, is a mixed state-local issue.  
Results and Implications 
 
How does a centralized state structure shape the municipal implementation and the 
intergovernmental management of natural resources? The policy positions of 48 Colorado cities 
were collected. In some cases, there is outright opposition to the state’s goals and conflict with 
State policy leading to the COGCC and the Governor participating in two lawsuits against city 
governments (Cities of Longmont and Fort Collins). In others, there is evidence of collaboration 
and cooperation leading to voluntary agreements with industry, typically done to avoid 
challenging the state’s preemptive authority (Cities of Loveland and Erie). Finally, in other 
communities, there are examples of acquiescence, support/excitement and indifference to 
expanded urban gas drilling (Cities of Greeley, Grand Junction and Aurora). SO1 summarized 
Colorado’s second order politics as: 
“The overall state of state-municipal relations concer ing fracking depends, at least in part, 
on the particular municipal jurisdiction. However, there is definitely a tension between the 
state and local jurisdictions, and in Fort Collins many residents have definite land-use, public 
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health and welfare concerns. Such concerns were manifested with the passage of a local 
ballot measure to implement a 5-year moratorium on fracking within city limits.” 
One of the dissertation’s major research questions is an inquiry about the scope and 
variety of municipal responses to urban natural gas development. A variety of cities support 
fracking and include both high green/high turnout communities to low green and low turnout 
jurisdictions. Cities that oppose fracking, conversely, appear to cluster in the ‘box’ that includes 
green and mobilized communities. Table 4.7 below shows the results.  
Table 4.7 Aggregated Municipal Responses to Oil and Gas Development  
Policy Responses (Policy Responses 





Bans or Moratoria (0)* 4 8.3 8.3 8.3 
Zoning Regulations (1)* 2 4.2 4.2 12.5 
Bans on municipal property (2)* 2 4.2 4.2 16.7 
Voluntary Agreements (3)^ 4 8.3 8.3 25.0 
Resolutions for local control/anti-
fracking (4)^ 4 8.3 8.3 33.3 
No Action/resolutions in 
favor/special use permits that do not 
conflict with state law (5) 24 50.0 50.0 83.3 
Actions increasing development (6) 8 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 48 100.0 100.0  
Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news articles 
^Symbolic Policies 
*Substantive Legal Challenges  
  
Table 4.7 reveals a number of interesting dynamics. The first is that while the recent 
bans/moratoria in several cities have attracted a gre t amount of media coverage and attention 
from state lawmakers, two-thirds of Colorado cities either have taken no position relative to 
fracking and land use or have opted to take actions  increase development including the larger 
cities of Aurora (340,000) and Greeley (95,000), although there are anti-fracking groups of 
citizens in both communities. Half of the sampled cities have passed polices and land use plans 
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that do not exceed the applicable state standards and one in six communities (nearly 17 percent) 
have taken extra steps to facilitate development. Action taken in support of industry, however, 
does not mean more drilling within city limits and quite frequently leads to extraction in areas 
outside of the supporting community.  
Despite the state’s goal of promoting uniform development policies, approximately one 
third of sampled cities registered some opposition to fracking and to the highly centralized nature 
of natural gas policymaking in Colorado. Two trends are noteworthy. The first is that in four 
communities, cities and industry have signed voluntary agreements that likely come close to 
reconciling municipal preferences for more restrictive development with the objectives of state 
policymakers and industry (voluntary agreements are allowed under state law). When the most 
coercive policies are singled out (bans and moratoria and zoning) six out of 48 sampled cities, 
have policies that likely conflict with the state’s goal of orderly natural gas development and 
challenge its preemptive authority.  
Aggregate trends are good indicators of the overall patterns of state-municipal relations. 
They do not, however, answer questions as to the factors that may be associated with specific 
municipal responses to urban drilling. To begin the process of identifying factors that contribute 
to municipal policies that conflict with the state, each city is sorted into the green-mobilization 
typology, as discussed in Chapter 3. Next to each city is its policy represented by a number that 
corresponds to the municipal policy positions in Table 4.7. At the bottom of table 4.8 are the 
average policy positions for the different types of c mmunities.  
Table 4.8 Individual Municipal Policy Responses to Oil and Gas Development* 














Dacono 5 Holyoke 5 Commerce City 3 Fort Collins 0 
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Evans 5 Centennial 5 Aurora 6 Loveland 3 
Fort Lupton 6 Englewood 5 Arvada 5 Timnath 5 
Greeley 6 Glendale 5 Westminster 4 Boulder 0 
Fruita 5 
Greenwood 
Village 3 Brighton 2 Lafayette 0 
Grand 
Junction 5 Sheridan 2 Thornton 5 Louisville 1 
Craig 5 Wray 6 Carbondale 4 Longmont 0 
Trinidad 5 Yuma 6 
Glenwood 
Springs 4 Erie 3 
Johnstown 5 Akron 5 Cortez 4 Meeker 5 
Windsor 5 Littleton 5 Parachute 6 Rangely 5 
Sterling 5 Brush 6 Rifle 1 Durango 5 










*Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news articles 
 
ANOVA Results  
 
 In order to test whether the differences between th  groups (High Sustainable Economic 
Development-High Turnout, High Sustainable Economic Development – Low Turnout, Low 
Sustainable Economic Development – High Turnout, Low Sustainable Economic Development – 
Low Turnout) occurred by more than just chance, I conducted a two-way ANOVA with a 
factorial structure based on high and low levels of ustainability and mobilization. In short, there 
is a difference between groups (p= .001), suggesting that the average scores in Table 4.8 did not 
occur by chance. Differences between the groups are not uniform as reflected in Table 4.9. 






Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 46.417 3 15.472 6.707 .001 
Within Groups 101.500 44 2.307   
Total 147.917 47    
 
112 
Several patterns are worth highlighting. First, while data limitations preclude stating any 
definitive causal relationships, there are statistically significant differences between the groups 
and these differences are in the anticipated direction. Communities inclined to support 
sustainability and environmental protection efforts are associated with more restrictive fracking 
policies (policy average of 2.67) as compared to cities that are less committed to growing 
sustainably and where overcoming the collective action problem is likely more difficult (policy 
average of 5.25).  
It also appears that ease of mobilization impacts the willingness of cities to enact more 
coercive and controlling land use policies. Cities hat ranked as more sustainable in terms of their 
economic development goals but less easily mobilized also demonstrated a greater propensity to 
advocate publically for greater local control but may be unwilling to go further and pass policies 
that might be seen as challenging the state’s preemptive authority i.e. promulgating zoning 
policies or enacting (through citizen initiative or by municipal ordinance). 
Table 4.10 Relationships among Specific Municipal Groups based on Greenness, Ease of 
Mobilization 
  Mean 
Difference 





(SD) and Low 
Mobilization 
Low SD and High Turnout .41667 .62006 .505 
High SD and Low Turnout 1.16667 .62006 .067 
High SD and High Turnout 2.58333* .62006 .000 
Low SD and 
High Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization 
-.41667 .62006 .505 
High SD and Low Turnout .75000 .62006 .233 
High SD and High 
Turnout 
2.16667* .62006 .001 
High SD and 
Low Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization 
-1.16667 .62006 .067 
Low SD and High Turnout -.75000 .62006 .233 
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High SD and High 
Turnout 
1.41667* .62006 .027 
High SD and 
High 
Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization 
-2.58333* .62006 .000 
Low SD and High Turnout -2.16667* .62006 .001 
High SD and Low Turnout -1.41667* .62006 .027 
 
As shown in the table above, there are statistically significant group-level differences. The High 
SD – High Turnout group (HGHT) is significantly different when compared to the other three 
groups, with the relationship between sustainable economic development/mobilization (the 
typology) maintaining its strength with the other th ee categories, as shown in Table 4.10, p = 
.027; p= .001; p = .000).  
What is the relationship between ‘sustainable economic development,’ mobilization and 
municipal fracking regulation? The two-way ANOVA is u ed here because of multiple 
independent variables and observations for each independent variable may interact with one 
another and whether the independent variables are significantly associated with loud or 
conflictual second order relationships. The two-way ANOVA shows the main effect of each 
independent variable in the table below.  
Table 4.11 Being Sustainable or Being Mobilized  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 46.417
a 3 15.472 6.707 .001 
Intercept 850.083 1 850.083 368.509 .000 
Sustainability (SD)  33.333 1 33.333 14.450 .000 
Turnout 10.083 1 10.083 4.371 .042 
SD * Turnout 3.000 1 3.000 1.300 .260 
Error 101.500 44 2.307   
Total 998.000 48    
Corrected Total 147.917 47 
   
R Squared = .314 (Adjusted R Squared = .267) 
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The measures of both variables (green and mobilization) indicate statistically significant 
relationships with urban drilling municipal responses. Overall, as a pair, they account for nearly 
28 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. The variable approximating support for 
sustainable development is significant at p = 000. The turnout variable also showed statistical 
significance, p = .042. Interestingly, despite the HGHT group reporting statistically significant 
differences between it and the other groups, there app ars to be no interactive effect between 
green and turnout and municipal natural gas policy.  
A second ANOVA model incorporated socio-demographic factors including median 
home value and education.53 Once included, they negate the effects of the turno t variable, 
although Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) noted that these variables shape mobilization patterns. 
Sustainable economic development maintains its statistically significant and robust association 
(p=.011) with group level differences associated with second order relationships. Despite the 
inclusion of additional variables, the model’s ability to account for variation increased only 
slightly to 27.2 percent.  
Table 4.12 Sustainable Economic Development versus Being Mobilized with Socio-
Demographic Characteristics 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 51.748a 5 10.350 4.520 .002 
Intercept 2.781 1 2.781 1.214 .277 
LNHomeValue .999 1 .999 .436 .512 
Education  .232 1 .232 .102 .752 
Green 16.082 1 16.082 7.023 .011 
Turnout 4.262 1 4.262 1.861 .180 
Green * 
Turnout 1.772 1 1.772 .774 .384 
Error 96.169 42 2.290   
                                                   
53 These variables showed a statistically significant association with the dependent variable in the bivariate 
correlation table (Table 4.13). 
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Total 998.000 48    
Corrected Total 147.917 47    
a. R Squared = .350 (Adjusted R Squared = .272) 
 
Explaining the Differences  
 
Despite the high bar for municipal natural gas legislat on, state-level actions have not 
impeded municipal governments from entering the arena of fracking politics. The Cities Fort 
Collins, Longmont, Lafayette and Broomfield have enacted bans or moratoria, first two already. 
The Colorado Oil and Gas Association and the COGCC have already filed lawsuits against the 
Cities of Longmont and Fort Collins contending that state law preempts the cities’ actions to 
restrict drilling. Cities, in response, typically argue that their inherent home rule zoning powers 
provide legal grounds for local land use restrictions (Rochat 2013).54 Other cities are taking a 
less ‘visible’ approach to regulating development and working with developers to sign voluntary 
memorandums that include more stringent land use and setback provisions when compared to 
state law. Finally, in other cases, municipalities b come willing partners to industry and have 
taken actions to spur on additional development. 
A number of factors may be associated with more restrictive municipal fracking policies. 
In the bivariate table below, a variety of socio-demographic, environmental and housing 
characteristics are included to assess what, if any, impact they may have on municipal fracking 
policies.    
                                                   
54 Industry and its supporters in State Government have initiated multiple lawsuits that address second rder 
federalism. Currently, the City of Longmont faces two lawsuits based on its oil and gas regulations and its ban on 
hydraulic fracking. In December 2012, COGA sued the city based on its hydrofracking ban. In July 2012, COGCC 
filed a lawsuit against Longmont arguing that the city's oil and gas rules materially conflicted with COGCC rules. 
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Table 4.13 Bivariate Correlations and Second Order Federalism 
 













Correlation 1 -.541**  -.019 .388**  .293* .071 .457**  -.143 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .896 .006 .043 .632 .001 .333 




Correlation -.541**  1 .032 -.386**  -.297* -.103 -.419**  -.094 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .829 .007 .040 .484 .003 .525 




Correlation -.019 .032 1 .109 .255 -.288* .066 .013 
Sig. (2-tailed) .896 .829  .463 .081 .047 .655 .929 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Home Value 
Pearson 
Correlation .388**  -.386**  .109 1 .840**  -.113 .781**  .032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .007 .463  .000 .443 .000 .828 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Income 
Pearson 
Correlation .293* -.297* .255 .840**  1 -.116 .863**  .092 
Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .040 .081 .000  .434 .000 .534 




Correlation .071 -.103 -.288* -.113 -.116 1 -.013 .274 
Sig. (2-tailed) .632 .484 .047 .443 .434  .931 .059 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Education 
Pearson 
Correlation .457**  -.419**  .066 .781**  .863**  -.013 1 .075 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .003 .655 .000 .000 .931  .615 




Correlation -.143 -.094 .013 .032 .092 .274 .075 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .333 .525 .929 .828 .534 .059 .615  
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news article
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 A number of statistically significant relationships are evident with the caveat that they do 
not address causality.55 The second order typology reported an R= -.541, the s rongest 
relationship between the dependent variable and any independent variable. In other words as the 
typology moves from LGLT to HGHT, municipal regulation/policy values decrease (becomes 
more anti-fracking). Other variables also supported a finding of statistical significance. Both 
median home value (R= -.386) and per capita income (R= -.297) reported negative relationships 
with the dependent variable -.386 and -.297, althoug  these two indicators are also highly 
correlated with one another. For both, the relationship suggests that as home value and income 
levels increase, municipal policy towards urban natural gas extraction becomes more restrictive. 
Finally, education is highly correlated with income and home value, and is negatively associated 
with municipal policies favoring natural gas producers.  
Municipal leaders seeking to restrict fracking within their corporate limits have offered a 
variety of idiosyncratic reasons that sharpen second order federalism. Representatives of the City 
of Fort Collins explained that the city’s first (and year-long moratorium) was needed so that it 
had enough time to develop local regulations, to consider and leave time for any legislative 
changes in the 2013 session and to give the City enough time to contribute to the COGCC 
rulemaking process (setbacks and groundwater monitoring).56  
Additional justifications for municipal action include the advantages of local control over 
the issue, concerns over uncertain public health and environmental impacts and the need to work 
with the city’s operators (Weinheimer 2013). SO1 reflected that “for municipalities such as Fort 
Collins, one of [the] most important “brands” is the quality of life that exists here and that [the] 
                                                   
55 I also ran non-parametric correlations, which also flagged statistically significant relationships relat d to the 
typology, income, home value and education. They ar available in the appendices.  
56 The moratorium was enacted after an extensive public comment period, substantial research by city staff and work 
with industry, the COGCC, Air Pollution Control Division of the Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment, and extensive discussions with both regulators and members of the industry.  
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community is a healthy and safe place to live, work and play with open spaces, natural resources 
and opportunities to be outside.” 
Similar justifications precipitated Longmont’s opposition. Longmont Mayor Dennis 
Coombs described the COGCC lawsuit as unfortunate, but he added that his city “wasn't ready to 
retreat on the issue.” He noted that that city governments “already have the right to restrict heavy 
industrial uses from residential zones, and that oil and gas drilling shouldn't be any different…It's 
not something I feel we should back down on” (Jaffe 2012). Finally, he explained that the city’s 
policy does not substantially interfere with the state’s goal of orderly oil and gas development. 
Rather, it balances public health and environmental protection with oil and natural gas 
development (Jaffe 2012).57  
In other cases, municipal responses have adopted more easured responses and include 
private agreements with industry that exceed the stringency of state regulations. The City of 
Loveland presented operators with two options should they seek to drill within the city. They 
may opt to meet the standards established by the COGCC but also must accept a local review 
process that may take months and include multiple ape ls. The alternative is to sign a voluntary 
agreement with the city that is more stringent than the standards established by the COGCC. The 
city’s lone operator indicated a willingness to work with the City (Maher 2013).  
Loveland’s middle ground approach, however, is not without its detractors. Mayor Cecil 
Gutierrez criticized the ordinance’s language as being highly influenced by the COGCC and 
industry stating, “those two entities [the State and industry] had significant impact into those 
regulations…we bent over backward to abdicate, acquiesce to the state” (Gutierrez quoted in 
                                                   
57 A separate lawsuit, filed in December 2012 by COGA and recently joined by the COGCC, contends that the city’s 
fracking (the drilling technique) ban also violates state law. According to Matt Lepore, executive director of the 
COGCC, “The COGCC did not initiate this lawsuit or this process…that said, the COGCC does believe Longm t's 
ban on hydraulic fracturing is contrary to state law, nd we believe clarity from the courts on this matter is 
important” (Jaffe 2013). 
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Maher 2013). He also highlighted a number of provisi n  ultimately stripped after consulting 
with the state and industry. Councilman Ralph Trenay, in even stronger language, noted that “I 
can't agree to the City of Loveland deciding our policy and programs in that kind of convoluted, 
manipulated process.” (Trenary quoted in Maher 2013). Councilman Phil Farley equated the 
participation of the COGCC and industry to the “fox guarding the henhouse” (Farley quoted in 
Maher 2013).   
Industry has endorsed Loveland’s more restrictive standards. Anadarko’s attorney Susan 
Aldridge stated that the city’s standards “were crafted with consultation of the oil and gas 
industry and are now agreeable” (Aldridge quoted in Maher 2013). For the city, the agreement 
provided stability and a template for other communities, “other cities will look to us for a 
template...we have nothing but to gain for enacting these for our community” said 
Councilmember Klassen (Klassen quoted in Maher 2013). In agreeing with developers on 
voluntary agreements, Loveland City Councilman Hugh McKean, reflected “you cannot have 
500 sets of rules for every jurisdiction, every county and every municipality when it comes to an 
industry that has to operate across Colorado using the same technology” (McKean quoted in 
Observer Staff 2013).  
Other cities have remained silent or have had electd officials issue laudatory comments 
about the drilling and extractive development. Located in the resource rich Niobrara Shale play, 
Greeley has shown to be much more of a cooperative ctor. Inside the city’s growth area, there 
are already 427 wells with another 1200 projected in its long-term future. The City’s Mayor, 
Tom Norton, commented that new rules expanding setbacks to 500 feet “would hurt 
development and city planning and would undermine local governments” (Healy 2013). The city 
also collects millions in tax and lease revenues from oil and gas operators. In 2012, for example, 
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the city estimated that oil and gas operations generated 3.3 million dollars for the city and over 
the next twenty-five years, municipal oil and gas related revenues could surpass $420 million 
(City of Greeley 2013).  
Elected leaders of Centennial (located in the lower gr en but higher mobilization 
quadrant) also refused to enact any sort of local restrictions on gas development. In defending his 
decision, Councilman Ken Lucas described the city’s experience with fracking politics as “we 
were lobbied by the usual anti-fracking crowd, they presented the usual misrepresentations and 
we saw right through them…and after some extensive analysis, we believed that the State regs – 
which are the best in the country – were good enough for us” (Lucas quoted in Staff 2013). 
Lucas indicated that developers cannot freely drillwithin the city and that they must receive a 
special use permit prior to drilling.  
Through their permitting processes, cities including Centennial and Greeley (and many 
others) impose a variety of ancillary requirements on natural gas operators, i.e. employing 
conditions of use rather than broad land use authority (specifying the location of wells). Greeley, 
for example, mandates screening and ‘camouflage’ be placed in and around many of its more 
urban wells and compels operators to keep the well sit  free of large weeds. Municipal permits 
may also require that wildlife passages be built or other that the firm takes other actions designed 
to mitigate the effects of development on wildlife and/or residents’ quality of life. If the city 
suspects that a new well will damage public streets, part of the permit can also mandate that the 
operator’s truck follow a specific route or that the driller reimburse the city for the cost of the 




Why Critique or Exceed the State? 
 
The final question of this dissertation is identifying and then considering potential 
relationships between the dependent (municipal fracking policy) and the independent variables. 
Table 4.12 presented the bivariate correlations and revealed a number of variables that may help 
to explain why municipal governments enact policies that encroach upon the ‘turf’ of state 
leaders. Yet, bivariates are limited to identifying relationships between the variables and they 
cannot address the third question, which is to isolate the factors associated with municipal 
policies that challenge and go beyond those of the s ate.   
Because of a small sample size (n=48; sample on page 116), there is not enough variation 
in each category to support a probit regression model. There is, however, sufficient variation to 
run logit regression models. To do so, municipal policy responses are recoded into two different 
dichotomous dependent variables, each designed to further evaluate and explain the relationships 
between cities and their state government. The first logit model is a broader measure of second 
order relations and groups together municipal respon es that challenge, restrict or voice 
displeasure relative to the State’s natural gas goals (municipal policy responses 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). The 
second model includes those municipal policies that exist in direct opposition to state law, i.e. 
city regulations that challenge or conflict with the state’s preemptive authority (originally coded 
as municipal policies 0, 1, 2). For both, I ran forwa d and backward LR logistic regression, 
which identified the most parsimonious set of independent variables – the results of forward and 
backward LR matched one another and are presented below.  
The first overall model reported statistical significance (P=.042). Two variables showed 
noteworthy and significant relationships with municipal challenges to the state’s preemptive 
authority including the logged home value (p = .05) and cities committed to more sustainable 
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forms of economic development (p=.01). Interestingly, turnout fails to reach statistical 
significance, although it may be indirectly accounted for through the logged home value variable 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
Table 4.14 Municipal Fracking Policies that Exceed State Policy Requirements 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Green -2.734 .847 10.430 1 .001 .065 




e* -1.943 .990 3.850 1 .050 .143 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development* -2.295 .905 6.433 1 .011 .101 
Constant 
26.13
0 12.270 4.536 1 .033 2.229E11 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Green. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: LNHomeValue. 
Cox & Snell R Square = .325  
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
In this first model, each one unit increase in a municipalities sustainable development 
score is associated with a 90 percent decrease in th  odds of a municipal policy that supports or 
does not interfere with the State’s goals, while holding the logged home value constant. This is a 
dramatic decrease in the odds. Part of this, however, is due to the sample of ‘green cities,’ which 
is limited to those cities that have actively sought out a high number and concentration of 
environmental and clean tech jobs. For some cities th e jobs amount to three to four percent of 
the city’s overall employment base, which is much larger than the average community in 
Colorado. The log of median home value also reached statistical significance, albeit its P value 
was considerably higher than the ‘green’ variable. For each one unit increase in the logged home 
value, the likelihood of deferring to the state of Colorado on oil and gas regulatory issues 
decreases by approximately 86 percent, holding enviro mentalism and turnout levels constant. 
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While this number may seem like a dramatic shift in the odds, a one-unit increase in the logged 
home value is the equivalent of a median home value incr asing from 100,000 to 274,000, a 
sizable and improbable jump. 
In the second model, only those communities whose plicies contradict and challenge the 
state (originally coded as municipal policies 0, 1, 2) are considered. Although, no variables 
reached the .05 level of statistical significance, if a more generous .1 threshold is applied, both 
the sustainable economic development variable and tur out variable become statistically 
significant and associated with challenges (loud) to the state’s preemptive authority. 
Interestingly, the combined effect shows no relationship with the presence of policies that 
challenge the state’s preemptive authority.  
Table 4.15 Municipal Fracking Policies that Challenge the State’s Preemptive Authority 








nt** -2.341 1.267 3.416 1 .065 .096 
Turnout** -2.176 1.236 3.097 1 .078 .114 






nt**  -1.914 1.167 2.687 1 .101 .148 
Turnout -1.914 1.167 2.687 1 .101 .148 
Constant 4.470 1.438 9.662 1 .002 87.333 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: BachorHigher, DistrictCouncil, LNHomeValue, Green, 
Turnout, LNIncome, Interaction1 (GreenXTurnout) 
**Significant at the .1 level 
 
In the ‘challenging the state’s preemptive authority’ model, with each one unit increase in 
the greenness of the municipality (with the same caveats identified on page 30, the first overall 
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model), there is a 91 percent decrease associated in he likelihood that a city passes a policy that 
complies with state law, holding turnout constant. I  a similar manner, with a one unit increase 
in voter turnout, the odds of passing municipal drilling policies that do not interfere with state oil
and gas goals/policies decrease by 89 percent, while holding the green measure constant. Unlike 
the first model, the log of median home value failed to reach statistical significance. The 
remaining variables were not significant in either model.  
Discussion of Results 
 
The sample of Colorado communities revealed interesing, but limited results. First, the 
small sample size presents challenges when generalizing about other Colorado cities let alone the 
population of cities in those states that currently allow fracking. Second, data are not random and 
cannot address questions of causality and are limited to measures of association. Finally, because 
of data and logistical limitations, the city-level r asons behind decisions to support or oppose 
stricter municipal fracking policies are unknown.  
Despite these limitations, the sample did reveal several patterns associated with 
challenges to the state’s preemptive authority and second order federalism. In Colorado, more 
sustainable communities are associated with a greater likelihood of promulgating policies that 
challenge and test the state’s centralized natural gas policies. Data in both logit models and the 
ANOVA models reflect the key role that environmental support and ideologies play in municipal 
fracking opposition. Data also points to a role for p litical activism and mobilization, evident in 
Tables 4.15 and 4.11. Turnout, for the sample cities, is also associated with municipal policies 
that exerted more local control over natural gas development. Both help to explain second order 
dynamics in Colorado, albeit through a number of potential mechanisms and dynamics, 
explicated below. 
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Table 4.16 Summary of Findings 
Variable Model 1 – Critical of the State 
(Symbolic and Substantive 
Challenges) 




Development  Support Support 
Turnout 
No Support Observed (highly 
correlated with home value) Support 
Income 
No Support Observed (highly 
correlated with home value) No Support Observed 
Owner Occupied 
No Support Observed (highly 
correlated with home value) No Support Observed 
Median 
Household Value Support No Support Observed 
Municipal 
Institutional 
Structures No Support Observed No Support Observed 
Race No Support Observed No Support Observed 
 
Second Order Politics and Information  
While casual mechanisms are beyond the scope of this analysis, its findings underscore 
the strategic nature of information in impacting environmental and turnout dynamics. Both 
explanations highlight the role of information in eg ndering the political will necessary to 
exceed and challenge the state. Disclosure scholars, Desvousges, Smith, and Rink’s (1992) study 
of radon testing offers insights into how municipal opposition to state policies may be a function 
of the quality, saliency and proximity of information that is available to municipal stakeholders 
and less so at the state level. First, information must be disseminated, accessible, clear and 
salient in the minds of the public. Second, the public must internalize the information in such a 
way that it leads to changes in their knowledge and behavior. Because of its proximity and 
novelty, natural gas development and its impacts to residents’ quality of life may become highly 
salient among residents and drive them to push their city halls for more restrictive land use 
drilling policies. City councilmembers, mindful of their reelection prospects, may be more 
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sensitive to these localized pushes when compared to state lawmakers, who can have much 
broader ideological and geographical (and less proximate to oil and natural gas development) 
constituencies.  
The City of Longmont’s efforts to limit fracking within its limits, exemplifies the 
interplay between rational choice, anti-fracking activism and information. In July 2012, 
following a citywide drilling moratorium, the City enacted a new set of oil and gas regulations 
that included an outright ban on drilling in residential areas (passed on a 4-3 vote). Part of this 
vote also authorized for the City to cap and close the Rider Well. Located near a middle school 
and reportedly leaking benzene, this particular site became a catalyst in prompting the city’s 
interest in promulgating tougher oil and gas rules. Longmont citizens also mobilized against 
fracking once they learned of the leaking well. In November 2012, Longmont voters backed a 
complete fracking ban by a 60-40 margin (Rochat 2012; 2012a).  
Second Order Politics, Mobilization and Sustainability  
 The results here also support a long line of research that links oil and gas development, 
proximity to development and ideological factors. Klyza and Sousa (2007) found that 
Republicans generally advocate for the positions of the business community and other anti-
environmental interests. Democrats, conversely, are gen rally more sympathetic and supportive 
of the environment (See also Kamienicki 2006). Michauda, Carlisle and Smith (2008) 
documented ‘perception’ patterns that appear to be present in Colorado’s second order fracking 
proxy battles. They note that Republicans and those p sessing individualist cultural attitudes 
were more likely to favor oil drilling as compared to Democrats, liberals, or egalitarians. The 
former also tended to believe that spills were rareand that drilling can be done safely. Finally, in 
terms of scientists, this ‘group’ was less likely to believe environmental scientists and more 
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likely to believe oil industry scientists. Democrats, on the other hand, were more likely to believe 
environmental scientists as compared to industry scientists, that drilling was less safe and were 
more likely to oppose drilling.  
Greener cities were associated with restrictions on fracking and challenges to the state. 
These results reaffirm the notion that fracking is as much an environmental issue as it an energy 
one (Davis and Fisk 2014). When Colorado communities ar  prone to have concerns about 
environmental protection, they are associated with more oppositional fracking policies and a 
greater willingness to challenge the state’s preemptive authority. This finding is not necessarily 
surprising, although, the willingness to challenge state fracking policy may be suggestive of a 
new form of bottom up environmental activism and potentially, an attractive new venue and 
issue boundary for opponents.  
What is new, however, is that mobilization and turnout matter when it comes to second 
order federalism. Turnout and mobilization help cities overcome collective action dilemmas, i.e. 
they are willing to legislate in policy arenas traditionally reserved to the state – but why? 
Jennings and Andersen’s 2003 study of AIDS activism suggests some clues pointing to a 
potential relationship between conflicting second or er relations and motivation/engagement, 
emotion and context. Jennings and Andersen (2003) created two models, only one of which 
included AIDS-specific variables. In the first model, they found statistically significant 
relationships between gender and sexual orientation nd activism levels, suggesting that gay men 
were most likely to be active in the AIDS movement. However, when Jennings and Andersen 
introduced AIDS-specific attributes into the model (their second model), gender and sexual 
orientation lost much of their explanatory power in favor of the context specific factors i.e. 
personal health status and whether AIDS had affected a loved one.   
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Contextual factors attributed to AIDS status and the intensity of pain and loss, i.e. 
conditions that would create anxiety were responsible for heightened levels of activism. This 
latter model indicated that those who face the greatest risk or have suffered a significant loss, 
regardless of gender and sexual orientation, were the most likely to seek information and engage 
in political activism. In a similar manner, when citizens are motivated, as they were in Longmont 
and Boulder after the Rider Well leaking focusing event or spills near Fort Collins, they may 
become more likely to work to overcome environmental collective action dilemmas and pass 
policies that challenge the state’s authority (Rochat 2012; 2012a).  
Economic Development Goals, Second Order Federalism and Fracking 
Local governments often use their resources to influe ce location decisions made by 
business leaders. The competitive environment influe ces how a city allocates its resources and 
the decision to support or impede oil and gas development. Kantor and David (1988) argued that 
because they operate in a political environment that expects them to compete for economic 
investment and business attraction they are likely to promote economic development and 
competitiveness, such motives are seemingly evident in ci ies that are going beyond the state’s 
development goals.  
Regime theory may also help understand decisions to res rict fracking. Such decisions 
may be less because of democratic responsiveness, but because expanded development may 
threaten green jobs in the community. Additionally, if a community does not expect or depend 
on impact fees for its general fund the influence of industry may be blunted. Concomitantly, 
industry’s very early presence in some communities may also limits its ‘place’ in a governing 
regime, especially when a community is already home to a variety of green businesses, which do 
not want the additional competition (Imbroscio 1999).   
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Colorado’s Second Order Dynamics Revisited 
Elmore’s (1980) description of backward mapping identifies limitations inherent to the 
top-down implementation model as well as more centralized institutional systems. Elmore argues 
that executives or higher level agencies can focus attention on a problem, help set the agenda and 
offer opportunities for street-level officials or lower level governments to exercise discretion and 
judgment, they cannot solve the problem, as they ar too far removed from the actual problem-
solving process. Others go further and note that top-down executives cannot unilaterally control 
the agenda and do not hold a monopoly on political power (Frederickson et. al 2012; Hupe 2011; 
Long 1947; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984).  
Elmore’s descriptions of the problems associated with top-down implementation may 
help explain the ‘tense’ second order relationship in centralized Colorado. Heated second order 
conflicts in Colorado have led to a number of results in addition to multiple lawsuits, especially 
in more mobilized cities that are predisposed to support environmental protection. First, through 
municipal activism, the state’s natural gas agenda is more crowded. State lawmakers, for 
example, have heralded the passage of numerous bills that advance issues of local concern 
including: stricter air regulations and emission limits, tougher disclosure laws and larger buffer 
zones between occupied structures and new development. Local activism has helped to spur a 
new ballot initiative that “empowers cities and counties to set their own standards providing 
Coloradans with regional flexibility in regard to fracking and other highly industrial forms of Oil 
and Gas Development.” The proposed initiative, according to proponents, would also offer new 
legal protections to communities, which pass more restrictive policies, i.e. the flexibility to solve 
local problems (Local Control Colorado 2014).  
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Chapter 5                                                                                                                    
Second Order Politics in Ohio 
 
 
Ohio’s intergovernmental experiences are important for several reasons. First, it is typical 
of a middle ground state in which the state’s oil and natural gas development goals can be 
somewhat balanced by municipal land use preferences. Second, its eastern geography is home to 
the expansive Marcellus and Utica Shale Plays, which are driving industry interest in extraction 
and economic optimism in the region. New economic opportunities are particularly attractive for 
the region’s policymakers, who are seeking to help Ohio emerge from persistent unemployment 
and the slow economic recovery following the 2009 recession. Advocates also promise 
secondary economic benefits for local communities including rising property and sales tax 
collections and the payment of impact fees (OOGA 2012; Wiseman 2009). Third, fracking has 
brought drilling to Ohio’s population centers of Youngstown and communities near Cleveland, 
Canton and Akron. As of 2013, over three million Ohioans live within a mile of a natural gas 
well (Gold 2013). Finally, Ohio’s second order politics mirror Colorado’s more mercurial 
politics with tense and oppositional dynamics (an ongoing state lawsuit), indifference and 
cooperative relationships between Ohio’s cities, its elected State leaders and the Department of 
Natural Resources (ODNR).  
 This chapter’s organization follows the same format as the preceding chapter. It begins 
with a summary of relevant state statutes, regulations and judicial opinions that establish the 
formal boundaries governing natural gas development, hydraulic fracturing and municipal-state 
relations. Fracking’s costs and benefits in an Ohio specific context follow. The chapter then 
transitions to a municipal-centric perspective and d resses the dissertation’s second (municipal 
policy responses) and third (challenging the state’s preemptive authority) major questions. 
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Through a sampling of cities, the chapter summarizes and offers an explanation of the landscape 
of municipal responses to increasing urban drilling. It concludes by addressing the dissertation’s 
third major question: why are some cities exceeding a d / or challenging the state’s preemptive 
authority and others are not?   
Ohio’s Natural Gas Experiences and Context 
 
Commercial oil and natural gas production began in 1888 and grew quickly. The boom, 
however, was short-lived and production peaked in 1896. Operators began to vertically frack 
many of Ohio’s oil and gas wells in 1951 and revived production in many of the state’s depleted 
fields. A second production ‘boom’ began in the late 2000s with the deployment of directional 
drilling. Today, Ohio produces a modest but growing volume of natural gas (78 billion cubic 
feet) and oil (4.7 million barrels) (OOGA 2014).  
Natural gas formations are located primarily under th  Eastern half of the State. The 
larger Marcellus Shale lies underneath the eastern edge of the State. Ohio officials, however, 
consider it the less economically viable shale deposit.58 Comparatively, industry leaders and state 
policymakers see the Utica Shale as a richer source of natural gas. State estimates put the total 
volume of reserves at 3.75 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas and 1.31 billion barrels of oil 
assuming a 1.2 percent recovery rate. Production forecasts skyrocket to 15.7 TCF of natural gas 
and 5.5 billion barrels of oil if the recovery rate rises to five percent (OOGA 2012).  
Table 5.1 Recoverable Natural Gas in Ohio 
Shale Play Recoverable Natural Gas (in 
Trillions of Cubic Feet TCF) 
Region 
Marcellus 369 TCF Extreme Eastern Ohio 
Utica 111 TCF Eastern half of the State 
Source: EIA 2014 
                                                   
58 At its deepest point in Ohio, the Marcellus Shale is 62 feet thick (which is generally not thick enough for 
recoverable quantities of oil or natural gas). 
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Both Ohio Democrats and Republicans generally support expanded natural gas 
development via fracking. Former Democratic Governor, Ted Strickland, touting HB278/SB 
165’s environmental and economic benefits, signed it into law in 2010. The law added new pre-
drilling notification requirements in urban areas, increased insurance rates and fees, standardized 
spacing and well intensity regulations, and it included additional resources (for the ODNR) for 
environmental enforcement (ODNR 2014). Republican Governor, John Kasich and his allies in 
the Statehouse are also favorably inclined towards fracking and have taken steps to encourage 
drilling. Natural Resources Director, Jim Zehringer, noted that the Kasich Administration 
worked with industry to produce comprehensive new rules governing well-pad construction, 
permitting, processing and waste recycling, and hired new staff to meet the regulatory demand 
associated with its expectation of expanded production. He described industry as a wonderful 
partner through the process and stated that Ohio is open for business (Zehringer quoted by 
McParland 2014).  
Debate about whether to allow fracking in Ohio appears settled, although new concerns 
over seismic activities have contributed to calls for a statewide fracking moratorium and new 
efforts to limit the underground injection of fracked water.59 Lawmakers have also sparred over 
oil and natural gas revenues and reimbursements to local governments for fracking related 
impact costs. Statehouse Republicans (backed by industry) favor a lower severance tax rate while 
the Republican Governor favors of a higher one, “I want to make sure as they deplete our 
resources that they pay for it, mostly out-of-state people, and that we use those resources to 
benefit every Ohioan by reducing the tax burden [for] every Ohioan” (Governor Kasich quoted 
in Kovac 2013). Kasich’s plan is also more generous t  local governments, which allocates a 
fourth of the additional severance tax collections to the 33 counties most affected by oil and gas 
                                                   
59 There are also examples of municipal/township bans and other land use restrictions on urban drilling. 
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exploration. If the plan were to become law, affected counties would receive approximately $15 
million in 2014 and nearly $110 million by 2016 (Vardon 2013). Statehouse Republicans, 
however, oppose the Kasich plan and efforts to raise the severance tax rate (Pelzer 2014).  
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
 
 A number of formal documents (statutory and constitutional) shape Ohio’s second order 
politics. Pertinent provisions include constitutional language that lays out the scope of home rule 
authority, environmental protections and the relationship between state authority and municipal 
autonomy. Other relevant constitutional clauses establi h rights pertaining to water withdrawals/ 
usage and private property (surface and subsurface property) rights.   
 The State Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3, imbues Ohio’s municipalities with the  
“authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their 
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general 
laws” Morris v. Roseman,162 Ohio St. 447 (1954). Home rule powers are inherent to all local 
governments regardless of enabling legislation, their size, class or charter. The section contains 
three clauses that add further depth but also uncertainty to the second order relationship between 
Ohio’s cities and state leaders: 
1. The power to exercise all powers of local self-government. 
2. The power to exercise police powers concurrently with the state.  
3. The conflict clause (usually modifies the police powers clause). 
The State Constitution delegates to city and other sub-state governments two additional powers. 
First, local governments may conserve and preserve natural and open space areas, which the 
Constitution defines as legitimate public purposes. Second, municipalities and counties may 
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“control, prevent or minimize, clean up or remediate water contamination or pollution” (Nolon 
and Gavin 2013). 
Ohio law considers water a property right, protected by Article 1, Section 19b of the State 
Constitution. Landowners, under the current regulatory scheme, are allowed to make reasonable 
uses of groundwater (beneath their land) and of surface water (waters located on or flowing 
through their land) without state oversight. Unreasonable withdrawals that interfere with other 
landowners’ rights to use water are subject to state regulation and possible litigation. Section 
1521.16 of the Ohio Revised Code clarified what is meant by ‘interfere’ and required that firms 
(like natural gas operators and extractors) possessing the capacity to consume or withdraw more 
than 100,000 gallons per day (about 70 gallons per minute) register with the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources Division of Soil and Water Resources (Division of Soil and Water Resources 
[DWSR] 2012).   
Ohio statutes distinguish cities from villages (having fewer than 5,000 residents) and 
townships. There, are, however, few substantive diff rences in regards to sub-state type and the 
authority to regulate land use and author zoning regulations. Cities, villages and townships may 
provide residents with public safety and health servic s, offer waste management, build senior 
and community centers, roads, parks, maintain lightin  and engage in zoning/land use and 
transportation planning (Cox 2012).60  
The Ohio Oil and Gas Act of 1965 established the first set of formal boundaries for state 
and city governments relative to natural gas. Two recent amendments to Chapter 1509 of the Act 
are noteworthy. First, Democratic Governor, Ted Strickland, signed into law Substitute SB 165, 
                                                   
60 Within Ohio, 59 percent live in cities and 35 percent reside in townships. 
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centralizing the state’s permitting authority in urban areas and adding new enforcement 
provisions including (ODNR 2014):  
• New directionally drilled wells may not be closer than 150 feet to any property line 
unless the operator has secured the landowner’s written consent  
• New surface wells cannot be located closer than 100 feet to an occupied dwelling or 
public building 
• New permit fees for urban areas (ODNR 2014) 
Republican Governor John Kasich signed Senate Bill 315 (“S.B. 315”), into law on June 11, 
2012. The new language placed additional standards fo  well and site construction, added new 
disclosure requirements and increased fines for health and safety violations. The bill also 
required new pre-drilling water testing, tracking water usage and increased insurance 
requirements (ODNR 2012; Simmer 2012). Table 5.2 identifies other statutes with tangential 
impacts on urban drilling.  
Table 5.2 Other Environmental and Energy Laws  
 Name and Year Policy Area Agencies 
Ohio Solid and 
Hazardous Waste and 
Disposal Act (1967) Reducing and preventing pollution 
Division of Materials and 
Waste Management 
Clean Air Act (1970) 
Stationary and Mobile Air Sources 
and state implementation plans 
Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency  (OEPA) 
Clean Water Act 
(1970) 
Regulate wastewater treatment 
plants, factories and storm water to 
reduce the impact of pollutants. OEPA 
Source: Ohio Rules 2014 
 
Ohio is a split estate state. In Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C. 106 (Ohio Cir. 
Ct. 1911) the Circuit Court held that the mineral estate owner was entitled to an implied right to 
use the surface estate. The Court’s decision permitt d the subsurface owner (Chartiers) to 
explore and drill for oil and gas on the surface estat  to a reasonable extent. I  J.R. Operating 
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Co. v. Lindsay, (Mahoning App. No. 96 C.A. 35) the Mahoning appellat  court clarified what 
“reasonable” meant. The court determined that the mineral estate owner may not unreasonably 
intrude upon the surface estate while he or she is extracting underground resources (Energy and 
Mineral law Institute 2011). 
Regulations 
 
 Two state agencies oversee Ohio’s natural gas industry. The Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency (OEPA) regulates fracking’s environmental impacts to water and air quality. 
The Ohio Department of Natural Resources Division of Mineral Resources Management 
(ODNR-DMRM) holds considerably more authority to shape fracking’s land use impacts. The 
agency oversees the life cycle of a frack site from the issuance of initial drilling permits to its 
operational stages and then to well plugging and abandonment. The ODNR’s regulatory 
authority also extends to natural gas transportation, land use and wastes/waste byproducts 
produced during production (Shale 2014).  
Founded in 1972, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency protects the environment 
and public health. A gubernatorial appointee heads several divisions (air, water, hazardous 
wastes and site remediation) and sets day-to-day policy. Each division, in turn, carries out 
several functions: reviewing and issuing permits to facilities/firms, investigating complaints from 
citizens/landowners, providing technical assistance to firms and monitoring and enforcing 
environmental regulations (OEPA 2014). The OEPA’s jurisdiction over fracking extends to 
monitoring air and water impacts typically through the permitting and inspections process.  
Finally, the OEPA regulates soil contamination. If drilling is suspected of polluting adjacent 
soils, it is classified as a contaminated solid waste, which only permitted waste facilities can 
receive (OEPA 2014a). 
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Since 1959, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) has promoted, protected 
and regulated the state’s natural resources. Also led by a gubernatorial appointee, its mission 
includes four disparate goals. The first two promote the state’s natural resources and the 
facilitation of statewide economic development through policies that lead to job creation, 
expansion and retention. To advance these goals, the agency cultivates ties with industry. Third, 
the ODNR is to provide leisure and recreational opportunities for Ohio residents and tourists. To 
achieve its fourth goal, the ODNR regulates industrial development in such a way that it does not 
endanger public health or cause serious environmental harm (ODNR 2014).  
Under its current regulatory authority, the ODNR enacts rules that govern a number of 
industry activities of interest to local governments such as disclosure, injection wells and well 
setbacks (ODNR 2014). Like its counterparts in Texas and Colorado, ODNR requires that 
operators first apply and obtain a drilling permit from the Oil and Gas Division. Once received, 
firms must meet requisite casing, cementing, well integrity and completion and disposal 
standards. State law requires firms to leave a 150-foot minimum setback requirement between 
new wells and residential units (in urban areas) and a 50-foot buffer between development and 
water sources. Municipalities (as of April 2014) can still enact zoning ordinances and land use 
regulations to oversee natural gas development but mus do so in a way that protects public 
health or its environment, i.e. simple opposition t development is not sufficient.  
Table 5.3 Ohio’s Other Fracking Regulations 
Area Regulation 
Disclosure  
CAS numbers be disclosed; maximum 
amount of all additives and pressures; base 
fluid; pre-drilling water quality sampling; 
process to challenge trade secret exemptions  
Pre‐Drilling Water Well Testing  Within 0.28 miles of well 
Water Withdrawal Restrictions  
Permit req. if>2m gal/day, reg./report 
if>100k gal/day 
Casing and Cementing Depth Requirements  50 feet. blow water table 
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Intermediate and Production Casing Cement 
Circulation Regulations  
 
Surface Casing Cement Circulation 
500 feet above SHOE 
 
 
1000 feet above SHOE 
Venting and Flaring  Banned, Restricted 
Fluid Storage   Permit required for all pits and tanks 
Underground fluid injection Permit/approval and recordkeeping required 
Source: Richardson et al. 2013 
 
Both the OEPA and ODNR hold significant authority over natural gas operations within the 
State. As co-regulators, each has the opportunity to influence oil and natural gas operations and 
to affect Ohio’s second order politics. The table below summarizes applicable powers by 
operator activity.  
Table 5.4 State Co-Regulators 
 REGULATORY AGENCY 
 Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources 
Ohio Environmental Protection 
Agency 
Drilling   Drilling permits  
 Establishes requirements for 
spacing/location, design and 
construction of wells  
 Performs inspections and oversight  
 Sets requirements for spills, releases 
and well plugging/abandonment 
 Permits to withdraw water 
 Mandates that operators receive 
authorization for 
construction when a proposed 
activity impacts wetlands, streams, 
rivers   
 Drillers must obtain an air permit-




 Creates and enacts design 
requirements and closure 
requirements when operators plan to 
store drill cuttings and 
brine/flowback water in on-site pits 
or lagoons 
 Establishes standards for cuttings and 
sediments left on-site 
 Once soil is considered a solid 
waste, operators are required to 
follow solid waste protocols for 
shipping it off-site 
Water 
disposal 
 Regulates the disposal of brine and 
sets design standards and oversees 
operation of underground injection  
 Responds to citizens  
  




Judicial Decisions  
 
Ohio Courts conduct a three-step home rule analysis for determining the scope of state-
municipal relations (Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 96 NE 2d 967 (2008). 
The analysis is applied in a variety of circumstances ranging from gun control and toxic waste 
facilities to urban drilling.  
 The analysis begins by determining whether or not a  ordinance falls within the inherent 
set of powers of municipal self-government or if its an extension of local police 
powers. Municipal actions are permissible if the “rsult affects only the municipality itself, with 
no extraterritorial effects, the subject is clearly within the power of local self-government and is 
a matter for the determination of the municipality. However, if the result is not so confined it 
becomes a matter for the General Assembly” (Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 
Ohio St.2d 125, 129, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968), quoting Beachwood at 371).  
If the Court determines that the ordinance is an exercise of local police power rather than 
a pure local issue, the analysis proceeds to a second step (Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. 
City of Clyde, 96 NE 2d 967 (2008)). Police-power ordinances, according to the Court, are pieces 
of legislation that protect public health, safety, morals or residents’ general welfare. If the Court 
finds the ordinance is a police power, it then attempts to determine if a state general law should 
supersede the municipal ordinance.  
The Court defines general laws as (Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 (2002)):   
1. The statute is part of a statewide enactment and is comprehensive 
2. The statute is applied uniformly throughout the state 
3. Establishes police, sanitary or other standards that are not just restrictions on state power  
4. Articulates rules of conduct upon citizens 
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During this final step, the court ascertains whether or not there are inconsistencies, 
contradictions or conflicts between state law and the municipal action (Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. 
v. Parma, 55 Ohio St. 3d 101 (1990). If the municipal ordinance conflicts with the relevant state 
law (a general law), then the Court rules it as unconstitutional and strikes it down. However, 
local communities may promulgate regulations that do not necessarily conflict with the State’s 
general laws, suggesting that concurrent regulation is permissible.  
In its 1986 Fondessy decision, the State Supreme Court applied its three-part analysis to  
two ordinances passed by the City of Oregon to regulate toxic waste facilities within the city 
(Fondessy Enterprises v. City of Oregon, 492 N.E.2d 797, 23 Ohio St. 3d 213). Under its 
ordinance, the City charged a permit fee on hazardous waste sites within city limits and 
mandated that waste site operators keep detailed and complete records. The State Supreme Court 
held in favor of the City, explaining that the permit does not conflict with or impede the 
implementation of state law (Nolon and Gavin 2013).  
The judiciary has also inserted itself into second rder natural gas debates. In its Newbury 
decision, the Supreme Court evaluated Newbury’s Township drilling ban in residentially zoned 
areas, which coincidently included large swaths of farmland, typically where natural gas 
extraction takes place (Newbury Township Board of Trustees v. Lomak Petroleum, Inc 583 
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1992). The Court struck down the Township’s ban. In its holding, the Justices 
surmised that more than just concerns over public healt  and welfare (part of the Constitutional 
obligations of city and township governments) drove th  township’s policies (Nolon and Gavin 
2013). The practical effect of Newbury is that should municipal or township governments 
promulgate fracking restrictions or regulations (as they failed to do in Newbury), they must 
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demonstrate a compelling concern for health and safety; mere opposition to oil and gas 
development is not a sufficient cause.   
The most recent case to test the legal relationship between cities and the State originated 
in the northeastern city of Munroe Falls. In this ca e, the City charged Beck Energy with 
violating its zoning, right of way and permitting ordinances after the company began to drill on 
private property. The trial court ruled in favor of Munroe Falls. The Appellate Court, however, 
reversed the lower court and held in favor of Beck Energy. At issue, is whether HB 278 preempts 
municipal home rule authority. In its holding, the Appellate Court centered its logic on the 
comprehensive language used in HB 278/SB 165 (included well location, spacing and operation, 
permitting, drilling, well stimulation and completion), and found the legislation sufficient to 
preempt municipal regulation (Cocklin 2013). The State Supreme Court has accepted the case for 
review with a decision likely in late 2014 or early 2015.  




Much of the recent and renewed natural gas development is concentrated in the State’s 
eastern half. Driving these production increases is fracking via directional drilling and vertical 




Figure 5.1 Ohio’s Natural Gas Production, by Extraction Technique 
Source: EIA 2013e  
 
Despite the recent rise in overall gas production, the number of producing natural gas wells has 
remained steady at 35,000. 
 
Figure 5.2 Ohio Natural Gas Wells (Count) 
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Ohio’s gas industry expects continued growth. Production, like Colorado and Texas, is 
location specific contributes to the unequal distribution of natural gas environmental/economic 
costs and rewards. 
Table 5.5 Ohio’s Fracked Counties 
2012 Rank County Wells Drilled Average Depth Footage Drilled 
1 Carroll 87 13,541 1,178,078 
2 Noble 49 5,824 285,376 
3 Licking* 42 2,709 113,757 
4 Knox 40 3,042 121,675 
5 Stark 36 6,342 228,312 
6 Monroe 31 4,677 144,987 
7 Columbiana 30 13,005 390,147 
8 Harrison 22 13,906 305,933 
9 Coshocton 18 4,299 77,382 
10 Guernsey 18 4,733 85,194 
*Located just east of Columbus 
**Development is also occurring in and around Cleveand, Youngtown and Akron 




Industry advocates promise increasing severance tax revenues, private sector economic 
growth and strong employment forecasts. Government budget experts also project additional 
property and sales tax receipts and the creation of thousands of industry jobs, filled by 








Table 5.6 Statewide Economic Impacts 
Year 
(in millions) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Employment 3,794 21,469 102,052 177,006 203,138 
Gross Regional Product $180 $1,090 $5,382 $9,972 $12,265 
Wages  $153 $955 $4,907 $9,412 $11,990 
Output  $336 $2,028 $9,987 $18,429 $22,583 
Local Wage Tax (@ 2%) $3 $19 $98 $188 $239 
Source: Kleinhenz and Associates 2011 
 
Table 5.7 Employment Impacts 
  Direct Employment Impacts 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mining and Extractive  494 2,922 14,222 71,297 30,900 
  Indirect Employment Impacts  
Support activities for mining 2,473 13,521 63,118 105,709 117,204 
Retail trade  166 1,007 4,948 8,990   10,743 
Professional and technical services 149 885 4,299 7,675     8,988 
Administrative and support services  107 625 3,023 5,365    6,236 
Ambulatory health care services  106 634 3,215 5,911     7,060 
Construction 98 660 3,235 6,673       9,077 
Food services and drinking places  71 434 2,156 3,994       4,940 
Wholesale trade  54 321 1,539 2,722     3,162 
Real estate  43 259 1,287 2,307       2,670 
Personal and laundry services  33 201 1,010 1,834     2,158 
Total 3,300 18,547 87,830 105,709 172,238 

















Table 5.8 Revenue Impacts 
Year Severance Taxes 
Commercial 







2012 $434,862 $239,430 $1,072,262 $1,878,604 $469,651 $4,094,809 
2013 $2,967,123 $1,633,663 $7,316,193 $12,817,970 $3,204,492 $27,939,440 
2014 $15,080,854 $8,303,341 $37,185,668 $65,149,290 $16,287,322 $142,006,475 
2015 $32,368,301 $17,821,606 $79,812,249 $139,831,060 $34,957,765 $304,790,980 
Total $50,851,140 $27,998,040 $125,386,372 $219,676,924 $54,919,230 $478,831,704 
Source: Kleinhenz and Associates 2011 
 
 The tables point to a number of optimistic projections. Severance taxes, for example, may 
grow by hundreds of millions of dollars along with new indirect sales and property taxes 
(Kleinhenz and Associates 2011). Additional revenues via better paying jobs and support 
industries, according to forecasts, will help reinvigorate stagnant municipal and regional 
economies. Rising gas and oil collections have created  number of attractive policy options 
available to elected officials (especially the Governor), such as income tax cuts, increasing local 
aid and new spending on enforcement and environmental remediation programs (McParland 
2014; Vardon 2013).  
On the ground, numbers are mixed. In FY 2012, Ohio’s t p fifteen shale gas producing 
counties’ sales tax receipts increased by 20 percent, significantly larger than non-producing 
counties. Job growth from shale exploration, even in strong and moderate shale producing 
counties, however is weak, averaging less than one percent. Industry and its supporters are quick 
to explain that they expect that as more Ohioans complete natural gas job training programs and 
as more gas fields begin producing, these employment numbers will improve (Institute of 
Government Studies 2013).  
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Gas economics are not always favorable to municipal governments. According to 
Amanda Woodrum, a researcher for Policy Matters Ohio, oil and natural gas extraction 
contributes to cycles of boom and bust, which should give caution to state and municipal leaders 
eager to cultivate new industrial development. Woodrum observed that during boom cycles 
“communities across all [Marcellus Shale] five states show increased retail and food 
consumption, higher educational enrollment rates and l rger tax revenues via severance and 
property taxes in the first couple years of drilling.” During bust episodes, however, she warns 
that municipal governments will confront more pernicious effects, “communities experience 
higher incidences of drug use and criminal activity, increased drop-out rates” and a growing 
number of abandoned properties, increasing demands on social services and rising crime levels 
(Woodrum 2013; See also Remington 2013).61 Cycles are sharper in states like Ohio, which have 
not historically experienced high levels of natural g s development (Remington 2013).   
Environmental Impacts   
 
Environmentalists and other anti-fracking activists point to a number of environmental 
harms. Many of these are described in Chapter 1 and include air and water degradation and 
quality of life concerns. Ohio’s unique geography also means that fracking debates center on 
more parochial concerns including water consumption, p table water safety and earthquakes 
(Henry 2013a).  
Citing numerous examples of potential agency capture, environmentalists charge both the 
Governor and Statehouse leaders with being too cozy with industry. They cite the resignation of 
the State’s Environmental Protection Agency director, who left the agency because of purported 
conflicts (air and fracking pollution enforcement plans) he had with the Governor (Johnson 
2014) Anti-fracking groups also argue that state authorities do not respond to citizen complaints. 
                                                   
61 Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, West Virginia and Ohio 
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Brian Kunkemoeller, of the Ohio Sierra Club stated “we want the EPA to investigate all these 
complaints because we don’t trust the substantiation by state agencies that these contaminations 
are not legit” (Kunkemoeller quoted in Knox 2014). He continued by casting doubt on the Ohio 
Department of Natural Resources’ (ODNR) new regulations, believing them to be ineffective at 
protecting water and the public’s health (Knox 2014).  
Environmentalists are especially concerned about water quality and have charged the 
ODNR with ignoring water quality violations. Respondi g to environmentalists’ claims, the 
Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management highlighted that between 2010 and October of 
2013, it investigated over 180 natural gas well/site complaints. It found that all of the problems 
were from older vertical wells and that even these spills rarely affected surface water quality. 
ODNR maintains that fracking is environmentally benign as shown in Table 5.9 (Downing 
2013a).  






2010 37 0 
2011 54 2 
2012 59 2 
2013 33 (as of October 2013) 2 
Source: Downing 2013; Knox 2014 
 
Air emissions are particularly problematic in rust belt states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania 
and West Virginia. In July 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council ranked Ohio as one of 
the top states for poor air quality, partly due to the state’s industrial heritage. Fracking, according 
to environmentalists, contributes to and could exacrbate this poor legacy through emissions and 
particulates. They contend that each stage in a natural gas well’s life cycle emits harmful air 
pollution. In just five days of production, for example, operators consume 29,000 gallons of 
diesel fuel and once burned, they release toxic compounds including benzene, smog and 
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formaldehyde. This phase, according to Mike Settles, spokesman at the Ohio EPA, can last 
several years, but is mostly unregulated by local, st te or federal environmental laws (Ohio 
Environmental Council 2013; Staff 2012).  
Table 5.10 Environmental Impacts of Fracking 
Environmental Harm 2012 Impact 
Acres damaged since 2005 1,600 
Based on Well Completion from 2005 to 2012 
(metric tons of  carbon dioxide-equivalent) 420,000 tons 
Particular Matter 100 tons 
NOx 1,700 tons 
Carbon Monoxide 2,600 tons 
Volatile Organic Compounds 200 tons 
Sulfur Dioxide 6 tons 
Source: Ridlington and Rumpler 2013 
 
Fracking’s causal relationship to earthquakes is also generating high levels of elite and 
public attention, and is especially acute in Ohio, which has a high number fracking wastewater 
injection wells. In 2011, the wells contributed to a series of small earthquakes in Eastern Ohio 
(near Youngstown).62 Following the eleventh earthquake of 2011, state officials froze 
underground waste injections until scientists could gain a better understanding of the causes 
behind the tremors (Henry, Tom. 2013, 2013a).  
Second Order Issues  
 
The state of municipal natural gas regulation is ‘in waiting’ while the State Supreme 
Court deliberates the Munroe Falls case. While state government in Ohio is home to a great deal 
of decision-making authority, municipalities do have land use authority and constitutional 
powers to protect the environment and limit the effcts of urban drilling. Second order disputes 
center around differing interpretations of the three-part home rule analysis. State regulations 
preempt home rule authority with these constraints:  
                                                   
62 The quake measured below 4.0 on the Richter scale. 
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1. The power to exercise all powers of local self-government 
2. The power to exercise police powers concurrently with the state 
3. The conflict clause (usually modifies the police powers clause) 
Results and Implications 
 
In order to determine how Ohio’s ‘middle of the road’ second order political structures 
impact municipal decision-making, I compiled the policy positions of 60 cities and townships 
(full list available on page 148). A variety of state-local relationships may be observed ranging 
from cities that actively embrace fracking to those who prefer to exercise greater levels of local 
control. Research findings show instances of direct challenges to the state’s preemptive authority 
through zoning and bans. Much like Colorado communities, these cities also argue that their 
home rule and land use authority permit them to regulate where drilling may take place. For 
others, fracking and urban drilling are the means to fund new public projects, to contribute to 
local economic growth and to improve municipal budget forecast levels.  
The second major goal of this dissertation is to provide an overview of the actions and 
frequency of municipal activity relative to urban natural gas development. The types of activities 
are well dispersed once placed in the municipal policy action scale. Most cities prefer to defer to 
the state, the position of slightly over a third of the cities in the sample. Findings show that three 
other policy options are fairly popular among local governments: zoning regulations (considered 
a challenge to the state’s preemptive authority), resolutions for local control (considered as 
oppositional but not challenging the state’s authori y) and actions supporting additional 
development (supporting the state’s extraction goals). When this latter category is combined with 
deferential cities, over half of sampled cities are supportive of the state’s natural gas land use 
policies.  
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Concomitantly, almost a third of cities have acted assertively, through either bans or 
zoning regulations that exceed and challenge the stat ’  policies towards natural gas. When 
expanded to include communities that support decentralized authority like the City of Munroe 
Falls in Munroe Falls vs. Beck Energy Corp, this number increases to almost half of the sampled 
municipal governments. Table 5.10 displays the aggre ate results and descriptive statistics.  
Table 5.11 Aggregated Municipal Responses to Oil and Gas Development 
Policy Responses (Policy 





Bans or Moratoria (0)* 3 4.8 5.0 5.0 
Zoning Regulations (1)* 14 22.6 23.3 28.3 
Bans on municipal property 
(2)^ 1 1.6 1.7 30.0 
Voluntary Agreements (3)^ 0 0 0 30.0 
Resolutions for local 
control/anti-fracking (4)^ 10 16.1 16.7 46.7 
No Action/resolutions in 
favor/special use permits that 
do not conflict with state law 
(5) 22 35.5 36.7 83.3 
Actions increasing development 
(6) 10 16.1 16.7 100.0 
Total 60  100.0  
Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news articles 
^ Symbolic Challenges  
* Substantive Legal Challenges  
 
 Once disaggregated, it becomes possible to identify relationships between the variables. 
Each of the typology’s four quadrants (see below) is home to a variety of municipal legislative 
and regulatory actions. Lower green and lower turnot c mmunities are not monolithic 
supporters of state gas policy and some communities have enacted zoning and other land use 
restrictions. Conversely, there are communities located in the high green – high turnout quadrant 
that take actions to encourage gas development within their corporate limits.  
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Table 5.12 Individual Municipal Policy Responses to Oil and Gas Development* 
























Clairsville 5 Toronto 5 Belpre 0 Massillon 6 
Barnesville 6 Cortland 5 Marietta 6 Euclid 4 
Bellaire 6 Girard 5 Columbiana 4 
North 
Olmsted 5 
Shadyside 5 Hubbard 1 East Palestine 5 Parma 1 








Liverpool 5 Westlake 5 
Goshen 1 
Youngstow
n 4 Perry 1 Alliance 1 
Mead 5 Bazetta 5 Aurora 4 Canton 4 
Pease 5 Champion 5 Streetsboro 5 Brooklyn 1 
Pultney 4 Canfield 1 Dover 1 Bay Village 1 
Richland 5 Howland 5 
New 
Philadelphia 5 Akron 4 
Warren 
(Belmont 
















*Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news articles 
 
ANOVA Results  
 
 There appears to be differences among the groups when classified according to the 
second order typology. However, are such differences th  result of stochastic processes or are 
there meaningful differences to be observed? To begin answering this question, I apply one and 
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two way ANOVA tests (Tables 5.13 and 5.14). The latter includes a factorial structure based on 
the second order typology. The results suggest that there are significant differences between the 
groups that may be associated with the typology (p= .000).   




Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups* 76.516 3 25.505 6.948 .000 
Within Groups 602.002 164 3.671   
Total 678.518 167    
*Bold relationships are significant 
 
Table 5.14 Relationships among Specific Municipal Groups based on Commitment to 
Sustainable Economic Development, Ease of Mobilization 
  Mean 
Difference 








Low SD and High Turnout -.07143 .41809 .865 
High SD and Low Turnout* .91696* .42063 .031 
High SD and High Turnout* 1.54430* .41565 .000 
Low SD and 
High 
Turnout 
Low SD and Low Mobilization .07143 .41809 .865 
High SD and Low Turnout* .98839* .42063 .020 
High SD and High Turnout* 1.61573* .41565 .000 
High SD and 
Low Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization* -.91696* .42063 .031 
Low SD and High Turnout* -.98839* .42063 .020 
High SD and High Turnout .62734 .41821 .136 
High SD and 
High 
Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization* -1.54430* .41565 .000 
Low SD and High Turnout* -1.61573* .41565 .000 
High SD and Low Turnout -.62734 .41821 .136 
*Relationships are significant  
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Several group relationships are worth highlighting. The High SD – High Turnout group 
(HGHT) is unique and differs significantly from both lower green groups p = .000; p= .000) but 
not the other high green (but lower turnout; p = .136) category. The high SD - low turnout group 
also shows meaningful differences between itself and the two lower green groups (p = .031; p= 
.020).  
What is driving the differences between the groups? Are cities more committed to 
sustainable economic development more likely to exercis  control over land use policy versus 
more highly mobilized cities? Do they interact in a w y that suggests HGHT cities are different? 
To further evaluate the relationship between the ind pendent and the dependent variables, I ran a 
two-way ANOVA. Table 5.15 presents the results. 
Table 5.15 Being Green or Being Mobilized 





Corrected Model 23.267a 3 7.756 2.035 .119 
Intercept 851.267 1 851.267 223.318 .000 
Sustainable Economic 
Development 9.600 1 9.600 2.518 .118 
turnout1* 13.067 1 13.067 3.428 .069 
Sustainable Economic 
Development * 
turnout1 .600 1 .600 .157 .693 
Error 213.467 56 3.812   
Total 1088.000 60    
a. R Squared = .098 (Adjusted R Squared = .050) 
*Statistically significant at the .1 level 
 
Overall, the model lacks significance. Neither the gr en nor turnout variables reach the .05 
threshold of statistical significance, but if a more generous .1 measure is applied, turnout reaches 
statistical significance.  
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Do any of the common socio-economic variables help account for differences observed 
between the groups? With the inclusion of the new variables, the significance of turnout becomes 
slightly stronger (P=.05). A second predictor variable, percentage of occupied homes, also 
reaches statistical significance (P =.03). Overall, the enhanced socio-economic model inches 
closer to overall statistical significance (P = .052) and explains 11 percent of the variation 
present in the dependent variable.  
Table 5.16 Being Sustainable versus Being Mobilized with Socio-Demographic 
Characteristics 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model** 48.084a 6 8.014 2.251 .052 
Intercept .522 1 .522 .147 .703 
Logged Median 
Home Value 4.071 1 4.071 1.144 .290 
Logged Per 
Capita Income 6.088 1 6.088 1.710 .197 
Owner 
Occupied* 17.685 1 17.685 4.969 .030 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development 8.875 1 8.875 2.493 .120 




turnout1 .039 1 .039 .011 .917 
Error 188.649 53 3.559   
Total 1088.000 60    
Corrected Total 236.733 59    
a. R Squared = .203 (Adjusted R Squared = .113) 
*Significant at the .05 level 






Explaining Differences  
 
Despite the threat of legal challenges, sampled municipal governments are active 
intergovernmental participants. Multiple cities, such as Munroe Falls and Oberlin, have enacted 
citywide zoning restrictions, bans and moratoria. Other cities act as willing partners to industry 
and supporters of the State’s goal of expanding natural gas development by leasing public lands 
and excess water. Below are the bivariate correlations between municipal fracking policy and the 
predictor variables, with statistically significant relationships bolded.  
156 
 






























Pearson -.279* 1 .551**  .645**  -.362**  .624**  -.277* -.274* .060 -.106 .076 




Pearson -.279* .551**  1 .945**  -.097 .876**  -.080 .103 .394**  .374**  .223 




Pearson -.257* .645**  .945**  1 -.100 .939**  -.070 .091 .381**  .265* .295* 
Sig. .048 .000 .000  .447 .000 .594 .487 .003 .041 .022 
Race 
Pearson .023 -.362**  -.097 -.100 1 .052 -.051 .361**  .438**  .172 .382**  
Sig. .864 .004 .463 .447  .691 .696 .005 .000 .190 .003 
Educ 
Pearson -.222 .624**  .876**  .939**  .052 1 -.062 .064 .437**  .232 .337**  
Sig. .088 .000 .000 .000 .691  .637 .626 .000 .075 .008 
Manager 
Pearson .209 -.277* -.080 -.070 -.051 -.062 1 .059 -.182 .105 -.035 
Sig. .108 .032 .542 .594 .696 .637  .653 .165 .425 .791 
Council 
Districts 
Pearson -.059 -.274* .103 .091 .361**  .064 .059 1 .415**  .422**  .328* 
Sig. .654 .034 .435 .487 .005 .626 .653  .001 .001 .011 
HGHT 
Pearson -.281* .060 .394**  .381**  .438**  .437**  -.182 .415**  1 .577**  .577**  




Pearson -.201 -.106 .374**  .265* .172 .232 .105 .422**  .577**  1 .000 
Sig. .123 .419 .003 .041 .190 .075 .425 .001 .000  1.000 
turnout1 
Pearson -.235 .076 .223 .295* .382**  .337**  -.035 .328* .577**  .000 1 
Sig. .071 .565 .087 .022 .003 .008 .791 .011 .000 1.000  
*Significant at the .05 level 
**Significant at the .1 level 
Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news articles
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 A number of statistically significant relationships are evident. While, the ‘sustainable 
development did not reach significance, its interaction term (HGHT) showed the strongest 
relationship with municipal policy. Its negative relationship (R= -.281) suggests that as 
municipal policy scores decrease, the interactive term (Greenness X Turnout) increases i.e. from 
zero to one. While, it is the weakest in terms of significance, turnout also appears to be inversely 
(as turnout increases, municipal fracking policies d crease) associated with municipal fracking 
policies (R =.235). There also appears to be a relationship between owner-occupied homes and 
municipal fracking policy. Both the median home value and the percentage of owner occupied 
homes variables are inversely related to the dependent variable (R= -.279). Finally, as per capita 
income (R= -.257) rises, municipal policies towards natural gas decreases as cities assert more 
control over fracking, potentially putting them at odds with state leaders in Columbus.   
Local Politics 
 
Examples of municipal legislation and less coercive approaches are taking place in an 
array of communities ranging from urban centers like Cincinnati to smaller college towns like 
Oberlin. Outright bans in the Cities of Oberlin, Hartville, Bowling Green and Mansfield have led 
to lawsuits and/or threats of litigation by both industry and State leaders. In other cities, 
municipal opposition has contributed to the enactment of conservation zones and zoning 
restrictions. The cities of Athens and Munroe Falls, for example, have ‘zoned out’ gas wells in 
residential areas (Brumfield 2013). Like municipal b ns, zoning regulations also stand on 
questionable legal grounds. Finally, in other communities, municipal policymakers are staying 
quiet or looking for ways to benefit from the state’s policy of encouraging expanded 
development.63  
                                                   
63 Amesville, Athens, Athens County,, Bowling Green, Broadview Heights, Brunswick, Burton, Canal Fulton, 
Canton, Chester Township, Cincinnati, Columbiana, Grrettsville, Girard, Hartville, Heath, Hinckley Township, 
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Many of the same motivations underlying local oppositi n in Colorado are present in 
municipal activism opposing fracking in Ohio. Oberlin resident, Sam Rubin, who spearheaded 
the initiative to prohibit fracking within the city, described the impetus to ban fracking as a duty 
to protect the environment and as a “chance for Oberlin to re-assert its democracy” (Rubin 
quoted in Miller 2013). An Oberlin resident struck a similar environmental chord, stating that 
“we can’t do anything to prevent that from happening here…I’m concerned about the 
environmental impacts of fracking itself and what it’s doing to the water and the air” (Rev. Steve 
Hammond of Peace Community Church quoted in Miller 2013).64 Brunswick Councilman 
Anthony Capretta, explaining his vote in favor of an anti-fracking resolution made a similar 
justification (Capretta quoted in Lisik 2013). Brunswick Councilman-at-large Brian Ousley (also 
supporting the resolution) reported that he believed that the state should not tell us [the city] what 
do and that he is not “business unfriendly, but I am resident friendly…threats by businesses 
cannot bully our citizens” (Ousley quoted in Lisik 2013).  
Other criticisms of state policy revolve around the heterogeneous nature of cities and 
close proximity city leaders share with citizens. North Royalton Ward 4 Councilman Paul 
Marnecheck, noted that “I feel when it comes to municipal drilling, the residents of North 
Royalton can do a better job with how to have this in our city than a bureaucrat in 
Columbus….the best way to make sure communities have laws that reflect their unique character 
is to strengthen home rule” (Marnecheck quoted in Anton 2013). Ward 6 Councilman Dan 
Kasaris, while generally supportive of extraction, was baffled that “we [City of North Royalton] 
can regulate the placement of fences, driveways, sheds and houses but not an oil well? To me 
                                                                                                                                                           
Lake Erie, Madison Township, Meyers Lake, Montville Township, Munroe Falls, Niles, North Canton, Oberlin,  
Plain Township, Randolph Township, Sharon Township, South Russell, Stow, Summit County, Weathersfield 
Township, Yellow Springs, Youngstown and York Township 
64 Bruce Whitteberry, assistant superintendent of Cincinnati Water Works (CWW) stated that “Our goal is to know 
what is in a spill – and know about it ahead of time…that gives us the best shot to make sure all of our customers 
stay protected.” CWW is also opposed to any water-based shipping of fracking wastes (Smith 2014). 
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that fact is inconsistent with the rule of those who reside within the boundary of any city…” He 
concluded that “cities need to be able to control when and where oil wells are placed” (Kasaris 
quoted in Anton 2013).  
The willingness to challenge the state is also grounded in the belief that the state has 
failed in its duty to protect the health and wellbeing of citizens. John Spon, City of Mansfield’s 
law director, explained his community’s decision to ban underground injections was necessary to 
protect Mansfield’s water supply. He added that he believed that ODNR’s current regulatory 
framework was illogical, inadequate and failed to pr tect the public’s health (Marshall 2012).  
Also citing the need to protect public health, cities have used their police powers to restrict 
fracking. Bowling Green City Attorney Michael Marsh advised city council members that the 
city’s fracking ban is part of its larger police powers rather than of its zoning code. He equated 
the legal logic behind the city’s fracking policies to its decision to ban public smoking prior to 
state action: 
“the same tack was taken by us several years ago when e were the first city in Ohio to 
regulate cigarette and cigar smoking in certain facilities. Smoking at that time was also a 
‘legal’ activity and was heavily regulated by the state of Ohio. Our ordinance was 
challenged, and it was upheld, as a reasonable exercise of our police power, and since it 
did not conflict with the state criminal code, there was no pre-emption argument to 
overcome” (Marsh quoted in Henry 2013).  
 
Like Texas and Colorado, Ohio’s municipalities range in their policy positions towards 
urban drilling. Voters in the City of Youngstown rejected multiple fracking bans, even after a 
2011 series of earthquakes. In other jurisdictions, cities have leased their park space to operators 
or have sold extra water to natural gas firms. Economic reasons often drive municipal support. 
Mahoning County commissioners, for example, authorized the County to sell up to 500,000 
gallons of water a day to a natural gas firm. In tur , the county will be paid $6 per 1,000 gallons 
for up to $90,000 per month (Downing 2013; See alsoGorman 2013). The City of Campbell also 
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raised revenue via fracking. Beginning in 2012, the City leased the mineral rights to 167 acres 
for $5,000 per acre plus 20 percent in royalties. The sale included mineral rights located under 
two parks and sparked little public protest.65 In Barnsville, City leaders struck a similar deal and 
permit drilling in public places.  
The promises of private sector job growth and urban redevelopment can also cement 
municipal support. Youngstown city leaders have promised to use new leasing revenues to fund 
municipal programs that combat urban blight and persistently high unemployment. Mayor 
Charles P. Sammarone said that “We’re not inventing anything here and we need money for 
demo, and if we don’t get it, then there’s no demo. He touts a new $650 million fracking pipe 
manufacturing plant that will employ 350 workers (Niquette (2012). Job growth is particularly 
attractive for many Ohio municipalities, especially around Youngstown, which have 
unemployment rates hovering around 10 percent (BLS 2014; Niquette 2012). 
Why Critique or Exceed the State? 
 
The third major question of this dissertation includes the assessment and exploration of 
second order relationships. What variables may be associated with pushing cities to challenge the 
state’s preemptive authority? Are these the same set of factors that are linked with cities that 
voice their opposition to state policy through more symbolic measures such as amicus briefs or 
resolutions criticizing the state’s approach?  
Due to the small sample size and distribution (n=60) logistic regression is the most 
appropriate statistical test. Municipal policy responses may be classified according to two 
different dependent variables with yes/no dyads. The first is designed to be a broader measure of 
second order relations by grouping together municipal responses that challenge, restrict or voice 
                                                   
65 Campbell’s population in 2012 was 8179.  
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municipal opposition to the State’s natural gas policies (municipal policy responses 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 
or 27/60 cities). The second dependent variable measur s municipal policies that directly 
challenge the state’s preemptive authority (originally coded as municipal policies 0, 1, 2 or 18/60 
cities). With both models, forward and backward LR logistic regression identified the most 
parsimonious set of explanatory variables – the results of forward and backward LR matched one 
another.  
The first model, by the fourth iteration, is significant (P = .011). Two of the tested 
independent variables also came back as significant: the green city (P = .035) and the turnout 
variables (P = .035).   
Table 5.18 Municipal Fracking Policies that Exceed State Policy Requirements 




Occupied -4.951 4.152 1.422 1 .233 .007 
Logged Home 
Value -2.704 2.442 1.226 1 .268 .067 
Logged Per 
Capita Income 4.792 3.597 1.775 1 .183 120.526 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development -1.278 .694 3.392 1 .066 .278 
Turnout1 -1.465 .644 5.183 1 .023 .231 




Occupied -4.409 4.155 1.126 1 .289 .012 
Logged Per 
Capita Income 1.300 1.706 .581 1 .446 3.669 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development -1.489 .666 4.999 1 .025 .226 
Turnout1 -1.350 .624 4.681 1 .030 .259 








Development -1.251 .577 4.704 1 .030 .286 
turnout1 -1.173 .570 4.233 1 .040 .310 





Development* -1.196 .567 4.445 1 .035 .302 
turnout1* -1.196 .567 4.445 1 .035 .302 
Constant 1.352 .528 6.549 1 .010 3.865 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: OwnerOcc, LogHomeValue, LogIncome, Sustainable 
Economic Development, turnout1. 
Cox and Snell R = .14 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
Both independent variables are associated with municipal fracking policies that challenge 
the state or criticize state control. A one-unit increase in either is associated with a 70 percent 
decrease in the likelihood of a municipal policy that supports or does not interfere with the 
State’s goals, while holding the other variable consta t. A one-unit increase in turnout (growth in 
the number of active voters) is associated with a 70 percent decline in the municipality enacting a 
policy that furthers state goals, while holding thegr en level constant. When turnout is held 
constant, a one-unit increase in commitment to sustainable economic development (here, this 
means increasing the number of green jobs and membership in climate change networks) reduces 
the likelihood of a city policy that advances state goals by 70 percent.  
The second model narrows the pool of municipal legislation/actions to only those 
communities whose policies directly challenge the state’s preemptive authority (originally coded 
as municipal policies 0, 1, 2). Unlike the broader measure of municipal opposition, both the 
green and turnout variables fail to reach statistical significance.66 However, when socio-
                                                   
66 An alternative model, which included the interaction term (High Green X High Turnout) also did not reach 
statistical significance. 
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economic predictors are included, the percentage of owner occupied homes becomes significant 
(P = .02). In the model, with each one unit increase in the percent of owner occupied homes, 
there is a 99 percent decrease associated in the likelihood that a city passes a policy that follows 
the state’s oil and gas development land use goals. Thi  may seem like a dramatic effect but its 
‘real world’ implications are somewhat more muted. Consider Youngstown, which has over 
26,800 homes, of which nearly 16,000 were owner-occupied. A one-unit change from .597 to 
1.597 is neither feasible nor possible. Even a .4 unit increase to 100 percent owner occupied 
homes is highly unlikely. Despite these limitations, the association between owner occupied 
homes and more restrictive land use policies is fairly robust (P = .02) (ACS 2012).  
Table 5.19 Municipal Fracking Policies that Challenge the State’s Preemptive Authority 




Occupied -12.062 4.738 6.481 1 .011 .000 
LogHome 
Value -2.627 2.865 .841 1 .359 .072 
Logged 
Income 5.737 4.030 2.026 1 .155 309.999 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development -1.043 .775 1.813 1 .178 .352 
turnout1 -.978 .695 1.980 1 .159 .376 




Occupied -11.887 4.795 6.145 1 .013 .000 
Logged 
Income 2.501 1.885 1.760 1 .185 12.199 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development -1.309 .730 3.214 1 .073 .270 
turnout1 -.880 .681 1.668 1 .197 .415 




Occupied -10.678 4.653 5.266 1 .022 .000 
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Logged 
Income 1.600 1.703 .882 1 .348 4.952 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development -1.159 .710 2.662 1 .103 .314 




Occupied -7.544 3.119 5.849 1 .016 .001 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development -.848 .617 1.888 1 .169 .428 




Occupied* -7.055 3.044 5.373 1 .020 .001 
Constant 5.754 2.174 7.005 1 .008 315.374 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: OwnerOcc, LogHomeValue, LogIncome, Sustainable 
Economic Development, turnout1. 
Cox and Snell R = .095 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
While, answering the precise causal mechanisms undergir ing second order federalism is 
outside of the scope of this project, Ohio communities’ activities reflect both macro and micro 
factors. These likely contribute to a community’s ‘uncomfortableness’ with nearby oil and gas 
development and its ability to overcome collective action dilemmas. At a more macro level, 
greener and more mobilized communities appear more likely to push for policies that challenge, 
voice disagreement or exceed state natural gas regulations. Data also point to more contextual 
and micro-level reasons associated with municipalities treating fracking as dangerous and 
exercising greater levels of land use control (and challenging the state) over fracking.  
Table 5.20 Summary of Findings in Ohio 
Variable 
Model 1 – Critical of the State 
(Symbolic and Substantive 
Challenges) 
Model 2 – Challenging the 
State (Substantive Challenges) 
Environmentalism Support No Support Observed 
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Turnout Support No Support Observed 
Income No Support Observed No Support Observed 
Owner Occupied No Support Observed Support 
Median Household 
Value No Support Observed No Support Observed 
Municipal 
Institutional 
Structures No Support Observed No Support Observed 
Race No Support Observed No Support Observed 
 
Second Order Politics, Mobilization and Sustainability  
 The relationship between pro-environmental attitudes/policies and concern over fracking 
is generally supported by the applicable literature (Davis 2012; Davis and Fisk 2014). Much like 
the evidence and explanations offered in the Colorado chapter, Ohio data confirms the 
relationship between oil and gas development, proximity, partisanship and environmental 
opposition. Attitudinal scholars Michauda, Carlisle and Smith (2008) found a relationship 
between pro-environmental attitudes and less support for drilling. They also documented that 
Republicans and those possessing individualist cultural attitudes are more likely to favor drilling 
when compared to Democrats, liberals, or egalitarians. Republicans also believed that spills were 
infrequent and rare events. Democrats, conversely, are more likely to be receptive to 
environmental groups and scientists and to believe that drilling poses a public health and 
environmental risk (See Davis and Fisk 2014).  
For several cities, commitment to sustainable development appears to have contributed to 
the willingness to challenge the state’s preemptive authority or voice opposition to state policy. 
When citizens see something as threatening quality of life, the threat of loss is intensified. 
Fracking, in an urban context can directly threaten a park, clean air or water. Earthquakes, as a 
result of underground injections, may also raise enviro mentally based concerns. When citizens 
are motivated, as they are in Munroe Falls and other communities impacted by nearby 
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earthquakes or responding to other perceived enviromental threats, they appear to be more 
likely to support and work towards passing policies that challenge the state’s authority or 
supporting their city’s leadership as they engage in second-order political contests with state-
level actors.   
Second Order Politics, NIMBYISM, Social Capital and Proximity  
Urban drilling is collective action dilemma. By their nature, collective action dilemmas 
are difficult to overcome. Under this sort of dilemma, players would be better off if they 
cooperated in the pursuit of a common goal, but for one reason or another, each seemingly 
chooses a less optimal course of action (Vig and Kraft 2009). However, proximity and higher 
participatory efforts offer “a forum through which residents can achieve some degree of 
consensus on the idea that reducing externalities represents a desirable community good and 
consensus on how to reduce these externalities” (Portney and Berry 2010, 122). Despite the 
challenge, some Ohio cities have passed bans and zoning schemes. Why and how do some cities 
overcome this challenge and pass or maintain these types of policies? Part of this answer may 
relate to how individuals, especially Ohio’s homeowners perceive the costs and benefits posed 
by fracking i.e. more localized concerns (NIMBYISM or quality of life), may be driving 
municipal opposition to fracking, especially among residents who are more predisposed to be 
attentive and mobilized.  
For some cities and residents, earthquakes may be significant drivers for elevated levels 
of skepticism relative to fracking and NIMBYISM and an impetus to work together. State 
Representative Robert Hagan, following the series of earthquakes near the Youngstown area, 
called for a statewide moratorium on injection drilling and a right of residents to know what the 
State is doing and what is causing the quakes (Niquette 2012a). Youngstown city leaders also 
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support the moratorium on injecting wells. Youngstown’s Mayor Charles P. Sammarone, in 
supporting the ban questioned whether fracking is making his city shake and informed his 
constituents that he recently bought earthquake insura ce. He also noted the stakes for 
homeowners, pointing out that “you lose your whole house, that’s your life savings, and if you 
have no money or no insurance to replace it, then what do you do…Information is needed to 
make the homeowner and the residents feel safe” (Sammarone quoted in Niquette 2012a). 
Governor John Kasich, in response, announced that he would not let anyone put Eastern Ohio’s 
economic revival in jeopardy and that the earthquakes are isolated events.   
 Researchers have found that home ownership alters ttitudes among the general public 
and how it may perceive risks. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) identified several key differences 
between renters and homeowners. 77% of homeowners reported that they voted in a recent local 
election, 25 percentage points higher than renters. They also found that a willingness to engage 
in local problem solving also differed. Approximately 40 percent of homeowners stated they had 
participated in mitigating and addressing a local problem as compared to only a quarter of 
renters. Finally, homeowners tend to invest more time and energy in acquiring local amenities 
relative to renters. New amenities improve owners’ p operty values and quality of life; only the 
latter available to renters. This suggests that if urban natural gas development harms resident’ 
quality of life or home values, homeowners may believe that they have more to lose than do 
renters.  
The willingness to invest in one’s community and adress its problems has important 
implications for second order federalism. Putnam (2000) theorized that as social capital 
increases, measured by the density of social networks, community members are more likely to  
eschew apathy, exchange information (like risk evaluations) and work together for mutual 
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benefit and solving problems. These facts may indeed push the city towards challenging state 
policy and its preemptive authority. Increasing social apital and levels of political efficacy also 
enhances a policy’s legitimacy, its perceived fairness and the level of citizen support, each of 
which may become important if municipal action challenges the state’s preferred policies 
(Hempel 2009; McKinney and Harmon 2002).  
Regime Politics and Second Order Relationships 
Early work by Dahl (1961) reflected concern about government’s coercive power and 
assumed that its legal authority alone was sufficient to govern. In this environment, private 
interests are among many other interests competing for favorable policies. Peterson (1987) 
challenged notions that municipal power politics was an egalitarian enterprise with groups 
competing over meaningful choices. He argued that the mobility of private firms and the 
competition between governments constrains and preclud d meaningful choice. As a result, 
cities pursue economic development opportunities and avoid policies that may limit real or 
perceived economic growth.   
In proposing his middle of-the-road approach, Stone (1980, 1993, 2006) described the 
ways in which local government policymakers work with each other and the private sector to 
facilitate economic growth. His articulation of regime theory builds on Lindblom’s (1977) 
observations regarding the fundamental tensions present in a market-based economy. The 
system, Stone (1980) suggests, requires near continu us economic growth but provides 
governments with only a limited role to affect decisions made by private sector i.e. where and 
how drilling may take place.  
The combined effect is that state and local governmnts often deploy resources and 
incentives to influence the ‘locational’ decisions made by business leaders. Cited as the need to 
169 
create a “favorable business climate,” states and municipalities offer tax and other financial 
inducements in order to attract business investment (Schragger 2009; Savitch and Kantor 2004). 
These efforts manifest themselves in developmental policies that are narrowly applied and 
increasingly generous (Kantor and David 1988). In Ohio, it likely has contributed to some 
communities opting to lease land and water to natural gas operators. They are also likely to 
support programs that foster economic development and competitiveness even at the expense of 
programs that promote more egalitarian ideals and social equity such wealth redistribution, living 
wages or environmental protection ordinances (Kantor and David 1988). 
Even communities that limit fracking may be doing less because of social capital and 
democratic responsiveness, but because expanded devlopment may not threaten or be seen as 
contributing to economic growth. Ohio’s uncertainty relative to impact fees, for example, may 
depress the need to new fracking related revenues. Concomitantly, industry’s nascent presence 
may also ‘shrink’ its influence and ability to influence local government, especially when 
compared to other industries like coal or other opponents to gas. Finally, smaller municipal 
restrictions like bans on drilling in residential zones or larger setbacks may be seen as an 
acceptable outcome because it does not end growth (Imbroscio 1999).   
Ohio’s Second Order Dynamics Revisited 
Ohio’s second order politics are uncertain, especially while the State Supreme Court 
deliberates the City of Munroe Falls case. Returning to the themes of implementation and 
intergovernmental management, a number of observations are possible even with a limited 
sample size. First, in Ohio, there exists legal ambiguity as to the relationship among 
municipalities, constitutional home rule authority and state regulatory power, likely contributing 
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to a wide variety of municipal responses to urban drilling. The Court’s current jurisprudence, 
nonetheless, supports concurrent state-municipal regulation. 
State and sub-state units and levels of government share power to oversee natural gas 
development and urban drilling. Anton (1989) noted that because power and authority are often 
incomplete, as they are in Ohio, tensions and uncertainty between stakeholders are inevitable. 
Second order oppositional relationships have led to the aforementioned lawsuit against the City 
of Munroe Falls by industry and the State. Uncertainty is also evident in Ohio’s 
intergovernmental natural resource management networks. It has enabled Ohio’s municipalities 
to adopt an array of policies ranging from outright support to remaining on the ‘second order’ 
sidelines to oppositional relationships between state and municipal policymakers (Bowman and 
Kearney 2012). For those communities that are challenging the state’s preemptive authority, a 
combination of macro and micro-level factors are influential determinants. The percentage of 
owner-occupied homes, environmentalism and mobilization through higher social capital 
‘scores’ and denser networks, are each associated wi h second order tensions.   
In more uncertain policy arenas, actors seeking to change the status quo may utilize 
conflict expansion strategies (Pralle 2006). Munroe Falls Mayor Frank Larson equated the issue 
to a larger trend of state’s preempting municipal authority, arguing “if this goes the way that I 
hope and pray it would go, it would restore some home rule to municipalities that has been taken 
away by the state…it would uphold our right to be ale to zone certain areas and exclude certain 
uses and to allow those uses in other areas” (Larson qu ted in Smythe 2013). In response, Beck 
Energy equated the zoning plan to imposing costly and onerous regulations with the goal of 




Chapter 6                                                                                                                    
Second Order Politics in Texas 
 
  
Texas’ second order (state-municipal) experiences, as a decentralized state, are important 
for many reasons. First, the state has a long history of nurturing oil and natural gas production, 
but its regulatory goals and interests exist alongside a robust set of land use powers delegated to 
sub-state home-rule governments. Home rule has empowered Texas’ cities to influence the scale, 
pace and location of urban/suburban natural gas production. Second, to many Texans, natural gas 
wells and drills have long been a common sight on Texas horizons, although their close 
proximity to population centers of Dallas/Fort Worth and San Antonio is somewhat new. In fact, 
the number of Texans living within one mile of a natur l gas well is closing in on seven million 
people (Gold 2013). Third, like Colorado and Ohio, examples of state-municipal tension, 
indifference and cooperation are observable in Texas, likely the result of a variety of causes. 
Fourth, three major players regulate natural gas production: the Railroad Commission of Texas 
(RCT), the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and home rule municipal 
governments.  
This chapter adopts an organizational scheme similar to the two preceding chapters. The 
first section summarizes the applicable state statutes, regulatory enactments and judicial opinions 
all of which establish the formal parameters governing atural gas extraction, hydraulic 
fracturing and municipal activities. The benefits and costs of fracking in a Texas context follow. 
The second section includes a series of statistical tests designed to better understand the factors 
associated with municipal governments challenging and/or exceeding the preemptive authority 
held in Austin. 
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Texas’ Natural Gas Experiences and Context 
 
The relationship between Texas’ policymakers and the natural gas industry stretches back 
to the late nineteenth century and has contributed to the growth of industry-friendly sub-
governments, especially within the RCT (Davis 2012). 67 Today, the State is the leading producer 
of natural gas in the U.S., extracting over 6 trillion cubic feet (TCF) in 2009 and 7.1 TCF in 
2012. Within the state, several major natural gas deposits exist: the Barnett Shale located near 
Fort Worth and the Eagle Ford Shale close to San Antonio (Pless 2010). The state expects the 
surge in gas production to continue, primarily through fracking in the Eagle Ford play (Davis 
2012; Rahm 2011).  
Table 6.1 Recoverable Natural Gas in Texas 
Shale Play Recoverable Natural Gas Region 
Eagle Ford 72 TCF 
Southern Texas (near San 
Antonio) 
Barnett 119 TCF 
North Texas (Dallas-Fort 
Worth Region 
Permian Basin 34 TCF West Texas 
Source: EIA 2013c 
 
Texas’ support for industry appears to be solid. A strongly conservative and Republican-
dominated state legislature along with allies in the Governor’s office has succeeded in blocking 
most legislation aimed at restricting fracking/extrac ion. Working in concert, they have also 
passed laws/regulations intended to facilitate additional development, including industry backed 
disclosure rules, air and water quality standards, well design and intensity and spacing, i.e. 
setback requirements (Davis 2012). The legislature vested oversight authority in two state 
agencies: the Railroad Commission of Texas (RCT) (all regulatory areas other than air quality) 
and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) (air quality). Davis (2012) noted 
                                                   
67 Major gas reserves were found near Laredo in 1911, White Point in 1914 and Kingsville in the early 1920s. 
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that in general, both are responsive to the concerns of industry even when natural gas production 
poses a threat to public safety and to environmental protection. 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
 
Voters amended the State Constitution in 1891 to allow for the creation of the Railroad 
Commission of Texas, although, at the time, its jurisdiction was limited to regulating the state’s 
railroads. In 1917, the Pipeline Petroleum Law (SB 68) provided the RCT with the jurisdictional 
authority necessary to oversee natural gas production and distribution within the state. With this 
act, the legislature deemed that pipelines, like railroads were common carriers, and it authorized 
the agency to exercise regulatory oversight upon them. The 1919 Oil and Gas Conservation Law 
(SB 350) expanded the commission’s authority to regulate the production and extraction of oil 
and natural gas, which led to the State’s first rules on well intensity, safety and gas conservation 
(Riley 2007; University of Texas Libraries 2014). Other laws that touch Texas’ oil and natural 
gas industry and municipal governments are outlined  Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 Other Environmental and Energy Laws 
Name and Year Policy Area Agencies 
Texas Pollution Control Act 
(1961) 
Reducing and preventing 
pollution 
Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
Texas Water Quality Act 
(1967) Water Pollution 
Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality and 
Railroad Commission 
Texas Injection Well Act 
(1961) 
Injection Wells (other than 
from the oil and gas industry) 
Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality and 
Railroad Commission 
Texas Solid Waste Act 
(1969) Hazardous Waste 
Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
Texas Clean Air Act (1965) 
Stationary and Mobile Air 
Sources 
Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
Source: Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 2014 
 
Property laws also shape Texas’ second order politics. Texas is a split-estate state, 
meaning that it recognizes property rights for surface and mineral estates, the latter of which, 
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according to Maxwell (2009, 356-357) is dominant. I effect, because it is the dominant estate, 
“the mineral owner is entitled to use as much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary to 
extract the mineral.”  
Texas local governments also enjoy statutory and costitutional powers. The law 
identifies two broad classes of cities: general law and home rule. Cities with more than 5,000 
residents may opt to adopt local charters and becom home rule cities.68 Once adopted, home 
rule cities enjoy constitutionally protected “full power of local self-government (McFarland 
2013). Home rule authority includes the power to adpt municipal ordinances and regulations, 
necessary to protect the “interest, welfare, or good rder of the municipality as a body politic” 
(Welch 2007, 144-146).  
Constitutional home rule powers also imbue municipalit es with inherent powers and the 
ability to act without prior authorization from the legislature. These powers include a number of 
municipal functions with a tangential impact to fracking: police and fire protection, health and 
sanitation services, transportation and street construction and land use restrictions. Municipal 
powers are presumed valid and legal unless the act in question is considered to be inconsistent or 
preempted by state statute with unmistakable clarity (Welch 2007). The legal position of general 
law cities is the opposite of home rule communities meaning that the state legislature must 




                                                   
68 The other type of city in Texas is general law. Typically, these are smaller communities with limited powers and 
operate according to state statutes that define the xtent of their powers. Unlike home rule cities, they do not have 
inherent powers and when there is no legislative authorization, the city cannot act.  It should be noted hat some 





Two state agencies are responsible for overseeing the industry and enforcing Texas’ 
environmental and gas laws. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) 
mission is to protect the environment in a manner consistent with sustainable economic 
development practices and policies. Three gubernatorial appointees establish overall agency 
direction and policy and set priorities relative to enforcement activity. An executive director 
oversees the agency’s day-to-day administration (TCEQ 2014a). The TCEQ’s jurisdiction to 
oversee development is much narrower as compared to the RCT and is limited to air quality and 
emissions due to: benzene (a (volatile organic compound), carbon disulfides, toluene, ethyl and 
trimethyl benzenes, xylenes and C1–C13 hydrocarbons (e.g., methanes, ethanes, pentanes, 
propanes) (Maxwell 2009).  
Beginning in 1917, the Railroad Commission of Texas h  served as the state’s main 
regulatory oversight arm for oil and natural gas. Originally, three gubernatorial appointees 
directed the RCT. In 1894, voters amended the Texas Con titution so that Commissioners run in 
popular elections and would serve six-year overlapping terms (RCT History 2014; University of 
Texas Libraries 2014). While there are no formal rules requiring that commissioners have a 
background in oil and gas production, Davis (2012) described the agency’s culture as generally 
supportive of extraction and that agency officials believe that the RCT’s current regulatory 
approaches/frameworks are sufficient to effectively manage fracking and urban drilling (See also 
Briggle 2012). 
The agency’s mission includes ensuring the efficient production and distribution of the 
state's natural resources, the protection of private property rights and public safety and the 
guarantee of a fair market price for developers (University of Texas Libraries 2014). In order to 
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do so, the legislature has authorized the agency to regulate all aspects of oil and natural gas 
production (permitting, monitoring and inspection of operations), distribution and portions of 
consumption. RCT’s mandates include the ability to set gas utility rates, oversee natural gas 
pipelines and to enforce applicable tax and rate regulations on producers and distributers (Turner 
2007, 363). 
 Within the RCT, the Oil and Gas Division oversees hydraulic fracturing along with other 
gas extraction activities. Besides carrying out the RCT’s mission of efficient production and 
waste prevention, it measures market demand and sets production limits for all operators. The 
division also carries out a number of functions affecting local governments and Texans’ quality 
of life through: the issuance of drilling permits, he promulgation and enforcement of health and 
safety regulations, the administration of a data cle ringhouse for oil and gas operations, the 
approval of well completions and the promotion of public safety by investigating complaints. 
Site remediation, protection of underground drinking water, well plugging and hazardous waste 
mitigation also fall under the purview of the Division (Rahm 2011; RCT 2014; Texas State 
Library Archives 2009).  
Under its current regulatory framework, firms interested in fracking (or deepening a well) 
must first apply and obtain a drilling permit from the Oil and Gas Division. Once received, firms 
must comply with casing, cementing, well integrity, and completion and disposal standards as set 
forth in the permit and in RCT regulation (Davis 201 ). Texas does not require additional 
environmental or wildlife assessments. The RCT does have the authority to shutter a well if it is 
found to be polluting waste and for technical/construction violations, although this process takes 
between two and three months to complete. It cannot, however, shut down a well for causing 
seismic activity (Allen 2014).  
177 
Table 6.3 Other Texas Fracking Regulations  
Regulatory Area  Texas 
Pre‐Drilling Water Well Testing No evidence of regulation in effect 
Water Withdrawal Restrictions Addressed in permit 
Casing and Cementing Depth 
Requirements Performance Standard 
Intermediate and Production Casing 
Cement Circulation Regulations 
 
Surface Casing Cement Circulation 
600 feet above SHOE 
 
 
600 feet above SHOE 
Venting and Flaring Notification and approval required 
Fluid Storage 
Pits allowed and regulated for all fluids including 
freeboard and liner requirements and five year 
tracking requirements 
Underground fluid injection 
Allowed in areas that are not producing oil, gas, 
or geothermal resources. Fluid injection areas 
must be separated by water formations by 
impervious zones that offer adequate protection 
against contamination 




Even though the State vested the RCT and TECQ with substantial regulatory authority, it 
did not replace or repeal the fundamental powers (th ough their inherent land use/zoning and 
police powers) of municipalities to regulate the surface aspects of urban drilling. Protected by the 
State Constitution and by way of their land use and police power authority, home rule 
municipalities and Type C general law cities may regulate drilling in order to protect public 
health, quality of life and private property (Welch 2007). In short, cities govern many aspects of 
the surface estate and operations while the RCT has jurisdiction over the mineral one and 
underground processes (Rahm 2011; Riley 2007).   
Municipal interest in oil and natural gas regulation began in the 1970s in an effort to 
further protect surface owners from the negative impacts of oil and gas extraction. Today, 
municipal authority to restrict and limit drilling’s surface impacts is fairly extensive (McFarland 
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2013). Many Texas communities, for example, require op rators to apply, qualify and pay for a 
permit before drilling can legally begin, costing the operator thousands of dollars and significant 
time (Dish 2014). Additionally, city officials or their authorized designees conduct inspections, 
enforce municipal regulations and issue sanctions fr non-compliance. They also have the 
authority to determine the frequency of inspections (typically at least one annual inspection of all 
permitted wells inside the city’s limits), when gas flaring and venting is permitted, issue well/site 
security regulations and set the timing of well plugging and abandonment. Finally, city authority 
extends to regulating water use during fracking operations. In some cases, cities have enacted 
seismic policies. In the table below, the City of Dish’ drilling requirements exemplify the 
regulatory latitude Texas communities hold regarding fracking operations: 
Table 6.4 Dish, Texas Urban Drilling Surface Regulations 
Policy Area – Surface 
Regulation Example of Municipal (Dish’) Requirements 
Notification 
The operator must post a sign at the well’s entrance at least 48 
hours prior to a fracking operation beginning. 
Fluid Recovery 
The operator may only recover fluids during daylight hours 
unless the local inspector authorizes non-daylight recovery 
hours. 
Security The operator must post a watchman during operations. 
Venting 
Venting directly into the atmosphere is not allowed an  
operators must first direct flaring and any flow through 
separation equipment or into a portable tank 
Noise 
Fracking operations cannot exceed the ambient noise level of ten 
(10) decibels. This level is lowered to five (5) decibels for 
backflow operations during nighttime hours. 
Odors 
Fracking operations must not emit odors that are “extremely 
repulsive to the physical senses of ordinary persons which 
annoy, discomfort, injure or inconvenience the health of any 
appreciable number of persons.” 
Sources: Dish 2014, 2014a, 2014b 
 
These particular restrictions and requirements apply to zoned areas within the City in which 
drilling is permitted. In other areas, the City has b nned development in areas near and in 
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floodways and in zoned areas not specifically designated for natural gas exploration, production 
or development (Dish 2014). 
 Judicial Decisions 
 
For the past seventy years, Texas courts have recognized that both the State and 
municipalities have an interest in regulating oil and natural gas development. One of the earliest 
cases to recognize concurrent authority was the 1944 Klepak decision (Klepak v. Humble Oil & 
Refining Co., 177 S.W. 2d 215). Litigation began after the City of Tomball enacted legislation 
that restricted drilling to one well per drilling block. The City denied Henry Klepak a drilling 
permit even after he obtained a drilling permit from the RCT, because the proposed well violated 
the community’s ‘one well per drilling block’ ordina ce. The First Court of Appeals (Galveston) 
held that the RCT did hold the requisite and final authority to issue oil and natural gas drilling 
permits. State authority, however, was not exclusive and did not preclude municipalities from 
promulgating their own ordinances that they believed w re necessary to ensure public safety and 
order. Municipal legislation, the Court continued, should be presumed valid unless city actions 
are “facially unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory.”  
The Klepak decision dominated case law through 1982. In 1982, the City of Burkburnett 
fined a private property owner, Unger, for drilling an oil well within city limits prior to obtaining 
municipal permits. Unger claimed that the ordinance went beyond the City’s authority to regulate 
drilling activities by proscribing them, which, he argued is reserved solely to the RCT.  
Consistent with previous jurisprudence, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Unger v. State held 
in favor of the City of Burkburnett and reaffirmed that home rule municipalities and the state 
may act as co-regulators when it comes to urban/suburban natural gas permitting and drilling 
(Turner 2007). Equally important, the Court set a high bar to overturn municipal regulation. 
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Municipal legislation, according to the Court, enjoys the presumption of validity (as an exercise 
of local policing authority) and unless municipal ordinances are facially unreasonable or 
constitute a regulatory taking, they are constitutional. 
Although reaching a similar decision as Klepak, the Fort Worth Court’s logic in its Unger 
decision differed substantially. Klepak treated city natural gas legislation as a legal app ication of 
municipal police powers. In Unger, the Court determined that the ordinance was valid under the 
municipality’s power to regulate land use and zoning. Riley (2007, 371) described the 
significance of the Unger decision as one in which “the court opened a new line of reasoning 
supporting municipal authority regulating oil and gas development in a manner similar to other 
forms of land use restrictions” (See also McFarland 2013). 
The most recent challenge touching upon the relationship between cities and state 
regulatory power came in 1997 with Shelby Operating Co. v. City of Waskom, 964 SW 2d 75 - 
Tex: Court of Appeals, 6th Dist. 1997. In the case, th  Texarkana Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
the validity of municipal regulation. At the core of the dispute was the City of Waskom’s 
decision to deny a drilling permit to the Shelby Operating Company. Fifty-two years before the 
case, in 1945, Shelby Operating Company obtained a 303-acre mineral lease (outside the 
Waskom’s 1945 corporate limits) contingent upon the firm leaving at least 200 feet between any 
wells and then-existing structures. The City, in 198  annexed a portion of the land above the 
mineral estate. Five years later, the Aztec Manufact ring-Waskom Partnership purchased the 
surface interest. In 1987, the City extended its seback ordinance to 500 feet for any structure 
unless the operator secures the surface owner’s consent. In 1996, Shelby sought a permit for a 
well that was to be located between 200 and 500 feet from Aztec’s building. Aztec refused to 
consent to the well, leading to the City’s rejection of Shelby’s permit request and the lawsuit. 
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The Court, acting with the presumption that the City’s actions were valid, held in favor of the 
city. In its ruling, the Justices stated that Shelby failed to convince them that the setback 
ordinance was unrelated to City’s inherent powers of pr tecting its citizens’ health and safety 
(Riley 2007).   




At both state and municipal levels of government, the oil and gas industry typically finds 
a receptive audience. Coupled with technological innovations that made shale gas recovery 
economically feasible, Texas production has undergone significant growth in the number of 
producing wells and overall production as demonstrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.1 Texas Gas and Gas Condensate Wells (Count) 














































Texas Natural Gas 




Figure 6.2 Texas Natural Gas Production by Production Technique 
Source: EIA 2014 
 
Development and production is not uniform across the counties of the State and ranges from no 
production to billions of cubic feet per year.  
Economic Benefits 
 
Industry supporters cite a multitude of statewide economic benefits, specifically state and 
municipal revenues and employment forecasts that accompany drilling. These benefits would 
add to the already strong economic contributions made by the industry. Oil and gas related 
property and sales taxes, for example, generated ovr f ur billion dollars for state and municipal 
policymakers in 2010. Oil and natural gas firms also employ thousands of Texans in jobs that 
typically pay better than the state average wage (Texas Oil and Gas Association ([TXOGA 2014; 
TXOGA 2014a]). The total economic impact to the state is approximately $160 billion or nearly 
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Table 6.5 Economics of Texas' Drilling in 2010 
  Per Job 
Revenues Amount in Millions Oil and Gas All other Industries 
Property $3,219.00 $10,823.00 $2,779.00 
Sales, State & Local $1,114.00 $3,745.00 $1,256.00 
State franchise tax $332.00 $1,115.00 $409.00 
Other taxes $214.00 $720.00 $443.00 
Total taxes $4,879.00 $16,403.00 $4,887.00 
Royalties to State Funds $760.00 $2,555.00 $5.00 
Total Paid $5,639.00 $18,958.00 $4,892.00 
Source: TXOGA 2010 
  






Crude petroleum and natural gas 
production  79,618 $13,310,042,923.00 $167,175.00 
Natural gas liquid production 3,299 $515,612,718.00 $156,317.00 
Drilling oil and natural gas wells 30,817 $2,916,742,791.00 $94,647.00 
Support activities, oil and gas operations 72,943 $5,743,584,527.00 $78,740.00 
Natural gas distribution 7,322 $739,240,484.00 $100,958.00 
Petroleum refineries 21,880 $2,439,640,978.00 $111,504.00 
Petroleum manufacturing 15,319 $1,591,307,752.00 $103,881.00 
Oil and Natural Gas machinery and 
equipment 38,972 $3,307,019,123.00 $84,857.00 
Petroleum products wholesalers 12,826 $1,209,350,689.00 $94,293.00 
Pipelines 14,446 $1,903,262,799.00 $131,750.00 
Totals  297,442 $33,675,804,784.00 $112,412.20 
Source: TXOGA 2013 
 
The economics of urban drilling attract local policymakers as well. The Dallas-Fort 
Worth metroplex, located above the Barnett Shale Play illustrates the allure of oil and gas 
development. Throughout the region, various city leaders expect that the exploration and 
fracking of the shale formation will contribute approximately $5 billion annually and generate 
between 83,000-108,000 permanent jobs to the region's economy by 2030. The City of Fort 
Worth anticipates a significant share of the region wide economic benefits. Again, through 2030, 
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local policymakers anticipate that revenue from natural gas lease bonuses will exceed $740 
million and that additional property tax monies will surpass $250 million (Lovell, Barrow and 
Wiegand 2008).  
The state’s rainy day fund also benefits from oil and natural gas drilling revenues. For the 
FY 2010, oil and natural gas generated $1.7 billion in severance tax revenues, enabling 
lawmakers to transfer an additional $451 million into the fund. The transfer pushed the balance 
to over $8 billion and made it an attractive target for lawmakers, especially during lean budget 
years. In 2003, for example, Texas confronted a $9.9 billion dollar deficit. In order to help 
balance the budget, lawmakers appropriated $1.2 billion from the account. State leaders have 
also utilized rainy day dollars to avoid raising taxes and to reduce property taxes (Lovell, Barrow 
and Wiegand 2008).  
Environmental Impacts 
  
Support for expanding natural gas development is generally widespread across the state. 
When opposition does exist, anti-fracking advocates cite concerns about its impacts to air and 
water quality. Fracking’s most acute impacts in Texas stem from its voracious ‘appetite’ for 
water and resulting access/equity issues. Although,, cities have the authority to accommodate 
quality of life concerns, opponents still point to fracking’s potentially harmful effects on quality 
of life as a reason for advocating additional regulation ranging from outright bans (Denton) to 
comprehensive zoning regulations (Dallas) (Ridlingto  and Rumpler 2013). 
Water Supply 
 
Similar to Ohio and Colorado, natural gas operators are not immune from applicable state 
water laws. The State requires the issuance of water permits to operators when they seek to 
divert water from surface water (rivers and lakes) to drill pads/sites. The TCEQ grants water 
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rights under a “first come—first serve” rule and until the surface body of water reaches a 
withdrawal limit established by the TCEQ. Groundwater regulation, however, is considerably 
more laissez faire. Under Texas law, individuals or gr undwater conservation districts own most 
groundwater resources. Both, by way of the “rule of capture,” may divert, use or lease as much 
water as they choose. Significant groundwater usage may continue without legal liabilities 
relative to environmental externalities experienced by adjacent or nearby property owners 
(TCEQ 2014b; RCT 2014).  
Texas’ frack sites consume millions of gallons of water. Since 2010, Texas natural gas 
firms have consumed an estimated 25 billion gallons of water annually. Industry observers 
expect consumption to grow especially as drilling i the Eagle Ford Formation continues. The 
water needed per well, however, is highly variable and depends on a number of factors 
including: geological formation, location and the type of well, i.e. vertical or horizontal. In the 
Barnett Shale formation, fracturing a vertical well necessitates approximately 1.2 million gallons 
(28,000 barrels) of water while a horizontal well rquires nearly three times more or 
approximately 3.5 million gallons (over 83,000 barrels). Water extractions are nevertheless small 
(represent less than one percent of total state watr wi hdrawals) when compared to the water 
usage/volumes consumed by manufacturing, agriculture and local government entities (RCT 
2014). But, once withdrawn, operators inject the fracked water deep underground, where future 
users cannot economically recover it (Wittmeyer 2013). 
The severity of water issues varies across the stat(Wittmeyer 2013). In the East, water is 
less of a concern. In some western and southern portions of the State, fracking accounts for 
between 10 and 25 percent of all water consumption. When combined with the effects of a 
prolonged drought and growing water demands, millions f Texans face water restrictions.  
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Between 2011 and 2013, wells in nearly thirty West and South Texas communities ran almost 
dry. In Barnhart, Texas, the town’s well did go dry. In 2013, 15 million Texans lived under some 
sort of water restriction. Access to water has alsotransformed itself into an equity issue. 
Spicewood Beach, best described as a resort town near Austin, began trucking water into the 
community in early 2012. San Angelo, a city of 100,000, is financing a 60-mile pipeline to 
access new sources of underground water and is digging multiple new wells (Goldenberg 2013). 
Poorer and smaller communities, conversely, have found it more difficult to access new sources 
of ground and surface water.  
Air and Gas Emissions 
 
Air pollution is another environmental concern raised by fracking’s opponents. In 2006, 
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality estimated that leaks from storage tanks 
contributed to around 8% of all volatile organic compounds emissions. Increasing truck traffic 
and dust contamination also contribute to declining air quality in the Dallas and San Antonio 
regions (Song, Morris and Hasemyer 2014). Texas environmentalists and anti-fracking advocates 
also criticize the TCEQ’s environmental protection efforts based, in part, on the following: 
• As of early 2014, only five permanent air monitor stations measured air quality in the 
Eagle Ford Shale Play. Each monitor is located at the formation’s periphery, which 
covers over 20,000 square miles.  
• Many of the state’s oil and gas facilities self-audit their emissions and do so without state 
oversight.  
• Penalties for violations are rarely severe. Between 2010 and 2013, Eagle Ford residents 
made 284 complaints but only two resulted in fines ($14,000 was the largest fine). The 
TCEQ documented 164 violations.   
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• State lawmakers have reduced the TCEQ’s budget from $555 million in 2008 to $372 
million in 2014 (Song, Morris and Hasemyer 2014). 
Air quality is of particular concern for the Cities of Dallas and San Antonio. In San 
Antonio, development is pushing the City closer to violating Federal Clean Air laws. The City is 
located on the northern border of Karnes County, part of the Eagle Ford Shale Play. Peter Bella, 
natural resources director for the Alamo Council of G vernments, noted that for many cities in 
the region the “more immediate concern is all the exhaust from the diesel engines in the 
thousands of trucks, generators and compressors used to rvice the well sites.” Bella adds that 
as of “right now, the San Antonio region is the largest city in the United States that is in full 
compliance with all air quality laws. I have to say in the same breath, we are right on the cusp of 
violating the ozone standard” (Burnam quoted by Fehling 2012). Air quality is also a concern of 
North Texas and Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex lawmakers. Lon Burnam, a Democratic state 
representative from Fort Worth observed, “Those of us in North Texas (have been) in non-
attainment for so many years. We absolutely recognize the huge impact this is having, the 
negative impact on our air quality” (Burnam quoted by Fehling 2012). 
Safety  
Safety concerns are also on the agenda of those seeking to ban or restrict urban fracking. 
Aggregated RCT data shows that between January 2006 and December 2011, operators reported 
slightly more than 4,500 spills. Of this total, one i  twelve (six percent) or 266 resulted in 
harmful impacts to nearby bodies of water (RCT 2014a). In Forest Hill, Texas an accident 
resulting from contractors who ignored safety precautions killed a fellow contractor and led to 
the evacuation of 500 people.70  
                                                   
70 Safety concerns also include pipelines but since pip lines cut through multiple jurisdictions, they are typically 
under the exclusive domain of the RCT.  
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Natural gas projects also necessitate numerous trucks to carry water to frack sites. The 
group, Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Wter, came out in support of more oversight 
by expressing concern over the frequency of trips over roads popular with children and 
pedestrians (Turner 2007).  
Table 6.7 Environmental Impacts of Fracking 
Environmental Harm 2012 Impact 
GHG or equivalent emitted tons Since 2005 40,000,000 
Acres Damaged 2005 to 2012  130,000  
Particular Matter 7800 tons 
NOx 100,000 tons 
Carbon Monoxide 153,000 tons 
Volatile Organic Compounds 14,000 tons 
Sulfur Dioxide 300 tons 
Source: Ridlington and Rumpler 2013 
 
The City of Three Rivers’ experience encapsulates th  promise and peril of expanded 
urban gas drilling via fracking. New oil and gas tax revenues built a new high school and athletic 
facilities and precipitated the development of four new hotels. Despite its new wealth, Three 
Rivers Mayor Sam Garcia laments the side effects, drawing attention to the fact that “traffic 
accidents are a daily occurrence…the city’s small (ten person) police department is encountering 
a surge of traffic calls, break-ins and are even dealing with increasing prostitution (from San 
Antonio). He finally commented “Water's a big issue right now…It's as valuable as the oil” 
(Garcia quoted by Jervis 2014). 
Second Order Issues  
 
State authority through the Texas Railroad Commission is fairly extensive. Unlike 
Colorado and in some ways, unlike Ohio, the state shares its regulatory authority with Texas’ 
home rule cities. Municipal authority to regulate oil and gas activities within their corporate 
limits is protected by the Courts and applicable state regulations as long as it satisfies a three part 
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test included below (Klepak v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177 S.W.2d 215; Unger v. State, 629 
S.W.2d 811 (Tex.App.-Ft. Worth 1982).     
1. Does not govern matters that are preempted by state with unmistakable clarity prohibition  
2. Is validly enacted and is not arbitrary and unreason ble 
3. Advances a legitimate governmental interest and is rea onably related to protecting the 
safety and general welfare of the public (McFarland 2013; Turner 2007) 
With these restrictions in place, Texas’ cities are ctive policymaking venues for natural gas 
regulation. They have promulgated ordinances that limi access and hours of operation, restrict 
noise, prohibit certain uses and techniques, requir security and other vegetation on the site and 
have established larger setbacks than the state. 
Despite a fairly quiet second order relationship, cty governments may still find 
themselves inside a courtroom. The City of Dallas’ 1500-foot buffer may lead to legal challenges 
between it and the state and /or industry (Mosqueda 2013; 2013a). Following the council’s 
passage of the setback requirement, Councilmember Lee Kleinman called the ordinance an 
“unreasonable and extremist” attempt to ban gas wells in Dallas. Councilmember Vonciel Jones 
Hill agreed with Councilman Kleinman stating, “I believe that the setback requirement is 
arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable…I believe that [banning drilling] is what this motion 
does” (Kleinman quoted by Loftis 2013).  
In Denton, anti-fracking fervor has led to a proposed and subsequently passed (through a 
citizen ballot initiative) citywide ban on new drilling and frack sites. By early 2014, advocates 
announced that they have gained enough signatures to place a proposed ban on the November 
(2014) ballot. Cathy McMullen, the President of theD nton Drilling Awareness Group 
commented “We need to gather as many signatures as possible, to show they’ll pay a political 
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price if they try to thwart their constituents’ wishes.” She added, (referring to city officials) “we 
want to send a strong message to the city that the ci iz ns want this” (Malewitz 2014 citing 
McMullen).  
Results and Implications 
 
To assess how a more decentralized state structure shapes intergovernmental relations 
and to address the dissertation’s second and third research questions, the policy positions of 60 
Texas cities (on Page 188) are inventoried and categorized. A variety of state-municipal 
relationships are observable, albeit the data’s distribution appears to be somewhat bimodal. The 
most frequent policy response is little to no municipal action with the second most popular 
response being zoning and land use regulatory schemes. Part of this is likely due to an 
institutional design that enables local governments to pass regulation in policy areas that are of 
most concern to local governments (land use and setbacks) should they determine that municipal 
regulation is necessary.  
Despite the absence of second order lawsuits, confli t between cities and the State may 
be simmering below the surface on two fronts. The first is how to address environmental 
requirements of the Clean Air Act, especially in the San Antonio and Dallas metropolitan 
regions. The second being the citizen-led ballot initiative to ban fracking in Denton and the 1500 
foot setbacks, which industry and city councilmembers have labeled as de-facto bans and have 
described such policies as arbitrary and capricious (Loftis 2013).   
Table 6.8 Aggregate Municipal Responses to Oil and Gas Development* 








Bans or Moratoria (0)* 7 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Zoning Regulations (1)^ 15 25.0 25.0 36.7 
Bans on municipal property (2)^ 0 0 0 0 
Voluntary Agreements (3)^ 0 0 0 0 
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Resolutions for local control/anti-
fracking (4)^ 1 1.7 1.7 38.3 
No Action/resolutions in 
favor/special use permits that do not 
conflict with state law (5) 31 51.7 51.7 90.0 
Actions increasing development (6) 6 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news articles 
^Symbolic Challenges  
*Substantive Challenges  
 
In Table 6.8, several trends are noteworthy. First, da a appears to be bimodal with twin 
peaks in the zoning policies (that exceed the state) and the no actions/special use permits 
categories. Second, Texas cities are generally supportive of expanded urban natural gas 
development. Sixty three percent of the sample citis (N=60) have policies that minimize local 
oversight, by relying upon a more ad-hoc process of special use permits to regulate gas 
development within their community. Like municipalities in Colorado and Ohio, however, there 
does appear to be some pushback against relying solely on the state to establish oil and natural 
gas policies, with a third of cities enacting comprehensive land use policies that go beyond state 
regulations. 
The state of Texas permits municipal governments a gre ter role in regulating the natural 
gas industry, which likely explains the higher number of city zoning schemes. But like Colorado 
and Ohio, a small group of Texas communities have established setback distances so great that 
they have effectively banned the practice. In the case of Denton, residents deemed greater 1200 
foot setback distances as ineffective and succeeded in placing an outright ban on the ballot for 
the city’s November 2014 election. In these more restrictive cases, while the legal implications 
are unclear, they clearly stand in contrast to the pro-development positions of many of Texas 
state lawmakers and regulators. 
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Aggregate trends provide a general overview of municipal responses in Texas. They 
cannot, however, explicate the factors associated with cities challenging the state’s preemptive 
authority or going beyond its requirements. To begin identifying the antecedents to municipal 
activism, communities are organized by the typology as shown in Table 6.9 (N=60): 
Table 6.9 Individual Municipal Policy Responses to Oil and Gas Development* 













Ennis 5 Azle 4 Carrollton 1 Bowie 5 
Glenn Heights 1 
Mineral 
Wells 6 Denton 0 Burleson 5 
Midlothian 1 Weatherford 5 Corinth 0 Keene 5 
Red Oak 5 Hillsboro 5 Fort Worth 1 Addison 1 
Waxahachie 1 Yoakum 5 Plano 5 Dallas 1 
Lancaster 5 Cuero 6 Southlake 0 Garland 0 





Beeville 6 Columbus 5 Arlington 1 Irving 0 
Cotulla 6 Eagle Lake 5 Euless 1 Rowlett 5 
Carrizo 
Springs 6 Bellville 5 
Flower 
Mound 0 DeSoto 5 
El Cenizo 5 Sealy 5 Frisco 5 Cedar Hill 5 
Laredo 1 Karnes City 6 Lewisville 5 Mesquite 1 





ville 1 Jacksboro 5 Richardson 0 















ANOVA Results  
 
 Do these group level differences occur by chance or are there explanatory factors at 
work? A one and two way ANOVA (a factorial structure based on high and low levels of 
environmentalism and mobilization) were utilized to answer this question. Like Ohio and 
Colorado there are differences between the groups and the overall model reaches statistical 
significance (p= .013).  
Table 6.10 Relationships between Municipal Sustainable Economic Development, Ease of 
Mobilization and Fracking Policies 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 49.933 3 16.644 3.932 .013 
Within Groups 237.067 56 4.233   
Total 287.000 59    
 
 Are group level differences observable between all groups, i.e are high green/high turnout 
communities statistically significantly different than high green/low turnout cities? Do they 
differ from less green communities and do those citi s take sustainability seriously? In Texas, the 
results suggest differences between the groups. First, the low-green and high turnout is 
significantly different from its counterpart – the igh green, low turnout group. Second, for the 
high green-high turnout group, the only significant difference is between it and low green and 
high turnout.  
Table 6.11 Relationships among Specific Municipal Groups based on Commitment to 
Sustainable Economic Development and Ease of Mobilization 
  Mean 
Difference 




(SD) and Low 
Mobilization 
Low SD and High 
Turnout 1.26667 .75130 .097 
High SD and Low 
Turnout 1.26667 .75130 .097 
High SD and High 
Turnout .40000 .75130 .597 
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Low SD and 
High Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization 1.26667 .75130 .097 
High SD and Low 
Turnout 2.53333* .75130 .001 
High SD and High 
Turnout 1.66667* .75130 .031 
High SD and 
Low Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization -1.26667 .75130 .097 
Low SD and High 
Turnout -2.53333* .75130 .001 
High SD and High 
Turnout -.86667 .75130 .254 
High SD and 
High Turnout 
Low SD and Low 
Mobilization -.40000 .75130 .597 
Low SD and High 
Turnout -1.66667* .75130 .031 
High SD and Low 
Turnout .86667 .75130 .254 
Bolded relationships are significant 
 
The table above suggests that there is some sort of relationship between municipal 
fracking policy, ‘greenness’ and potential for mobilization. The ANOVA’s results, however, 
cannot begin to elucidate what that relationship is between green and mobilization or between 
municipal fracking policies. To explore these relationships, I again apply a two-way ANOVA 
test. The model and both of the typological variables show statistical significance. Overall, the 
model accounts for a modest 13 percent of the variation, which is about 50 percent less than 
Colorado and slightly less than Ohio. Both variables are significant, p = 008 (green cities) as well 
as voter turnout, p = .049. There is no interactive eff ct between green and turnout, which 






Table 6.12 Being Green or Being Mobilized 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 49.933a 3 16.644 3.932 .013 
Intercept 735.000 1 735.000 173.622 .000 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development   
(SD)* 32.267 1 32.267 7.622 .008 
Turnout* 17.067 1 17.067 4.031 .049 
SD* Turnout .600 1 .600 .142 .708 
Error 237.067 56 4.233   
Total 1022.000 60    
a. R Squared = .174 (Adjusted R Squared = .130) 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
I ran a second two factorial ANOVA model that included socio-demographic variables 
(education, logged per capita income, logged home value – flagged as significant in the bivariate 
correlation table). Once included, the socio-economic variables wash out the effects of the green 
and the turnout variables. After multiple models, the logged median home value reports the most 
robust level of statistical significance (P = .022) and produces the highest adjusted R squared 
value at .195, meaning it can account for nearly 20 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable, i.e. group differences.   
Table 6.13 Being Green versus Being Mobilized with Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 71.743a 4 17.936 4.583 .003 
Intercept 31.375 1 31.375 8.017 .006 
LoggedHomeV




(SD) 2.651 1 2.651 .677 .414 
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Turnout 9.658 1 9.658 2.468 .122 
SD * Turnout 1.994 1 1.994 .509 .478 
Error 215.257 55 3.914   
Total 1022.000 60    
Corrected Total 287.000 59    
a. R Squared = .250 (Adjusted R Squared = .195) 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
Explaining the Differences  
 
Texas’ law permits municipalities a wide degree of latitude when it comes to regulating 
natural gas development. They may establish setback st ndards, restrict the times that drilling 
may occur and require security and other safety featur s. This flexibility has contributed to a 
number of municipalities enacting comprehensive zoning schemes and even land use plans that 
effectively preclude gas development. With greater municipal autonomy, Texas’ communities 
have promulgated a wide variety of setback distances including several that according to 
industry, amount to de facto bans. Dallas, Duncanville and Grand Prairie, for example, all have 
bans or setbacks more than 1200 feet. Despite, the potential for lawsuits, the state-municipal 
relationship in Texas is fairly one sided in favor of development. Most cities are working with 
developers and have yet to pass comprehensive land use policies. 
 Table 6.13 presents the bivariate correlations. A number of statistically significant 
relationships are observable and in the hypothesized dir ctions. In general, socio-economic 
variables appear to be strongly associated with stricter municipal fracking policies. The strongest 
predictor variable, logged home value, reported an R= -.4, meaning that as median home values 
increase, Texas cities seek to exercise more control over natural gas development and 
promulgate more comprehensive land use policies. Other economic/social variables also reach 
statistical significance. Both income (R= -.348) and education (R= -.379) report negative 
relationships with the dependent variable, although these two indicators are also highly 
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correlated with one another. Green cities are also negatively associated with fracking policies 
(R= -.335; P= .009), suggesting that as cities increase in their environmental score, they also 
have more restrictive fracking policies. Finally, while the turnout variable fails to reach 
significance at the .05 level, it did report a P value of .06 (R= .244) and was positively associated 
with the municipal policy. Perhaps surprisingly, as turnout in Texas increases, municipal support 
for fracking does as well.
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Pearson 1 -.084 -.400* -.348* -.052 -.379* -.018 -.335* .244 
Sig.  .522 .002 .006 .692 .003 .892 .009 .060 
OwnerOcc 
Pearson -.084 1 .317* .319* -.173 .182 -.211 .030 -.270* 




Pearson -.400**  .317* 1 .962**  -.148 .907**  -.304* .519**  -.213 
Sig. 
.002 .014  .000 .259 .000 .018 .000 .103 
Logged 
Income 
Pearson -.348**  .319* .962**  1 -.103 .936**  -.352**  .564**  -.170 
Sig. .006 .013 .000  .434 .000 .006 .000 .195 
Minorities 
Pearson -.052 -.173 -.148 -.103 1 -.061 .172 .113 .276* 
Sig. .692 .186 .259 .434  .642 .188 .388 .033 
Education 
Pearson -.379**  .182 .907**  .936**  -.061 1 -.308* .674**  -.175 
Sig. .003 .165 .000 .000 .642  .017 .000 .182 
Council 
Districts 
Pearson -.018 -.211 -.304* -.352** .172 -.308* 1 -.012 -.041 
Sig. .892 .106 .018 .006 .188 .017  .927 .756 
Green 
Pearson -.335** .030 .519** .564** .113 .674** -.012 1 .000 
Sig. .009 .820 .000 .000 .388 .000 .927  1.000 
Turnout 
Pearson .244 -.270* -.213 -.170 .276* -.175 -.041 .000 1 
Sig. .060 .037 .103 .195 .033 .182 .756 1.000  
*Significant at the .05 level 
**Significant at the .1 level 
Data collected from municipal websites, codes and news sto
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Texas municipal leaders have offered a number of reasons for either supporting or 
opposing expanded natural gas drilling in their communities. In explaining the desire to ban 
fracking in Denton, Adam Briggle, the vice president of the Denton Drilling Awareness Group 
(DAG) stated “we saw, once the [original] ordinance was passed, the sort of futility of this 
compatibility strategy...the realization was that you can either have fracking or you can have a 
healthy city, but you can’t have both” (Briggle quoted in Dropkin 2014). Denton’s Mayor, Mark 
Burroughs, supports greater restrictions but cautioned that a ban could place the city at risk for 
lawsuits. Burroughs explains “if it [the ordinance] does pass, the city has to follow it…but we 
could be bound to enforce an illegal act, which throws into a whole panoply of open issues….we 
as a city would be bound to defend it, whether we believed it was illegal or not” (Burroughs 
quoted in Dropkin 2014). Denton’s ban is likely to lead to second order legal challenges 
(challenge the state’s preemptive authority and its gas goals) and opponents have claimed that 
the ban amounts to a regulatory takings.  
Besides leading to second order lawsuits, Cyrus Reed, th  Conservation Director of the 
Lonestar Chapter of the Sierra Club opined that Denton’s actions maybe a harbinger of a greater 
levels of activism within Texas communities in the near future. “I think cities throughout Texas 
are looking at the fact that while an individually fracked well might not be that big of a deal, 
when you talk about lots and lots of wells and lotsand lots of oil and gas facilities being located 
where people live, play and work, that does become an issue…but it’s unclear if a complete ban 
falls under the health, safety and welfare clause” (Reed quoted in Dropkin 2014).  
Other cities have also passed restrictive zoning ordinances. In Southlake, Texas, for 
example, tougher and more restrictive rules and the city’s 1500-foot setbacks contributed to 
Chesapeake Energy’s decision to abandon production within city limits (Dlouhy 2011). 
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Following the City of Dallas’ decision to enact 1500-foot buffer zones, Councilman Kingston put 
out a press release that stated, “I will oppose dangerous gas drilling, fracking, and refining within 
the city limits of Dallas. Even under the strictest of regulations, these activities still threaten our
air quality and water supply. I am the only candidate who has been a vocal and active opponent 
of drilling, and I am proud to have earned the endorsement of the Sierra Club as well as many 
environmental leaders in our city” (Kingston 2014).  
Other cities are more sanguine about natural gas development and believe it can be 
balanced with localized and neighborhood level concer s. Rick Trice, the City of Fort Worth’s 
gas drilling inspector noted that “In the early stages of the surge, drilling companies sometimes 
were less than sensitive to neighborhood concerns…executives from outside [Fort Worth] would 
come to public meetings and get frustrated and go, ‘we can just do what we want to.’ I mean, it 
was kind of obnoxious. They quickly learned [that] if you’re going to do work in Fort Worth in 
an urban environment, and with some of the politics, hat just wasn’t going to be the way things 
were going to operate” (Trice quoted in Fehling 2014). Since the early 2000s, the City has 
expanded its setback requirements to 600 feet and enacted other standards to mitigate the impacts 
of urban drilling. Despite pushing back development, Trice stated he still expects to encounter 
land use disputes, “you can expect a lot of conflict with what is essentially an industrial activity 
in an urban area. That’s what our ordinance attempts to do, is to attack quality-of-life issues” 
(Trice quoted in Fehling 2014). Mansfield Mayor Pro Tem, arguing in favor of gas 
development/fracking but also the need for local control argued, “it [local control] does allow 
citizens to control what’s going on in their own cities — and that’s a good thing” (Stephen 
Lindsey quoted in Malewitz 2013).  
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Many supportive cities are using natural gas revenues to fund other programs. Indicative 
of this trend is Arlington, which does have a comprehensive zoning scheme regulating gas 
development exceeding that of the state. The City uses its gas revenues to fund its Arlington 
Tomorrow Foundation. The foundation has grown to $80 million, enabling it to award 252 grants 
equating to over $7 million dollars to city departments, nonprofits and other neighborhood 
groups (Schrock 2012). The Eagle Ford Shale City of Carrizo Springs has experienced an even 
more precipitous increase in gas revenues and its related economic growth. Carrizo Springs 
Mayor Adrian DeLeon estimated that daily traffic counts as exceeding 200,000 and a population 
of fifteen to twenty thousand, both being dramatic increases since the City’s entire population 
was just 5,500 before the fracking boom (Petty 2014).  
Why Critique or Exceed the State? 
 
The third question relates to identifying and then exploring the variables that may be 
associated with more or less municipal regulation of urban hydraulic fracturing. Like Colorado 
and Ohio, I used logistic regression to identify potential relationships. Following the scheme 
described in Chapter 3, Texas municipal policies were r coded with two different ‘yes/no’ 
dependent variables. The first dependent variable lumps together municipal responses that go 
beyond the state and includes more restrictive zoning policies, bans or other restrictions on 
public property (municipal policy responses 0-4). The second is a more direct measure of state-
municipal conflict and sets apart those policies that conflict with the state’s goal of natural gas 
production (originally coded as municipal policy - 0). The output presented below represents the 
most parsimonious set of independent variables.  
The first model reaches a marginal level of statistical significance (P=.073). Echoing the 
ANOVA results, only the logged home value (p = .008) is a significant predictor variable. The 
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marginal effects, however, are impactful. For each one-unit increase in the logged home value, 
the likelihood of deferring to the state of Texas relative to oil and gas land use issues decreases 
by approximately 84 percent. Like Colorado, a one uit increase in the logged median home 
value is the equivalent of moving from a $100,000 median valued home to one valued at 
$274,000 dollars. 
Table 6.15 Municipal Fracking Policies that Exceeds State Policy  





(SD) -.022 .985 .000 1 .982 .978 
Turnout 1.222 1.003 1.486 1 .223 3.394 
Interactive 
SD * Turnout 
(HGHT) -.696 1.309 .283 1 .595 .499 
Log Home 
Value -2.822 1.905 2.194 1 .139 .059 
LogIncome 1.621 2.252 .518 1 .472 5.057 
Constant 16.807 9.982 2.835 1 .092 1.992E7 
Step 
2a 
Turnout 1.232 .906 1.849 1 .174 3.427 
HGHT -.715 .987 .524 1 .469 .489 
Log Home 
Value -2.817 1.888 2.226 1 .136 .060 
Log Income 1.602 2.087 .589 1 .443 4.964 
Constant 16.920 8.584 3.885 1 .049 2.230E7 
Step 
3a 
Turnout .762 .597 1.630 1 .202 2.143 
Log Home 
Value -3.098 1.863 2.766 1 .096 .045 
Log Income 1.756 2.085 .710 1 .400 5.792 
Constant 18.676 8.397 4.947 1 .026 1.291E8 
Step 
4a 
Turnout .833 .589 2.002 1 .157 2.301 
Log Home 
Value -1.702 .691 6.057 1 .014 .182 




Value* -1.825 .690 6.994 1 .008 .161 
Constant 21.846 8.109 7.258 1 .007 3.073E9 
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a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Green, Turnout, HGHT, LogHomeValue, LogIncome. 
Cox & Snell R Square = .145 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
The second model specified a narrower range of municipal policies (bans and setbacks 
that have blocked development) but produced a similar result. The model is statistically 
significant (P=.000) and like the previous model, the median logged home value is the only 
significant predictor variable. Here, a one unit change in its value equates to an 87 percent 
decline in the odds of a municipality passing a land use policy that fits within the regulatory 
framework of the state, i.e. one that encourages development.  
Table 6.16 Municipal Fracking Policies that Challenge the State’s Preemptive Authority 




Value -2.530 3.462 .534 1 .465 .080 
Logged 
Income .374 4.209 .008 1 .929 1.453 
Education .787 13.478 .003 1 .953 2.196 
Green x 
Turnout -.884 .899 .968 1 .325 .413 




Value -2.448 3.148 .604 1 .437 .086 
Logged 
Income .490 3.686 .018 1 .894 1.633 
Green x 
Turnout -.875 .883 .981 1 .322 .417 




Value -2.051 .934 4.820 1 .028 .129 
Green x 
Turnout -.875 .883 .983 1 .322 .417 




Home Value -1.984 .898 4.887 1 .027 .137 
Constant 25.521 10.761 5.625 1 .018 1.212E11 
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a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LogHomeValue, LogIncome, BachorHigher, HGHT. 
Cox & Snell R Square = .092 
*Significant at the .05 level 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
A number of variables fail to reach statistical significance including the measure that 
approximated a city’s proclivity to take sustainability seriously. This lack of significance perhaps 
is not surprising, given the pro-development attitudes and policies held by many state and 
municipal public officials in Texas (Davis 2012). Despite the absence of macro level factors i.e. 
environmentalism, bottom up municipal activism and local variation are observable in Texas. In 
Texas, however, greater levels of municipal oversight and the willingness to inch closer to 
challenging the state’s preemptive authority are associated with median home values, a micro-
level issue. Consideration of home values, while not necessarily a ‘usual’ suspect in explaining 
substate environmentalism, does make some sense in th  context of high cost-benefit decision-
making and the social–psychological/planned behavior explanations that undergird 
environmental support (Lubell 2002). 
Table 6.17 Summary of Findings 
Variable Model 1 – Critical of the State 
(Symbolic and Substantive 
Challenges) 
Model 2 – Challenging the 
State (Substantive Challenges) 
Environmentalism No Support No Support 
Turnout 
No Support Observed (highly 
correlated with home value) Slight Support 
Income 
No Support Observed (highly 
correlated with home value) No Support Observed 
Owner Occupied 
No Support Observed (highly 
correlated with home value) No Support Observed 
Median Household 
Value Support Support 
Municipal 
Structures No Support Observed No Support Observed 
Race No Support Observed No Support Observed 
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Second Order Politics, Rational Choice and Environme tal Protection 
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior includes two major components: a positive 
evaluation of the likelihood of success and holding favorable attitudes. Blake’s (1999) work 
identified that both components are part of the ration l choice orientation used by scholars 
attempting to explain individual and institutional decision-making. For these scholars, “reasoned 
human agency” is a critical factor that underlies action and volition, and it may help explain a 
municipality’s decision to challenge or ‘get close’ to challenging their state’s preemptive 
authority.  
Researchers adopting a rational choice approach are confident in the utility of their 
approach especially in high-cost situations. In these situations, strong pressures exist on 
individuals to make decisions based on self-interes and rationality because their choices involve 
real and tangible consequences (Blake 1999). Lubell (2002) identified several components that 
enter an individual’s calculus in higher-cost environmental scenarios:  
1. The collective good’s perceived value that would be produced by successful 
environmental action  
2. The chances of success and the individual’s contribution to success if he or she opts to 
participate in the environmental action 
3. The likelihood of group success 
4. The selective costs and benefits of participation 
By comparison, in lower-cost situations, the consequences are more abstract and decision-
making strategies become more idiosyncratic and less rational.  
Why would a threat to home values instigate municipal environmental actions and a 
NIMBY (Not in my backyard) like response? Miller and Krosnick’s work (2004) examined 
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citizen rationality and decision making in the context of a political threat.71 They surmised that 
under duress, rational citizens survey the politica landscape to identify the optimal course of 
action, i.e. where the selective benefits outweigh the costs and where they stand a reasonable 
chance of accomplishing their goals, i.e. mitigating the threat. A reasonably effective strategy by 
Texas citizens, who believe that fracking threatens heir home values, is to work with municipal 
leaders, where they stand a reasonable chance of achieving their goals, for instance to pass 
policies that keep their home values high through municipal bans and large setbacks. Their 
actions and motivation fits within the definition of Nimbyism as their opposition to state policy 
is based in part on elevated levels of apprehension ab ut the project’s risks and benefits and not 
generalized environmental concern (Michauda, Carlisle and Smith 2008).  
An additional way that Nimbyism and the threat of diminishing home values can lead to 
challenges to the state’s preemptive authority is through direct and indirect citizen mobilization 
efforts, information sharing and other disseminative strategies. Once activated, threatened 
individuals become more aware of select solidary, purposive and material benefits associated 
with their activism (Olson 1965). Because nearby urban drilling may negatively affect property 
values, once individuals become aware of this associati n, their calculus shifts and the material  
benefits of municipal action (higher home values) likely outweigh the costs of participation 
(time, energy and money) and leads the political calculus to favor municipal intervention into 
natural gas policies.  
Home values in Flower Mound, Texas illustrates the higher-cost rational choice 
calculation of urban drilling. Flower Mound homes are generally valued at more than $250,000. 
However, when they are located within 1,000 feet of a well site, they lose between three and 
                                                   
71 While, a complete causal answer is beyond the scope of the data and of this dissertation, potential answers need to 
address self-interest and rationality. 
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fourteen percent of their overall value. Visual buffers helped to mitigate this relationship but did 
not eliminate the financial impact. Perhaps not surprisingly, city leaders in Flower Mound 
responded and passed a 1,500-foot setback, effectively preventing gas development within the 
city (Integra Realty Resources 2010).  
Lubell’s second point (chances of success) further supports municipal regulatory 
activism. Portney (2002, 2009) noted that sustainability efforts were more successful in cities 
because of the processes in place that build social capital and facilitate increases in political 
efficacy among citizens, i.e. offer citizens more opp rtunities to become involved and shape 
local policies and accomplish one’s policy goals. In cities throughout Texas, citizens may 
comment on draft plans for the city’s future, comprehensive land use plans and potential 
ordinances. Citizens may also participate in surveys, boards and focus groups to share specific 
ideas (Portney 2009). These opportunities help to build social capital and encourage the 
development of relationships and social networks that help overcome collective action dilemmas 
(Hempel 2009).  
Texas’ Second Order Politics and Economic Goals  
In proposing his middle of-the-road approach, Stone (1980, 1993, 2006) also describes 
urban by the ways in which local government policymakers work with each other and the private 
sector. His articulation of regime theory is builds on Lindblom’s (1977) observations regarding 
the fundamental tensions present in a market-based economy. The system, Stone suggests, 
requires near continuous economic growth but provides governments with only a limited role in 
the decisions made by private sector. By forming regim s that often include state governments, 
local governments facilitate policy change while at the same time, acknowledging and accepting 
that business and government often share common interests. The resulting dynamics have 
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significant ramifications for democratic accountability and transparency. Imbroscio, in 1999 
concluded that the ways in which local governments coordinate with other policymakers have 
important implications for both policy promulgation a d democracy. Cities may possess room to 
maneuver and respond to public concerns i.e. pass greater setback distances, the prevailing 
structural bounds limit the range of acceptable public policy outcomes i.e. development will still 
take place. In short, the dominant structural system, characterized by the need for continuous 
economic growth constrains the actions and behaviors that public officials may take in response 
to public opinion.  
Texas’ Second Order Dynamics Revisited 
 Environmental factors are weakly associated with more robust municipal oversight of 
natural gas development. What seems to be driving Texas’ cities to pass policies that go beyond 
the state and in some cases challenge the state, are micro-level variables. Higher home values, 
likely by contributing to higher social capital and NIMBY attitudes, are associated with caring 
about the issue of urban drilling. When combined with greater levels of municipal decision-
making authority, Texas municipalities appear to be more willing to pass policies, such as zoning 
policies with large setbacks that exceed the state’s land use policies. These municipal land use 
plans stand in contrast to the all or nothing bans and moratoria that are increasingly appearing on 
the agendas of municipal lawmakers in Colorado, Ohio, New York, California, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois and Michigan.  
 By comparison to Colorado and Ohio, Texas’ municipalities have considerably more 
authority and latitude when it comes to establishing setbacks and other restrictions. Bottom up 
researchers (Hjern and Porter 1981; Lipsky 1980; Palumbo, Maynard-Moody, and Wright 1984) 
identified multiple reasons for why empowering bottom up forces may produce better outcomes 
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– in this case quieter intergovernmental relationships. Street level bureaucrats and organizations 
tend to possess more information as compared to higher level or executive actors since they are 
closer to the problem’s origins and its target population. In other words, city leaders are likely 
more aware of how urban gas development impacts their residents’ quality of life. This 
asymmetry may be even more important during episodes f policy change. Municipal 
government’s proximity to citizens also affords city leaders with more opportunities to 
immediately respond to citizens through site security measures, larger setbacks and other 
restrictions on development.  
The outright challenges to the state’s preemptive authority have yet to come to Texas and 
the state is not actively involved in any lawsuits that deal with the extent of municipal authority 
to regulate natural gas development. With this relative ‘calm’ Texas cities have become active 
institutional venues addressing fracking and its consequences relative to quality of life. Texas’ 
second order issues are ebbing and flowing. Recently, HB1496 (in 2013) appeared on the agenda 
of state lawmakers. The bill’s sponsors, Van Taylor and Gary Elkins (Republicans) argued it 
would promote uniform policies, encourage economic development and protect private 
property.72 The law forces municipalities to accept drilling with few, if any, restrictions on where 
it may occur including near schools, homes, hospitals and water wells (Southwell 2013). City of 
Lewisville Mayor Dean Ueckert, responding to the proposal, summarized the municipal 




                                                   
72 Under the proposed bill, most, if not all, municipal regulation would constitute regulatory takings if it devalued 
the property by more than 25 percent. 
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It is clear that HB1496 will drastically impact municipalities since city residents live 
in much closer proximity to one another than rural residents in the State, and neighboring 
property uses in municipalities naturally impact each other to a much greater degree 
and therefore, the need for municipal regulatory authority is paramount, 
particularly when there is drilling or production of natural gas…since drilling operations 
have distinct implications upon the surface estate and the owners 
of neighboring surface estates (Ueckert 2013).   
 
While future research may be able to pinpoint the causes or identify whether or not lawmakers 
are aware of the second order and inherent tension, the exchange between lawmakers illustrates 















Chapter 7                                                                                                                    
Summary and Implications 
 
 
This project addresses three major questions concerni g second order relationships 
relative to hydraulic fracturing and urban drilling. The first two address the general institutional 
landscape governing state and municipal governments in relation to urban natural gas drilling. 
The third question probes why some municipalities challenge their state’s preemptive authority 
while other communities do not. The answers to each of t ese questions add depth and a degree 
of explanatory power to the second order federalism/devolution literature (See Bowman and 
Kearney 2012; 2011; Davis 2014; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000; Stephens 1974; Woods and 
Potoski 2010). The answers paint a complicated picture of the politics and point to multiple 
explanatory factors (municipal environmental support, median home values, voter turnout and 
the percentage of owner occupied homes) all of which may be associated with challenges to state 
preemptive authority.  
Unlike the three previous chapters that specifically examine three states, Chapter 7 
follows and considers in greater detail a number of theoretical and practical implications. I begin 
by summarizing my findings and placing them within the context of a larger body of second 
order federalism research. In general, they support the hypotheses but also generate considerable 
uncertainty and generate numerous possibilities for future inquiries (addressed in the last 
section). The second section pays closer attention to the findings and makes some general 





Summary of Findings  
 
  The fracking renaissance in the Rocky Mountain West, Texas and the Mid-Atlantic has 
continued relatively unabated. Despite touting new layers of regulatory oversight and new legal 
provisions to better protect people and the environme t, political conflicts are contentious, ‘loud’ 
and reframing state-local relationships. The disputes between state elected officials and 
regulators and municipal policymakers reveal a statu  quo under attack and the emergence of 
new venues for opponents of urban drilling but also localities that support expanded drilling 
opportunities. Opponents are strategic actors and hve identified municipal audiences receptive 
to a variety of frames: sustainable economic development and threats to quality of life (owner 
occupied and median home value). These broad frames re not associated uniformly across the 
three states.  
The reader should exercise significant caution, municipal characteristics and structures 
and political climates appear to be associated withand can help shape the politics of second 
order federalism when it comes to oil and natural gas development. In Ohio and Colorado (the 
middle ground and centralized state), municipal chalenges to the state’s authority met with 
litigation and threats of future lawsuits and are associated with increasing receptiveness to 
sustainable economic development, mobilization through turnout and home ownership rates. 
Despite ‘loud’ relationships garnering much more space/time on local newspapers, for both 
states, the majority of sampled cities align (soft and collaborative relationships) with the 
statehouse policies.  
Municipal challenges can also reset the state legislative agenda. Activists have filled 
Colorado’s legislative ‘to-do’ list with proposals to devolve some powers including setback 
authority to municipal governments. The State Courts a e also busy with cases stemming from 
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natural gas second order disputes. Ohio’s lawmakers following earthquakes are calling for more 
restrictions on development.  
Texas, on the other hand, has yet to experience the hig ly oppositional (and publicized) 
relationships observed in Ohio and Colorado. Yet, Txas state-municipal politics are not quiet 
and appear to be simmering. Industry has called large municipal buffers arbitrary and de-facto 
bans and one city (Denton) has enacted a complete ban. Its decentralized nature has likely 
contributed to cities enacting a variety of setback distances in line with their preferences and 
until recently fairly calm (quiet) state-local relationships. This flexibility has also engendered 
uncertainty as to where the second order ‘line in the sand’ is drawn and when exactly municipal 
legislation runs afoul of state goals. The bubbling activism in Denton, Texas too, may lead 
towards more litigious strategies by state and industry interests.  
State Summaries   
Colorado, which has centralized much of the decision-making authority in the COGCC, 
produced a number of interesting results. Second order relations in Colorado are fairly 
schizophrenic. With few options available to municipal government, Colorado communities are 
active and in some cases, attractive decision making ve ues for the opponents of fracking. 
Multiple jurisdictions like Fort Collins, Boulder, Longmont and Broomfield have passed bans 
and multi-year moratoria in opposition to the state’s policy of uniform development. These 
communities tend to be more receptive to green policies and home to more engaged citizens. In 
more mobilized and greener communities, residents may see fracking as a generalized threat to 
the environment and believe that local action is called for to protect it. In other communities, 
municipal elites determined that more ‘middle ground’ responses are the best policy response 
and are, therefore, working with industry and the state to sign voluntary agreements that exceed 
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COGCC requirements. Yet, the vast majority of cities are following the state’s lead and deferring 
oil and gas decisions to state lawmakers and regulators.  
Ohio communities, representative of a more middle ground approach, are also engaged in 
second order conflicts, many of which have worked their way into the state’s judicial system. 
The evolving intergovernmental system has produced considerable uncertainty for Ohio’s city 
and township governments even with the recent amendts to Ohio’s oil and gas laws. Cities, 
in response, have enacted, upheld or passed a variety of policies both supporting and opposing 
state goals. In fact, the second most frequently used municipal policy option, zoning regulation, 
according to industry, violates state law with the most popular being deference to the state. What 
factors might be driving these potentially conflictual relationships? The sample of communities’ 
reveals that micro and macro factors are associated wi h challenges to Ohio’s preemptive 
authority and to heightened risk perceptions among city residents. At a more micro level, the 
housing mix of a city matters. Those cities with higher levels of home ownership are likely 
populated with a greater number of individuals worried about fracking and willing to work 
together to push for and support restrictive drilling policies and zoning. Environmental support, a 
more macro level factor, also contributes to heightened risk evaluations and may help explain a 
city’s willingness to voice its opposition to state policy.   
Like Ohio and Colorado, Texas cities are active participants in the intergovernmental 
management of natural gas resources. By comparison, however, they enjoy more autonomy than 
either Colorado or Ohio. Cities may pass zoning regulations that better balance development 
with concerns over protecting residents’ quality of life. The Texas sample shows that stricter 
municipal policies are associated with a concern that fracking may have harmful effects on home 
values. Despite the wider degree of latitude, second order politics are far from inert. Industry has 
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charged several communities with passing arbitrary buffer zones and de facto bans and two state 
Republican lawmakers have introduced legislation that centralizes urban drilling policies within 
the Texas RCT.  
The tables below (Tables 7.1-7.2) show the summarized results:  
Table 7.1 Summary of Descriptive Findings 























































Zoning) 30% 7 (Bans) 11.7% 
Sources: Municipal websites, Lexis Nexis News Articles 
 
























































































































































Sources: Chapters 4-6 
 
Explanations and a Return to Motivation 
 
The data supports both macro and micro level explanatio s for a city’s willingness to 
challenge its state government. Sustainable economic communities, especially in Colorado and 
Ohio are prone to view fracking as an environmental and public health issue. This belief may 
elevate the nuisances and dangers of being located near a frack site and, thus, may help to 
explain why these cities are associated with stricter land use policies and oppositional 
relationships. Micro level relationships shape the politics of fracking and municipal perceptions 
as well. Those communities better suited to overcome collective action problems, whether 
through higher levels of turnout, higher rates of owner occupied homes or concerns over 
property values also correlate with challenges to the state’s preemptive authority. The latter two 
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suggest that when residents view fracking as a hindrance to their quality of life or their home 
values, they are more likely to support tougher zoning/land use policies. Both sets of 
explanations also give credence to the idea that municipalities are responsive to their constituents 
and that accessibility matters. These factors may be especially important when city leaders 
consider passing policies that challenge the state’ preemptive authority.    
The proximity to a frack site is an influential factor throughout the policy life cycle and 
of second order federalism (Ajzen 1991; Davis and Fisk 2014). The causes of perceived risk are 
complex and likely interact with ideological leanings, education and other socio-economic 
characteristics. Data show a complex set of second order relationships and show an association 
between that cities having a higher number of owner occupied homes, greater home values and a 
commitment to sustainable economic development orientation are all prone to view fracking as a 
perturbation to quality of life. Individuals, howevr, do not view all nuisances and dangers of 
frack sites equally (Ajzen 1991; Dietz, Fitzgerald nd Shwom 2005; Mobley, Vagias and 
DeWard 2010; Sjoberg 2000; Slimak and Dietz 2006). Greener citizens and parents, for example, 
may be more concerned with human health and safety (illnesses related to exposure or vehicle 
collisions) than impacts to personal property (prope ty devaluation and property crimes) or vice 
versa. Homeowners, while unconcerned about faraway water contamination, may press local 
leaders to restrict fracking after having experienced nearby earthquakes.  
Proximity and Collective Action 
Municipal anti-fracking policies are a collective action problem because the 
environmental benefits of such policies cannot be withheld from non-participants. Under this 
scenario, rational individuals will free ride. The logit models identify a number of factors that 
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activate and transform free riders into active and e gaged citizens (Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; 
Lubell, Vedlitz, Zahran and Alston 2006).  
City officials and residents may support drilling and extraction “elsewhere” but not in 
their community (Swofford and Slattery 2010). This explanation may help explain the dynamics 
undergirding the relationship between home values, home ownership and quality of life with 
municipal anti-fracking policies. Opposition in this case is place specific rather than based on a 
general concern over the environment. Western Colorado esident, Sonny Lindauer, who lives 
along a creek, epitomizes the subtle distinction betwe n self-interest rational choice and 
environmentalism when he observed “oil and gas companies shouldn’t have the right to affect 
people’s homes by introducing odor and noise…“I know they need the natural gas. I wouldn’t 
object if they were honest and did it right…but a lot of it is sloppiness and a lot of it is lying” 
(Lindauer quoted by Cockerham 2013).  
In addition, scholars have repeatedly found relationships between socio-economic 
standing and support for environmental protection. Abel, Stephen and Kraft’s (2007) model, for 
example, linked higher levels of citizen affluence and educational attainment with greater levels 
of environmental awareness and support. Other studies have found a similar connection and note 
that elevated levels of education and wealth generally le d to a greater level of awareness of 
ecological vulnerabilities, a well as jurisdictions that are more supportive of environmental 
protection (Daley and Garand 2005; Davis, Davis and Peacock 1989; Howell and Laska 1992; 
Matisoff 2007; Ringquist and Garand 1999). Awareness aside, wealthier communities may 
pursue environmental protection because they are bett r able to meet other needs such as 
economic development and public safety (Daley and Garand 2005).73   
                                                   
73 While identifying the particular source of municipal opposition is a noteworthy future project, it is le s important 
for a study on second federalism. 
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Proximity and the Environment 
The bivariate results and logit models point to environmental support as a factor 
associated with challenges to the policy goals of state lawmakers in Colorado, Texas and Ohio. 
The environmental policy literature identifies multiple explanations for why ‘greener’ cities may 
be associated with anti-fracking regulations and enviro mental policies that challenge the state. 
This is in line with most environmental attitudinal research. Davis and Fisk (2014) found that 
when individuals hold pro-environmental beliefs, they are more likely to possess attitudes 
supportive of additional regulation of gas development and other restrictions. Rabe and Borick 
(2011), while finding a general degree of optimism about fracking’s economic benefits also 
identify a strong degree of concern (60 to 28 percent) among Pennsylvania residents about its 
effects on water quality.  
Second Order Federalism and Venues  
The relationship between venues and problem definitions, according to Baumgartner and 
Jones (1991) is partially shaped by the goals of political actors. Supporters of the status quo, for 
example, are likely to seek out venues that already possess the jurisdictional right to hear claims 
or the power to adjudicate the question. For fracking, ndustry-friendly and durable state 
subgovernments have historically been that venue (Davis 2012). Opponents wanting to enlarge 
the conflict, typically seek out new and friendlier venues like a city government. This change 
permits the introduction of new problem definitions and the inclusion of new solutions. Venue 
shopping has profound implications for the politics of second order federalism. By strategically 
selecting to work through municipal governments, activists are often trying to expand the scope 
of conflict, mobilize supporters, bring new attentio  to their issue and force the issue onto the 
agenda of a higher level of government (Pralle 2006).  
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Second Order Federalism and Public Policy  
In a significant majority of states, second order relations, while not immutable are fairly 
one sided in favor of the states. States enjoy centralized authority and establish the basic rules 
that local governments and other entities must follow. State power, however, is not 
unidirectional. The language used in most legal documents is frequently ambiguous and provides 
‘room’ for displays of informal power. Utilized by local policymakers and stakeholders, informal 
power mechanisms (mobilization, agenda setting, problem definitions, and ballot initiatives) can 
be utilized by those who are seeking to change the status quo and exert some degree of control 
over urban drilling operations.  
Second order dynamics are often about issue boundaries, venues and powerful political 
frames, with both states and local entities making reasonable claims over who should have the 
authority to adjudicate the issue. Policy research (Pralle 2006) defines boundaries as those 
informal and formal delineators that signal the endof a problem or resolution, its reach and 
jurisdictional claims. Second order boundaries are especially difficult to categorize and are 
subject to change through legislative, regulatory or judicial action. Where states and local 
governments draw their second order boundaries determin s who may participate and whether or 
not participation is meaningful. In the case of centralized systems, municipal participation may 
be limited to procedural roles rather than policymaking activities. In more decentralized 
jurisdictions, municipal participants are more likey to enjoy some legislative and regulatory 
authority.  
The lines separating legitimate and illegitimate participation also influence the behavior 
of issue networks, the formation and/or destruction of alliances and the ways in which groups 
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design and frame solutions. Networks in centralized systems may include less inter-local 
interaction and more state-local tension as compared to decentralized policy realms.  
Benefits and Future Directions 
Second order politics and challenges to state preemptive authority are not purely partisan 
disputes. Political context, problem severity, the goals of policymakers, motivation, commitment 
to sustainable economic development, home ownership and home values each contribute to the 
ephemeral web governing state-substate natural gas land use decisions. The passions of 
participants representing both sides amplify the stakes of natural gas development and 
oppositional relationships are often transformed into more than purely legal questions of 
operational conflicts. There are genuine concerns over public health, safety and the toll that 
fracking can take on the environment. There is also need to find employment for the 
unemployed and for governments to protect private property. More fundamentally, second order 
politics are debates about the role, powers and scope of democratic governments and the ability 
of policymakers to respond to citizens with effective and innovative programs that solve pressing 
public problems.    
The dissertation catalogs three disparate state expri nces and the municipal responses to 
those policies. It generates a number of benefits to bo h practitioners and academics. For 
practitioners the project offers a historical and descriptive account of natural gas politics in three 
states. Through a sample of municipal governments, a second benefit is an accounting of how 
municipalities are responding to increasing urban and suburban drilling. With each sample, I 
identify different policy responses, measure their fr quency and categorize them by type. 
Importantly, the sample is limited to those cities experiencing the most acute costs and benefits 
222 
of expanded urban drilling. When combined, the research reveals an in-depth account of second 
order relationships in three different states of a very specific policy area.  
The project’s final benefit is the building of second order federalism/devolution theory. 
This dissertation’s last question focuses on the introduction and testing of possible explanatory 
factors associated with strained or conflicted state-municipal relationships. My findings suggest 
that municipalities act in the context of both macro (environmentalism) and micro level factors 
(home ownership and property values) and frames, which may result because of prevailing state 
structures, degrees of municipal autonomy and second order institutional design. By tracing how 
natural gas intergovernmental relations have evolved over time and how multiple factors 
(greenness, turnout home ownership rates and home valu s) and institutions (court decisions, 
regulations and statutes) shape the state-municipal relationship, my conclusions suggest a more 
nuanced yet complete picture of two key political inst tutions. 
Future Directions 
 
State and municipal legislatures are dynamic institutions. They respond to a variety of 
frames, actors and arguments and each contributes to a unique and idiosyncratic set of second 
order politics. This comparison shows an association between a variety of factors and challenges 
to the states’ status quo. The study, however, has a number of weaknesses. It is notable that I do 
not address causality directly between these potential explanatory factors, municipal fracking or 
urban drilling policy and state institutional design. The nascent state of second order federalism 
and fracking policy research may in part explain ths shortcoming. Ostensibly, this is problematic 
but at the same time, it also suggests objectives for a variety of future projects. 
This project did not include a direct measure of risk. Risk, however, may underscore 
many of the associational relationships observed in Texas, Ohio and Colorado (Braiser, 
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McLaughlin, Rhubart, Stedman, Filteau, Jacquet 2013; Schafft, Borlu, Glenna 2013). With this 
in mind, a number of future projects are possible that can dig deeper into how municipalities 
respond and treat objective (number of wells) and subjective risks (unwanted proximity). How 
might time shape objective and subjective risk perceptions and second order actors? Future 
projects may center on elites (council members and city managers) and members of the public 
and how each form perceptions of risk relative to fracking. What filters do they apply when they 
receive information, and from whom or what institutions do they collect their information. What 
is seen as credible and trustworthy and what is dismissed? Other projects can link and evaluate 
measures of risk and trust in governing and non-governing agencies and institutions. Do differing 
levels of citizen’ trust shape second order relationships and/or expectations of citizens? Again, 
are there differences between municipal/state leaders and citizens when it comes to trusting their 
state/municipal counterparts?  
Future research should more clearly identify and explicate potential causal relationships. 
Future scholarship can accomplish this task in a variety of ways. Subsequent work might retest 
the typology presented here or scholars might develop new methodologies based on an 
alternative set of factors/criteria. Later work might also increase the number of cities considered 
and the number of states. Other work can dig deeper into state and municipal perceptions over 
their intergovernmental working relationships. Framing analyses may further explain how 
strategic activists behave in varying institutions with each often having complementary but 
sometimes competing goals. Both municipal and state legislatures frame natural gas development 
through combinations of environment, land-use, democracy, and economic development and 
property rights. It is likely that they adopt differing issues frames and use them strategically. 
Finally, researchers might also examine second order relationships relative to other natural 
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Appendix 1- Interview Questions 
 
1. How would you describe the overall state of state-municipal relations in your jurisdiction 
relative to fracking?  
 
2. How would you describe your interactions with municipal governments?  
a. What is a typical interaction like with appointed city officials? 
b. What is a typical interaction like with elected officials?  
 
3. Can you describe to me how the state’s policy governing fracking has played out at the 
municipal level? 
a. What have been the overall impacts to your state since the advent of hydraulic 
fracking in your area?  
b. From your perspective have municipal actors such as municipal officials or municipal 
businesses benefited from fracking? 
c. From your perspective have municipal actors such as municipal officials or municipal 
businesses been harmed from fracking? 
 
4. How would you describe a supportive/collaborative relationship with municipal 
governments?  
a. What is an example? 
i. Why is this relationship positive?  
ii.  What characteristics make this relationship positive? 
 
5. How would you describe an oppositional/conflictual relationship with municipal 
governments? 
a. What is an example? 
i. Why is this relationship negative?  
ii.  What characteristics make this relationship negative? 
 
6. Could you describe how you communicate with city officials with regard to hydraulic 
fracturing?  
a. How do you communicate with elected municipal officials?  
b. How do you communicate with city managers?  
 
7. To your knowledge, in what ways have municipal actors been involved in regulating and/or 
shaping the state’s policy towards hydraulic fracturing? 
 
8. Do municipal governments need more autonomy when it comes to regulating fracking?  
 
Post – Interview Questions 
Is there anything that I have not covered that you w ld like to discuss? 
Is there anyone else that you think I should contact and who would be willing to speak with me? 
